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I. THE REAL BORDERS 
When we think of borders as barriers to immigration, we picture the 
imaginary lines separating the United States from Canada and Mexico. 
Perhaps we think of physical signs such as fences or border patrol check-
points. But, there are other borders that have a much greater impact in de-
termining who we accept and who we keep out. Congress, by enacting 
substantive immigration law, defines our selective admission system. 
These laws erect legal borders that reflect the policy choices Congress has 
made about who may enter to work or to join family in the United States. 
But beyond this initial border, the agencies that implement the immigration 
laws have erected powerful process borders. These process borders, fos-
tered by congressional neglect and strengthened by a lack of coordination 
among the agencies, distort substantive immigration policy. Far too often, 
the bureaucratic process borders control who immigrates. Process in any 
legal system is important, 1 but it is of special concern in immigration law 
with its opacity, frequent lack of published decisions, and culture shaped by 
bureaucrats and non-lawyers.2 In many situations, immigration adjudica-
tion is almost completely insulated from political oversight and judicial re-
view.3 
I. Scholars such as Jerry Mashaw have amply demonstrated, an adequate analysis of 
administrative law process requires not only an examination of substantive legal provisions 
and the agency procedures, but an assessment of the larger context within which they oper-
ate. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 103 (1983) (stating different aspects which must be considered in analy-
sis); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 
65, 76-77 (1983) (providing discussion on rulemaking). 
2. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATNE PROCESS 24 (Greenwood Press 1974) 
(1938) (discussing role of administrative tribunals and importance of efficiency in adminis-
trative process); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN TiiE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 152-57 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (prepared for publication from 1958 tentative edition by 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey) (focusing on lawyers and courts to define 
fair adjudicatory policies). Lawyers are, of course, not the only people sensitive to the im-
portance of fair process, but in other adjudicative systems, where lawyers and legally trained 
judges dominate the operations, many essential process values are shared due to tradition, 
jurisprudence, and the emphasis on process in legal education. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, 
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF TiiE INDNIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13-25 
( 1980) (providing comparative discussion of process culture in other agencies). 
3. One reason behind this insulation is that while many areas of administrative law 
have low levels of judicial review, in immigration law, almost none of the decisions made 
by the Department of State are subject to judicial review. See James A.R. Nafziger, Review 
of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 {1991) {stating judicial re-
view of consular discretion is limited). Many other challenges have faced the judicially cre-
ated tradition of giving immigration statutes and decisions extraordinary deference as a re-
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In addition to these important concerns, immigration administration and 
adjudication should be examined for special reasons. First, the immigra-
tion laws are designed not merely as a system that conveys benefits for 
people permitted to enter and reside in the United States but, at the same 
time, the law defines by omission those excluded from legal immigration. 
In part, our "illegal immigration" problems result from the prospective im-
migrant's inability to understand and rely upon our legal immigration sys-
tem. 
Second, the immigration system affects millions of people, including 
those admitted each year in either permanent or temporary categories, those 
waiting because of quota backlogs, and, of course, those denied the right to 
immigrate.4 Moreover, the system affects members of existing communi-
ties as much, if not more, than those hoping to enter because almost every 
visa category involves an employer or family member acting as the non-
citizen' s sponsor.5 The adjudication of immigration eligibility is one of the 
flection of congressional and executive plenary power over immigration. For an overview 
of the plenary power doctrine, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 
545, 550-60 (1990) (providing overview of plenary power doctrine). See also Peter H. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1984) (noting 
U.S. Supreme Court has abstained from playing a significant role in immigration policy). 
Further, most people never seek judicial review of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) decisions, which concern business or family-based petitions. There are so 
many different ways to obtain immigration benefits, for many people, the most economic 
and productive strategy is to file in a different category or re-file the visa petition with addi-
tional supporting evidence. Many areas of administrative law are made visible by the active 
participation of special interest groups and the participation of political actors. In one sense, 
the group of people most affected by immigration law is unlike others impacted by admin-
istrative law for immigrants are not eligible to participate in our political process. See Ger-
ald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 15 MICH. L. 
REV. 1092, 1100 (1977) (commenting on how right to vote is not extended to aliens); see 
also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHJP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 571-93 (4th ed. 1998) (including a compilation of essays discussing alien suffrage 
and political participation). Of course, other groups interested in obtaining immigration for 
others or in limiting immigration may actively participate in the system, but these groups are 
necessarily one step removed from much of the actual operation of the law. See id. at 581 
(implying because native born citizens have the right to vote, they do not concern them-
selves with immigrant voting rights). 
4. Currently the United States admits less than one million immigrants each year 
while millions of others await agency adjudication of immigration related petitions. See in-
fra Figure 1, p. 215; see also INS., 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 14-18, 48 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 INS YEARBOOK] (document-
ing 660,477 individuals were granted legal permanent status in 1998); Immigrant Visa Pref-
erence Numbers for September 2001, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1301, 1335 (2001) (dem-
onstrating backlog and indicating which priority dates are current). 
5. Congressional offices routinely assign staff to handle constituent inquiries con-
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most important governmental acts touching an individual's life. American 
businesses expend substantial time and resources to secure work authoriza-
tion for prospective immigrants.6 The problems can be so complex and 
overwhelming that participants feel lost in a procedural maze. The result is 
a denial of a fundamental right: namely, to make an independent choice 
where to live, work, and travel.7 
Finally, when the administrative process frustrates the existing substan-
tive provisions, distrust in the law and the government grows.8 Inadequate 
reporting, inconsistent adjudication, prolonged delays, and bureaucratic 
morass foster indifference. These same problems lead policy analysts to 
extreme solutions, ranging from open borders to moratoria, or even a com-
plete ban on new immigration. 
While these bureaucratic process borders are pervasive throughout the 
system, they have increased and dominate the immigration categories re-
lated to employment.9 More important. the disparity between what appears 
ceming immigration matters, and many have full-time staff dedicated to this task. See Im-
migration Reorganization and Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2528 Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
87-90 (1999) (statement of Rep. Harold Rogers) (requesting congressional assistance for 
refonn, more effective enforcement, and improvements in INS services), available at 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/roge0729 .htm. 
6. These costs are difficult to quantify; they may include internal expenses for prepa-
ration of visa petitions, attorneys fees, and advertising costs. See infra note I 03 and accom-
panying text (estimating expenses). 
7. These are all essential components of human life, even if not yet rights fully pro-
tected by positive law. The focus of this Article is not to make a rights-based assessment of 
the duties the U.S. government owes to individuals. Some of the aspects of the process may 
be protected by treaty provisions, statutory mandates of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994) 
(defining immigrant status and detennining immigrant eligibility); Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 {1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth procedural safeguards). 
Rather than build legal arguments, however, this Article addresses policy planners and 
those responsible for implementing the law. Nevertheless, many of the problems docu-
mented here have and will give rise to litigation. See Jocelyn Y. Stewart, INS ls Sued Over 
Delays in Processing Applications, L.A. TlMEs, Aug. 29, 2000, at A3 (discussing class ac-
tion lawsuit filed by family members against INS for placing immigrants at risk of deporta-
tion by not processing their applications in a timely fashion). In rare cases, delay may even 
lead to special relief. See, e.g., Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995) (vacating or-
der denying suspension of deportation). 
8. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity 
Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 16 N.C. L. REv. 151, 161-62 (1997) (noting inco-
herence or complexity may increase taxpayer distrust and make it more likely for people to 
evade taxes). 
9. There are three main categories of legal immigration: family-based, employment-
based, and humanitarian relief. See generally infra Part II.A. 
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to be the substantive design and the actual operation of the law has grown 
exponentiaHy. In 1998, despite high demand, the government issued fewer 
than fifty-five percent of the authorized employment-based visas. In 1999, 
the figure fell to thirty-eight percent of authorized employment-based vi-
sas.10 With the explosion of new technology, business mobility, and in-
creased global trade, employment-based immigration has become an im-
portant part of many sectors of our economy .11 The immigration process is 
so replete with procedural obstacles that employers and would-be immi-
grants are unable to predict when or if their petitions will be approved. The 
10. See 1998 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 48 (providing data on numbers of immi-
grants admitted through employment petitions). In the FY 1998, only 77,476 employment-
based visas were issued out of the possible pool of 140,000. See id. In FY 1999 only 
61,936 visas of 160,898 were issued. In FY 2000, the percentage increased to seventy-eight 
percent or 111, 1065 of 142,299 authorized visas. See Interview with Charles Oppenheim, 
Chief Immigrant Visa Control and Reporting Division, Department of State (July 17, 2001); 
see also E-mail from Michael Hoefer, INS Statistics Division, to author (July 16, 2001) (on 
file with author) (confirming as of July, 2001, the agency had not yet released this data for 
FY s 1999 and 2000). The 1999 and 2000 numbers provided here do not include all INS 
controlled adjudications; rather, they include only those that require visa numbers from the 
Department of State. See infra Figure 1, p. 215 (illustrating gaps since 1992). The failure to 
issue the visas was primarily due to the government's inability to process the applications. 
See discussion infra Part II.C. In recent legislation, Congress authorized the reallocation of 
130,000 unused employment-based visas. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-
first Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 104, 114 Stat. 1251, 1252-53 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1184 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (setting forth provision to reallocate visas). This 
law also removes the per-country limit in instances where the overall applicant demand for 
employment-based visas is less than the numbers available without regard to those limits. 
This determination will be made quarterly, based on a comparison of the overall demand 
versus the available numbers. "If the total number of [employment-based) visas ... exceeds 
the number of qualified immigrants who may otherwise be issued such visas (during the 
same period], the visas made available under that paragraph shall be issued without regard 
to the numerical limitation ... during the remainder of the calendar quarter." INA 
§ 202(a)(S)A, 8 U.S.C. § l 152(a)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Immigrant Visa 
Preference Numbers for December 2000, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1625, 1648 (2000) 
(providing current priority dates for employment-based visa applications); see generally 
VISA BULL. (Dec. 2000), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin. As will 
be discussed below, this type of solution is, unfortunately, purely reactive and does not pre-
vent the process border distortions. 
11. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCil.., THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, 
AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 2-12 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997) 
(summarizing economic impacts of immigration); see also Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the House Educ. and the Wor/if(Jrce Comm., 106th Cong. 7-Jl Web. 17, 
2000) (statement of Dr. Richard W. Judy, Director Hudson Institute's Center for Workforce 
Development) (discussing worker dearth); Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the 
House Educ. and the Worliforce Comm., 106th Cong. 12-15 (Feb. 17, 2000) (statement of 
Dr. Henry J. Holzer, Urban Institute) (describing costs of worker shortages on employers 
and the economy). 
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uncertainty leaves businesses unable to plan efficiently and employees un-
able to change jobs. Worst of all, employees remain dependent, sometimes 
for years, on the sponsoring employer's good will throughout the immigra-
tion process. 
There are several sources of process obstacles. Under our current immi-
gration system, both family and employment-based categories face multi-
year processing delays. Three separate federal agencies may be involved in 
adjudicating one immigrant petition.12 These are the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of Labor and the Department 
of State. While the actual language of the Immigration Nationality Act 
(INA) delegates to the Attorney General, Secretary of Labor, or Secretary 
of State, the responsibility falls to three agencies.13 The INS is a division 
of the Department of Justice.14 The Department of Labor has assigned im-
migration adjudication to the Employment and Training Administration, 
Office of Workforce Security.15 The Department of State places central 
administrative authority in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, but the INA 
guarantees each consular officer abroad has independent adjudicative 
authority.16 These agencies are guided by their own internal rules and are 
12. It is hard to compare administrative agencies' structures, let alone how well they 
function. While this Article analyzes three agencies (the Department of Labor, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of State), another study systemati-
cally measured federal management performance of twenty agencies based on five criteria, 
with the goal of prompting them to manage better. See ALAN K. CAMPBELL Pus. AFFAIRS 
INST. OF SYRACUSE UNIV. MA.xWELL SCH. OF CmZENSHIP & Pus. AFFAIRS, FEDERAL GRADE 
REPoR.T 1999 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 GRADE REPoRT], available at 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/Federal/fedreportl 999.htm; See also Anne Laurent, 
Stacking Up: The Government Performance Project Rates Management at 15 Federal 
Agencies, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1999, at 13 (outlining and discussing Project in detail). 
The INS was given an overall grade of C-, while its high volume adjudication counterparts 
scored as follows: Social Security Administration, A; Veterans Health Administration, B; 
Internal Revenue Service, C. See id. at 14. 
13. See INA § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (describing 
labor certification requirements for immigrant workers and involvement of Secretary of La-
bor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General); INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) 
(stating aliens may be excluded for security reasons as determined by Attorney General); 
INA§ 237(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1994) (outlining Attorney General's power to imme-
diately deport aliens excluded from admission or entering in violation oflaw). 
14. See DOJ Organization of the Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 0.105 (2001) (de-
scribing powers and responsibilities of the Commission of INS within Department of Jus-
tice). . 
15. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, ' OFFICE OF WORKFORCE 
SEC., DMSION OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATION CHART, al 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/org.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
16. See INA § 104(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating con-
sular officers act independently in their duties and functions relating to granting or refusing 
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given little direction from Congress. The lack of clear standards, complex 
substantive and procedural rules, and redundancy in adjudication create 
process obstacles, so significant to U.S. immigration law, that in many 
cases the adjudication hurdles are more burdensome and restrictive than the 
substantive law itself. 
One of the roots of process obstacles is the ineffective structural delega-
tion of authority among the agencies involved in the immigration process. 
Multi-agency adjudication leads to redundant and unnecessarily fragmented 
decisions. Furthermore, there is a lack of coordination between the agen-
cies that creates problems when the requirements and policies of one con-
flict with those of another.'7 Jn turn, non-precedent agency decisions 
sometimes contradict one another, leading to conflicting adjudication of 
similar visa petitions. At times, these differences in interpreting the law 
could lead participants to forum shop among agencies with parallel respon-
sibilities in an effort to manipulate the adjudication process. 
Another significant contributor to process obstacles is the opacity of 
both the substantive and procedural requirements of immigration law. Im-
migration law creates multiple pathways to immigrant status. There are 
currently more than nine separate employment related categories, several of 
which contain subcategories, permitting a foreign worker to immigrate. 
However, due to the complexity of the law and process delays, an individ-
ual rarely takes a direct path to immigration. Instead, most non-citizens18 
first use some of the nineteen non-immigrant or temporary visa categories 
while completing the journey through the immigration process. 
Delay not only frustrates the purpose of the immigration law, but at 
times serves to negate it.19 Some delays spring from horrific bureaucratic 
of visas). There are other agencies, such as the Public Health Service, which sometimes 
play a subordinate role in immigration adjudication. See INA § 232, 8 U.S.C. § 1222(b) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing upon arrival, aliens are examined by officers of the Pub-
lic Health Service); see also INA§ 240(c)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(l)(b) (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999) (establishing upon a medical certification an alien has a particular disease, illness, 
or addiction, such alien will be found inadmissible). 
17. See infra Part 11.C.3 (discussing conflict between Department of Labor and INS 
requirements for the immigrant advanced degree category). 
18. I have adopted the term "non-citizen" to refer to people who are called "aliens" in 
the statutes and regulations. See INA§ l0l(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(3) (1994) (defining 
alien as a person "not a citizen or national of the United States."). At other times, I use the 
term "immigrant" to refer to people pursuing permanent residence in the United States to 
avoid the pejorative associations of the word "alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5) (defining the 
word "immigrant"); 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(20) (explaining the term "'lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence"'). 
19. One might argue, however, that the process problems and delay are intended, as a 
braking mechanism, to limit overall immigration. See infra Part III.B (discussing congres-
sional responsibility). 
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backlogs. For instance, Congress established employment-based immigra-
tion to immediately fill any position for which no qualified and willing 
U.S. worker could be found.20 However, it can take four years to complete 
the immigration process. Despite high demand, process obstacles caused 
fewer than sixty percent of the allocated employment-based immigrant vi-
sas to be actually issued.21 In other cases, particularly those that are age 
and relationship sensitive, process controls so completely that the immi-
grant loses eligibility altogether. For example, a child turning twenty-one 
years old before her family can complete the immigration process cannot 
immigrate with her parents until a much later time.22 
Thus, the statutory provisions, regulations, and implementing forms and 
instructions, as complex as they are, are only the map; they are a theoretical 
depiction of the route one might take to immigrate. In reality, a person 
wishing to determine her eligibility for immigration faces a gap between 
what is theoretically possible and the reality of the adjudication process. 
While a map shows the general distance between one place and another, it 
cannot show the difficulty an individual encounters along the journey, or 
whether the journey can be completed at all. The map is not the territory.23 
20. See INA § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating un-
skilled and skilled laborers are inadmissible unless there are not sufficient workers who are 
able, willing, and qualified to fill these positions). 
21. See infra Figure I, p. 215 (illustrating gap between authorized and issued visas). 
22. The parents can petition for their adult, unmarried child, but the current backlog in 
this category suggests a ten year wait before the family can be reunited. See INS Revoca-
tion of Approval of Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 205.l(a)(3)(i)(F) (2001) (stating if a child turns 
twenty-one prior to immigrating with family, the son or daughter cannot accompany them 
and family may file a petition on the son or daughter's behalf); Immigrant Visa Preference 
Numbers for September 200 I, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1301, 1335 (2001) (demonstrating 
backlog and indicating priority dates for unmarried son or daughters of permanent resi-
dents); see also INA § 203(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(a)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 
(qualifying only the spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters of pennanent resi-
dents for visa petitions). If the child marries during the waiting period, she may only be 
sponsored ifthe parents become U.S. citizens. See INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(a)(3) 
(disqualifying married son or daughters of permanent residents). The quota delay in the 
category for married children of citizens is also significant. As of August 2000, the appli-
cant could expect a wait of six years or more. See Immigrant Visa Preference Numbers for 
August 2000, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 937 (2000) (indicating Family-Based Third Prefer-
ence). 
23. See JONATHAN z. SMITII, MAP IS NOT TERRITORY: STIJDIES IN TIIE HISTORY OF 
RELIGIONS 289-309 (1978) (quoting ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS AND GENERAL SEMANTICS 750 (4th ed. 
1988) (using map as a metaphor)); see also SAM D. GILL, STORYTRACKING: TEXTS, STORIES, 
& HISTORIES IN CENTRAL AUSTRALIA 3 (1998) ("The academy exists because there is a 
gaping chasm between the reality of our world and our understanding ofit."). 
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These process borders have received little scholarly attention.24 Most 
immigration law analysis focuses on issues related to the first border: who 
should be allowed to immigrate, who should be barred, and what is the 
constitutional status of immigrants in various circumstances.25 When 
scholars do address particular procedural obstacles to the attainment of 
immigration goals, they seldom examine the intricacies of the bureaucratic 
system that erected the obstacles in the first place.26 When scholars ignore 
24. This may be partly due to the fact that these obstacles are more difficult to trace. 
They are rarely revealed by reading judicial opinions, or by parsing statutes and regulations. 
Moreover, as discussed in Part III, infra, the agencies involved make study difficult by fail-
ing to gather, publish, or otherwise allow access to data concerning much of their work. 
The study of informal adjudication is inherently difficult, but the particular lack of transpar-
ency in the immigration adjudication process compounds the problems. 
Despite the lapse of thirty years since Kenneth Culp Davis called upon law scholars to 
pay more attention to decisionmaking role of administrative officials, this work has largely 
been left to political scientists, sociologists, and historians. See KENNEm CULP DA VIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY vii (1969) (discussing law and decision-
making role of administrative officials). See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, 
Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAW 
& Soc. INQUIRY l, 34-35 (2000) (examining decisionmaking by border officers enforcing 
one aspect of Chinese exclusion laws and providing insights of continuing relevance); Ste-
ven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
Cou.JM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing theoretical examination of administrative process). 
25. The scholarship about immigration policy is growing in many disciplines. See, 
e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND TiiE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY 86-90 (1999) {examining immigration from an economic angle); see generally 
SASK.IA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION {1996) 
{discussing immigration from a sociological point of view); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, 
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998) (dis-
cussing how immigrants have shaped American life and law). 
26. There are some notable exceptions of articles that examine specific aspects of im-
migration process. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A "White Pa-
per," 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1997) (proposing alternatives and improvements to INS 
detention policy); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation For Detained Ali-
ens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1655 (1997) (discussing 
lack of legal representation for immigrants). There were several studies sponsored by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). See, e.g., Diver, supra note 1; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Acfjudication: A Study of 
the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297, 1301 (1986) (developing criteria for se-
lecting the proper administrative and judicial forums in which to review agency adjudica-
tion); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Acfjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohe-
mia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247 (1990) (examini.ng asylum decisions and providing 
recommendations); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-ofStatus Adjudication: A Case Study 
of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1974) (discussing standards to apply 
in deciding whether to grant procedural protections to immigrants); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study 
of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984) (analyzing due process in immi-
gration functions performed by INS and Department of Justice); see also LINDA ZENGERLE, 
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or gloss over the process, they render irrelevant much of their otherwise 
thoughtful analysis of substantive immigration law and proposals for re-
form. In reality, these process borders, control or distort the substantive 
policy.27 
Unfortunately, governmental studies are almost always flawed because 
the studies focus on a single agency.28 While serious critique of each 
agency's operations is necessary, the failure to adequately address the in-
teraction of the agencies' procedures reinforces the existing process borders 
between the agencies. Reforms or process problems in one agency dra-
matically affect the operations of the others. More importantly, the experi-
ence of moving through the immigration process is made more chaotic by a 
lack of coordination and control of the entire process. 
I contend the sources of the process borders must be studied and under-
stood so that the borders can be dismantled. This Article begins that study 
and recommends several changes critical to fundamental procedural 
change. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the signifi-
cance of process to the administration of immigration law and introduces 
the sources of the bureaucratic borders. Part II maps the categories of legal 
immigration and uses a detailed narrative to describe the interaction of the 
three agencies that control immigration. The narrative also reveals the 
strategies representative participants-an employer and an immigrant-
must use to successfully navigate across the process borders. This 
narrative demonstrates many of the systemic process failures. Part III 
identifies three process values: integrity, efficiency, and transparency and 
illustrates how several key sources of bureaucratic borders, independently 
and in concert, diminish these qualities in immigration adjudication. Part 
N uses the focus on administrative process to evaluate several radical 
proposals for reform and proposes pragmatic incremental changes aimed at 
ACUS, LABOR CERTIFICATION OF IMMIGRANT ALIENS, ACUS REP. No. 73-2 (1973). Con-
gress did not renew the funding of the Administrative Conference in 1995. See Symposium, 
Administrative Conference of the United States "ACUS," 30 ARJZ. ST. L.J. 19-162 (1998) 
(providing a history and evaluation of ACUS). 
27. In order to focus on what I call process borders, I have chosen to take the law's 
substantive provisions at face value (i.e., as intending what they purport to do). Some may 
view this approach as naive or otherwise flawed, theorizing that process is inseparable from 
substance, and the attempt to separate them nonsensical. Since substantive immigration law 
is the outcome of political compromise, one cannot improve the process without addressing 
the politics, which produced the substantive provisions in the first place. 
28. See, e.g., GAO, REP. GA0-01-488, IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: SEVERAL FACTORS 
IMPEDE TIMELINESS OF APPLICATION PROCESSING (May 2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT); 
OFFICE OF AUDIT U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S FOREIGN LABOR 
CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN AND NEEDS TO BE FIXED, REP. No. 06-
96-002-03-321 (May 22, 1996) (assessing Department of Labor's labor certification and la-
bor condition application programs). 
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reducing and breaking down the process borders. 
II. THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION PROCESS: MAP AND TERRITORY 
A. Mapping Eligibility 
No person simply immigrates to the United States. Only those who fit 
into a specific statutory category qualify for permanent residence. The 
1952 adoption of the INA29 divided immigration into three general catego-
ries. One is intended to reunite families,30 another allows limited immigra-
tion based on employment relationships,31 and a third gives specific kinds 
of humanitarian relief such as registry32 or political asylum.33 The statutory 
scheme maps who may immigrate, laying out only the broad substantive 
and procedural contours. 
Qualifying in any particular visa category is only part of the path, for 
Congress has rationed and apportioned visas under strict quotas. One 
group, immediate relatives,34 is exempt from a precise quota limitation. 
Furthermore, family and employment-based visas are divided among a se-
ries of preferences or priorities. 35 Since 1992, when the current preferences 
began operating, immigration in the family and employment based catego-
ries combined has ranged between approximately 661,000 and 952,000.36 
29. See INA 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994). 
30. See INA § 202(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating immediate relatives are 
aliens not subject to direct numerical limitations). 
31. See INA§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b) (establishing preference allocation of immigrant 
visas for employee-based immigrants). 
32. See INA§ 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (setting forth provisions oflegalization registry). 
33. See INA§ 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (establishing asylum provisions). 
34. See INA§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (describing family based immigrants). The statu-
tory definition of "immediate relative" is narrow. It includes only the spouse, minor chil-
dren, and parents of U.S. citizens. See INA § 202(a)(l)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 15l(b)(2)(A)(i) 
(1994) (excluding immediate relatives of U.S. citizens from immigrant visa limitations). 
35. See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (allocating a minimum of 226,000 family-
sponsored immigrant visas). The greater the number of immediate relatives, the lower the 
quota number permitted in the family-based category. Family-based immigrant quotas can 
expand to a high of 480,000 per year. See INA§ 201(c), 8 U.S.C. § I 15l(c) (establishing 
worldwide level of family-sponsored immigrants); see also id. § ll5l(d) (authorizing 
140,000 employment-based immigrants). In addition to quotas for the total number of im-
migrants, until 2001, the law strictly limited immigration from any individual country to 
seven percent of the total number of visas issued to avoid domination of any category by 
nationals from a single country. In late 2000, Congress authorized an exemption from the 
per country ceiling cap in any year in which all of the 140,000 employment-based visas 
have not been issued. The significance of this exception is discussed in Part 11.C.3. 
36. Total legal immigration, as indicated in Figure I, is larger due to other miscellane-
ous categories of immigration such as refugees, the 1986 legalization program, and the di-
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Figure 1: Totals of Annual Immigration 
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The preference categories and quota allocations can be briefly summa-
rized as a hierarchy where the "best and brightest" are given priority over 
other immigrants and are frequently exempted from onerous requirements. 
The first employment-based preference includes people of extraordinary 
ability, outstanding academics and researchers, and multinational execu-
tives and managers.37 The second preference contains persons with excep-
tional abilities or advanced degrees and normally requires a labor certifica-
tion unless the employment of the non-citizen can be of demonstrated 
benefit to the national interest.38 The third preference is for all other pro-
fessionals and skilled workers who successfully obtain the labor certifica-
tion and contains a limited subcategory, only 10,000 visas, of low-skilled 
workers who have a labor certificate.39 The fourth preference is reserved 
for certain special immigrants and religious workers and is generally ex-
empt from any labor market test.40 The fifth preference is available to in-
vestors with the ability to commit $500,000 to $1 million in businesses 
versity lottery. The INS has reported immigration data for FY s 1988 through 1998, but as 
of July 2000 has not released full data on FYs 1999 and 2000. See 1998 INS YEARBOOK, 
supra note 4, at 17 (providing a table from 1988 through 1998 breaking down the number of 
immigrants by category). 
37. See INA § 203(b}, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(I) (noting preference allocation for em-
ployment-based immigrants). 
38. See id . . § I 153(b)(2) (describing skilled workers as having exceptional ability in 
science, arts, or business). 
39. See id. § I 153(b)(3)(B); see also Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American 
Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255 (Supp. V 1999)) (allocating 5,000 of these 10,000 visas temporarily for use in spe-
cial relief programs for Central Americans). 
40. See INA § 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b)(4) (establishing availability of visas to 
qualified special immigrants who have extraordinary ability with arts, sciences, education, 
or athletics). 
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generating at least ten new positions.41 
F" 2 I tV" All f 12ure . mm1uan 1sa oca ion . 
Visa Category Description of Criteria Limitation 
Immediate Spouse, minor children, and There is no quota limit on this 
Relatives parents of U.S. citizens category. There is no labor 
certification (NLC) required. 
Family First Adult Unmarried Sons and 23,400 plus any numbers not re-
Preference Daughters of Citizens; (NLC) quired for fourth preference 
Family Second Spouses and Children, and 114,200, plus the number (if any) 
Preference Unmarried Sons and Daugh- by which the worldwide family 
ters of Permanent Residents; preference level exceeds 226,000, 
(NLC) and any unused first preference 
numbers 
Family Third Married Sons and Daughters 23,400, plus any numbers not re-
Preference of Citizens; (NLC) quired by first and second 
preferences 
Family Fourth Brothers and Sisters of Adult 65,000, plus any numbers not re-
Preference Citizens; (NLC) quired by first three preferences 
The total number of immediate Total: 226,000 floor 
relatives varies the family 480,000 ceiling 
preference limits 
Employment Priority Workers: (NLC) 28.6% of the worldwide level, 
First a) extraordinary ability in the plus any numbers not required for 
Preference arts, sciences, or business fourth and fifth preferences 
b) outstanding researchers and [minimum 40,040] 
professors 
c) multinational executives and 
managers 
Employment Advance Degree Professionals 28.6% of the worldwide level, 
Second or plus any numbers not required by 
Preference Exceptional Ability in the Arts first preference [minimum 40,040] 
and Sciences 
Labor Certification Required 
or National Interest Waiver 
41. See id.§ I 153(b)(5)(A)(ii-iii), (C)(i-ii) (stating eligibility of visas for new commer-
cial enterprises); see also Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § l 16(a)(2), 111 Stat. 
2467 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1999)) (ending pilot program on Sep-
tember 30, 2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 610, 106 Stat. 1874 (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § l 153 (Supp. V 1999)); S. REP. No. 102-918 (1992) (creating pilot investment 
program authorizing special investments of$300,000). 
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:::_isa Category Description of Criteria Limitation 
Employment Skilled Workers, Profession- 28.6% of the worldwide level, 
Third als, and Other Workers plus any numbers not required by 
Preference Labor Certification Required first and second preferences, 
or Schedule A Waiver [minimum 40,040] not more than 
5,000 of the 10,000 for other 10,000 of which to "Other 
workers have been temporarily Workers." 
allocated to other immigrants 
due to special relieflegislation. 
Employment Religious Workers and Certain 7.1% of the worldwide level 
Fourth Special Immigrants; {NLC) [minimum 9,940] 
Preference 
Employment Employment Creation; {NLC) 7 .1 % of the worldwide level, 
Fifth Millionaire Investors [minimum 9, 940] 
Preference not less than 3,000 of the total 
are reserved for investors in a 
targeted rural or 
high-unemployment area, and 
3,000 set aside for investors in 
regional centers 
Total: 140,000 min. spill down 
from family preferences can 
Increase this number 
Diversity Lottery for low-admission 55,000 [This category was tempo-
countries. Applicants must rarily reduced by 5,000 due to 
have the equivalent of a U.S. special relief for Central 
degree or two years of work Americans.] 
experience; {NLC). 
The existence of the quota limits and preferences makes identifying the 
appropriate category for a potential immigrant only part of reading the 
map. The quota limitations and per country restrictions add a layer of 
complexity that makes some categories undesirable if not illusory. For ex-
ample, the lNA contains a category authorizing the immigration of brothers 
and sisters of adult U.S. citizens. The statute authorizes 65,000 people in 
this category each year .42 My current estimate of a date of visa availability 
in this category is close to fifteen years. For people from the Philippines 
the wait may exceed twenty-five years.43 
Calculating when an individual is eligible to immigrate under the sub-
stantive law is like looking at a map depicting an island only several miles 
42. See INA § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(4) (indicating qualified immigrant sib-
lings must be at least twenty-one years old). 
43. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing difficulty in predicting visa quota movement and 
how no one can predict exact processing times, while estimates here are based on watching 
the movement of visa categories over several years). 
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out to sea. What you cannot see is that ferry service to the island is very 
limited. The ferry may be slowed further depending upon the tides, cur-
rent, and number of people on board. Unless you are willing to wait, you 
simply cannot get there from here. 
Individuals examining the immigration map usually evaluate both the 
family-based and employment-based options. If the delay in the brother 
and sister category means a fifteen year wait, the family and the immigrant 
will naturally seek a more expeditious route. Other people simply lack the 
qualifying family relationship and immediately tum to the employment-
based categories. This Article focuses on employment-related immigra-
tion, but similar or more egregious problems plague the family-based im-
migration cases. 
B. Three Stops on Map to Employment-Based Immigration 
To immigrate in the employment-based categories, an individual must 
first secure permission from each of the three separate "sovereigns" 
guarding the territory.44 Congress authorized three federal agencies, the 
INS, the Department of Labor, and the Department of State, to administer 
the immigration system.45 Travelers through this territory find that at times 
more than one agency controls the jurisdiction, and thus can limit their 
ability to progress to the next stop on the journey. Congress's selection of 
particular agencies reflects some of the complex po1icy goals of the INA. 
The Department of Labor protects U.S. labor and provides expertise on la-
bor conditions.46 The Department of State operates as a pre-screener of 
immigrants before they reach our shores and also aids in the identification 
of undesirable aliens based on the consular officer's understanding of the 
44. See infra Part II.C (discussing national interest waiver of labor certification and 
how the INA exempts a few categories from Department of Labor review). 
45. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (dividing agency action into rule 
making and adjudication, but contemplating some adjudication can be conducted less for-
mally with no statutory requirements for personal appearances or hearings). Much of the 
adjudication examined in this Article is informal adjudication. The term "informal adjudi-
cation" describes such informal procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (describing rulemaking 
process where interested persons participate in rulemaking). Almost all of the adjudications 
discussed in this Article are made by agency officials reviewing forms and supporting writ-
ten materials without any direct interaction with the applicant. See also Paul R. V erkuil, A 
Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. R..Ev. 739, 739 n.1 (1976) (defin-
ing "informal adjudication[s]" as "administrative decisions that are not governed by statu-
tory procedures, but which nevertheless affect an individual's rights .... "). 
46. See INA§ 212(a)(I4), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(5)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (grant-
ing Secretary of Labor authority to exclude unskilled and skilled laborers from entering the 
United States). 
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foreign country conditions.47 The INS identifies aliens entitJed to immi-
gration benefits and removes those persons not authorized to reside in the 
United States.48 
The first stop requires a test of the labor market. Unless specifically ex-
empted, such as the family-based categories, all immigrants, or, more spe-
cifically, their employers, must prove to the Department of Labor49 that 
their employment will not harm U.S. working conditions or wages and, 
more dramatically, will not displace U.S. workers.50 This first stop on the 
journey, the labor certification requirement, is often the most significant 
hurdle to employment-based immigration. 
After the labor certification is obtained, the employer must file an immi-
grant petition with the INS seeking classification in one of the five basic 
employment preferences.51 This is the second stop toward employment-
based immigration. Qualification in a higher preference can be important 
when worldwide demand indicates the quota or per country limitations 
might be reached. The preference classification can mean the difference 
between immediate qualification for immigration or a potential wait of 
many years.52 
Finally, the third stop requires the immigrant to prove that she is eligible 
4 7. See INA § 212, 8 U .S.C. § 1182 (listing grounds of inadmissibility). 
48. See generally INA, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of8 U.S.C.) (defining existing immigration law as to admissibility and exclusion of 
aliens); INS, INS MISSION, STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE, at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/ 
aboutins/insmission/index.htm (explaining INS's mission to administer immigration laws 
involves variety of inter-related functions) (last modified Nov. 13, 200 l ). 
49. Within the Department of Labor, the labor certification program has been assigned 
to the Employment and Training Administration. Unless otherwise specified, the use of the 
name Department of Labor refers to the Employment and Training Administration and its 
reorgani:zation. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKFORCE 
SECURITY, at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2002) (noting in 
Spring of 2000, the Secretary of Labor created a new division, the Office of Workforce Se-
curity, which has taken over management of labor certification program and other certifica-
tions required under the INA). 
50. See INA § 212(a)(l4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(i)(II) (excluding employment of ali-
ens who will adversely affect U.S. workers similarly employed); see also Bulk Farms, Inc. 
v. Martin, 963 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding as law developed in this area, labor certi-
fication could not be obtained for self-employment because Department of Labor required a 
bona fide test of labor market); Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding 
labor certification is appropriate only where the employer is not a sham corporation and is 
separable from non-citi:c:en employee seeking a particular position). 
51. See INA§ 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1994) (stating if employer believes non-citizen 
qualifies for an exemption from a certification requirement, employer bypasses Department 
of Labor procedures and applies directly to INS for immigrant preference classification). 
52. See infra Part 11.C (discussing how erratic visa movement of recent years makes it 
impossible to predict length of waiting period and it effects processing delays). 
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to immigrate and not subject to any qualitative ground of inadmissibility 
such as contagious disease, visa fraud or immigration violations, criminal 
conduct, etc. 53 The third stop can take place at a U.S. consulate overseas or 
at the INS through a procedure called "adjustment of status."54 Thus, an 
individual immigrant may choose between the overseas immigrant proc-
essing or, if eligible, to complete the transition within the United States 
through the adjustment of status process. 
C. Navigating Through the Territory 
Immigrating to the United States is much more than simply mapping the 
routes of eligibility and diagramming the three stops at the federal agen-
cies. Just as a two-dimensional map does not reveal the physical qualities 
of the territory it depicts, it also fails to reflect the experience of the person 
making the journey. In immigration law, process obstacles are the most 
significant contributor to the huge differences between the design of the 
map and the experience of journeying through the territory.55 The reality of 
the process is far different from the idealized map. Although the immigra-
tion law authorizes at least 140,000 employment-based immigrants per 
year, in most years, far fewer visas were actuaJly issued. 56 
What explains the gap between visas authorized and visas granted? The 
major contributors are the process obstacles blocking the way of legitimate 
53. See INA§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (listing grounds for inadmissibility). 
54. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting classes of aliens 
who are ineligible to receive visas and are excluded from admission). The adjustment of 
status procedure is not automatic and the criteria for eligibility to use the procedure are quite 
complex. Basically, the procedure is usually restricted to immigrants who have not violated 
their non-immigrant status and who have entered the United States lawfully, but many ex-
ceptions and additional limitations apply. Moreover, the INS retains the authority to deny 
an adjustment in an exercise of discretion. See generally INA§ 245{a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a{a) 
(1994) {describing visa processing for those abroad). There is no administrative appeal of 
this denial; however; some individuals renew the application to adjust in removal proceed-
ings and others reapply through the immigrant visa processing abroad. 
55. It is possible that Congress or the implementing agencies made the "design" inten-
tionally flawed and perhaps covertly meant to create the discussed process obstacles'. I rec-
ognize that some interested parties would not want to take steps to remedy the process ob-
stacles if the result was greater immigration. However, I assume Congress intended the 
system to at least preserve the number of visas authorized under our quota system, since in-
creased immigration in this context could not exceed the authorized amount. In the fall of 
2000, Congress passed legislation !1-Uthorizing the recapture of the unused employment-
based visas, which is more evidence of the thwarted policy. See infra Part 11.A-C (assuming 
immigration law obstacles are unintended consequences of failure to pay adequate attention 
to problem causing sources). 
56. See supra Figure 1, p. 215 (discussing gap between issued and authorized employ-
ment-based immigrant visas). 
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foreign workers seeking to immigrate to the United States. The failure of 
the agencies involved to adjudicate visa petitions and to complete the im-
migration applications of individuals with approved petitions in a timely 
fashion burdens the whole system.57 The unused visas illustrate how proc-
ess failures distort policy choices Congress made in adopting the INA.58 
To illustrate these territorial conditions and the factors contributing to 
the gaps, I will present a hypothetical exploring how I, as an immigration 
lawyer, might evaluate the route in a consultation with an employer and a 
potential immigrant.59 I have intentionally selected the example of a "high 
tech" employer seeking to hire an engineer from China with a masters de-
gree in computer software engineering. Not only does this scenario repre-
57. Interviews with Stephen Fischel, Department of State Visa Office, over 1999, 
2000, and 200 I. Frequently the Department of State Visa Bulletin reports the availability of 
visas is impossible to predict because of the slowdown in INS processing. It is my conten-
tion that all three agencies contribute to the gap. 
58. In one sense the employment-based visas were not missing, thus requiring the State 
Department to reallocate these visas in the next fiscal year to the family-based immigrants. 
See INA§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). However, in some years, the visas 
were not recaptured because the amount of allowable family-based visas is limited. See id. 
§ l 153(a)(2) (guaranteeing only minimum of 226,000 family-based visas). For example, in 
1998, the employment-based visas were not recaptured because the 226,000 minimum was 
the default rule. Therefore, it is inaccurate to say all unused employment-based visas are 
added to family-based quota limits in the following year. 
59. Before I became a full time law professor, I was a partner in the international law 
firm of Bryan Cave. I represented business and individual clients in immigration matters for 
over ten years. I have also based my advice on the comments and suggestions of several 
current practicing lawyers: Stephen Yale-Loehr, Veronica Jeffers, Frances Berger, Alicia 
DiBacco, and Luiza Muniz. 
The narrative addresses a situation in which the client(s) are represented, resources are 
available to pursue the process, and the participants are comparatively sophisticated. This 
may be true with some frequency in the context of business immigration, but in other cate-
gories the large majority of those filing are unrepresented. Significant numbers of unso-
phisticated participants only increase the costs-particularly the social costs to the would-be 
immigrant and her family-but also increase the irrationality and opacity of the system. In 
those situations, the lengthy processing delays, the overall lack of predictability, and the im-
pact of the adjudication to the individual or small business is even more important. 
There are no hard statistics about the number of people who are unrepresented. I re-
quested data from the business adjudications section of the INS. I suspected the agency had 
this data because an attorney must file a notice of appearance (Form G-28) with each visa 
petition or application. My request went unanswered. Cf. Taylor, supra note 26, at 1665 
n.60 (fmding little statistical documentation estimating number of attorneys appearing in 
deportation and exclusion proceedings, and indicating best evidence suggested attorneys 
represented less than twenty percent of all people appearing before the immigration court).· 
One person I interviewed recalls the Regional Director of an INS Service Center reported 
that less than twenty percent of all petitions and applications received at the Service Center 
were represented by attorneys. 
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sent one of the most common categories of immigrant, it should also repre-
sent a fairly non-controversial example. Even those calling for drastic re-
ductions in immigration to the United States usually exempt foreign work-
ers with strong academic credentials.60 Moreover, this scenario does not 
present any of the complications, such as self-employment or nontradi-
tional education, which typically frustrate an expeditious route to employ-
ment based immigration. Congress meant to facilitate the entry of people 
like this engineer. By examining this hypothetical we can see whether the 
immigration law is working as it was designed. 
"Computer Software Inc" (CSI),61 a large corporation located in North-
ern California, is a leading designer of software for business applications. 
The company has more than five hundred employees, is publicly traded, 
and has been in business for more than ten years. Last year, CSI recruited 
at the major engineering schools in the United States. It interviewed candi-
dates with master's degrees and offered a position to a top student from Cal 
Tech, Mae Cheng. She is a national of the People's Republic of China.62 
She will complete her master's degree in electrical engineering in June and 
wishes to immediately begin her employment with CSI. CSI selected Ms. 
Cheng both because of her strong academic performance, and because she 
worked on a pioneering programming language. This language will likely 
become one of the linchpins to a new line of software products developed 
byCSI. 
Ms. Cheng is legally in the United States on an F-1 student visa.63 Her 
60. See, e.g., BORJAS, supra note 25 (recommending restricting immigration to highly 
skilled employees); Rep. Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking 
the Right Reasons, 28 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 883 (1997) (recommending reduction of employ-
ment-based immigration and elimination of unskilled categories). See generally 
DEMETRIOUS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LoEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS: 
RETHINKING U.S. SELECTION OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS 144-64 (1996) (recommending elimi-
nation of"other worker" employment-based category having less than two years experience 
in job field). · 
61. This is a fictional corporation, but closely resembles any number of major employ-
ers who regularly use the employment-based immigration system. Some of the high-tech 
firms who have testified to Congress about their need for foreign labor include: Microsoft, 
Sun Microsystems, Intel, and Cisco Systems. See, e.g., Statement of Heidi Wilson, Corpo-
rate Immigration Manager, Sun Microsystems, Congressional Field Hearing on the INS 
(Feb. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Congressional Field Hearing] (discussing business processing 
concerns with INS), available at http://www.shusterman.com/wilson.htrnl. 
62. Mae Cheng is a fictional person, however, she represents one of the 12,337 Asians 
who immigrated in the employment-based second preference category in FY 1997. See U.S. 
INS, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 35 
(1999) (hereinafter 1997 INS YEARBOOK] (indicating number of immigrants admitted by 
region of birth and type and class of admission in FY 1997). 
63. All of the non-immigrant visa categories are known by an alphabetical shorthand 
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non-immigrant visa status is typical of millions of other foreign persons 
within the United States. In 1999, there were approximately 514,723 for-
eign students studying in the United States.64 Student visa status allows 
full-time students to work following graduation to gain "practical training," 
usually a period of twelve months.65 Provided Ms. Cheng meets all of the 
regulatory criteria, she should be able to receive permission from the INS 
to work for twelve months following her graduation. At the time of her 
interview with CSI, the company recruiter asked her if she was authorized 
to work in the United States on a permanent basis.66 Ms. Cheng explained 
she would have a period of practical training, but to continue her employ-
ment in the United States, CSI would have to sponsor her for a "green 
card.''67 
1. First Stop-The Labor Certification Process 
CSI has hired other foreign nationals and has a sophisticated Human Re-
source coordinator, Margaret Jones,68 who is very experienced in immigra-
tion law. Although the Human Resources Department and in-house coun-
sel supervise routine matters and often prepare visa petitions, it is company 
policy to consult with outside immigration counsel to develop the strategy 
which refers to the subsection of the INA which defines the non-immigrant category. See 
INA § 101(a)(l5)(F), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(15)(F) (1994) (creating visa for study in United 
States provided student maintains a permanent residence abroad). 
64. See NAFSA: Ass'N OF INT'L EDUC., IMPORTANT DATA ON INTERNATIONAL 
EDUCATION EXCHANGE To AND FROM 1llE UNITED STATES (2000), at http:/f 
www .nafsa.org/contentJPublicPolicy/DataonlntemationalEducation/FactSheet.htm (detailing 
numerous statistics concerning international students in the United States). 
65. See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(t)(10) (2001) (setting forth com-
plex regulations defining eligibility and length of practical training); see also supra Part 
IV.B.4 (discussing significant amount of attention Congress has devoted to this visa cate-
gory which has, at times, been a focus of intense INS scrutiny). 
66. It would be a potential violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to ask if 
Ms. Cheng is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(b )(a) (1994) (forbidding employers from discriminating against other classes of non-
citizens authorized to remain in the United States such as refugees and asylees). Sophisti-
cated employers have formulated the question as permanent work authorization to identify 
candidates who are foreign students. This formulation is not necessarily appropriate for all 
companies and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has said that a 
pattern of refusing employment to nationals of a specific country, even if they are not 
authorized to work within the United States, may constitute national origin discrimination, 
whic~ is also prohibited by Title VII. 
67. "Green card" is a slang term for status as a lawful permanent resident The actual 
card is no longer green. See Form I-551. 
68. Margaret Jones is also a fictional character. She represents many sophisticated us-
ers of the immigration system. She is named after Margie Jones, an immigration specialist 
at Intel Corporation and one of the people interviewed for this Article. 
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in each new case. 
a. Initial Strategy-Utilizing Non-immigrant and Immigrant Visas 
CSI can sponsor Ms. Cheng for an immigrant visa, but only after the 
Department of Labor certifies that CSI successfully established the lack of 
available and qualified U.S. workers. Ms. Cheng's period of practical 
training, based on her former student status, would most likely be ex-
hausted before the completion of the immigration procedures. It is because 
of this delay that the best course of action is to obtain an H-1 B visa. 
The H-lB is a temporary visa status reserved for persons working in 
specialty occupations. These are professions that normally require no less 
than a baccalaureate degree in a field related to the occupation. The H-lB 
status enables Ms. Cheng to work for the company for an initial period of 
three to six years.69 Although the mutual goal of employer and employee is 
to obtain permanent residence in the United States for Ms. Cheng, unless 
CSI is willing to wait several years to hire Ms. Cheng, she will need a more 
flexible temporary status giving her work authorization while the immigra-
tion process continues. 
The H-lB work authorization will allow her to work for CSI while the 
permanent process is on-going. While in H-IB status, however, Ms. Cheng 
is dependent upon CSI for work authorization and legal status. If she dis-
continues working for CSI, even if she does not accept other employment, 
her status is terminated. Furthermore, it is possible that the permanent 
residence application process would not be complete before the six years of 
H-lB status expires. At such time, Ms. Cheng may be forced to take a 
leave of absence or relocate to a CSI office abroad. Any continuation of 
employment without authorization could have serious consequences for 
69. See INA§ 214(g)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (limiting H-IB 
workers to six consecutive years). Usually, a sophisticated foreign student will then ask 
why give up the time granted on her practical training and wonder why the attorney is rec-
ommending an immediate H-IB petition. Since 1997, immigration attorneys have routinely 
recommended filing the H-IB as early as the regulations allow because the H-IB category 
has been oversubscribed. The H- IB change of status may be filed while the noncitizen is 
still a student or during practical training. By late spring of each year, there are no new pe-
titions until the fiscal year begins anew on October l. See INA§ 214(g)(IXA)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ I 184(g)(l)(A)(i) (restricting H-IB category to 65,000 new positions in 1999); American 
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. l 182(a) (Supp. V 1999)) (expanding this limit temporarily in 
1998 to 115,000). To ensure that an H-lB will be available, foreign students have often had 
to forgo some of the time allocated pursuant to practical training to ensure H-1 B status. See 
Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Prances Berger, New York, 
New York (Aug. 15, 2000). 
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both her and CSI. 70 
This strategy of developing a parallel path to keep the individual in tem-
porary or non-immigrant status while pursuing the immigrant petition is es-
sential to journeying through this territory. Participants in the system natu-
rally seek ways to minimize delays, cost, and uncertainty. The frustrations 
of the permanent system have led to widespread reliance on non-immigrant 
visas as a method of bringing and retaining foreign workers in the United 
States. 
The adjudicating agencies are unhappy with the dual-track strategy, be-
lieving it borders on fraud.71 Some agency procedures specifically require 
that a non-immigrant visa petitioner disclose if they are simultaneously 
pursuing an immigrant visa. The substantive requirements are silent on this 
process.72 The adjudicating agencies, however, view such a filing as incon-
sistent with the required temporary intent when the applicant has previ-
ously filed an immigrant petition. 
The consequences of the dual strategy are increased work for the agen-
cies adjudicating the non-immigrant petitions and a distortion of the em-
ployer/employee relationship. Almost all of the non-immigrant work cate-
gories require the employer to sponsor the foreign worker. Thus, as we see 
in the above example, the worker becomes dependent on the sponsoring 
70. See INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (containing exclusions from immi-
grating if individual has remained unlawfully in the United States). A person who accrued 
less than a year but more than 180 days of "unlawful presence" can be banned for three 
years and unlawful presence over one year can result in a ten year bar. These bars are only 
triggered if an individual departs the United States and seeks to reenter. Unfortunately, al-
though these bars were enacted in 1996, the INS has yet to issue regulations defining "un-
lawful presence." See also INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § l324a(a) (1994) (making employers 
subject to civil and even criminal penalties for continuing to employ an individual who is no 
longer authorized to work in the United States). 
71. Several officials told me they believed the statutory exemption from maintaining 
temporary intent was a mistake and inappropriately blurred the line between immigrant and 
nonimmigrant status. In interviews, many government officials referred to the dual intent as 
"fraud." See generally David Lazarus, A Question of Fraud: Silicon Valley Pushes for More 
Foreign Workers Despite Federal Probes, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 2000, at Al (discussing 
agency concerns about fraud in non-immigrant eligibility). 
72. See, e.g., INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2001) (stating employ-
ers using H-1 B petitions do not have to show they have a temporary need for the worker 
unlike other non-immigrant categories where the employer bears the burden of establishing 
need for foreign worker is not long term). Further, the INA specifically recognizes that non-
immigrants in this category and the intra-company transferees categories (L-1) may have 
dual intent-the intent to pursue permanent resident and non-immigrant status simultane-
ously. See also INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 184(b) (declaring guidelines for admission of 
non-immigrants, including presumption of status); 2 CHARLES GoRDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 20.06[3] (2001) (discussing "dual intent" principle for aliens enter· 
ing temporarily). 
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employer to complete the immigration process. In 1990, Congress formal-
ized the six-year cap on H-lB non-immigrant status.73 Congress hoped that 
by putting a time limit on the H-lB, employers would become less reliant 
on foreign labor. Shorter visas also discourage long-term guest workers. 
Guest worker programs are problematic because of the dependence of the 
worker on the benevolence of the sponsor and because these workers are 
not necessarily entitled to become permanent residents.74 
Congress created other problems, however, by capping the length of 
many non-immigrant stays and requiring non-immigrant visas be issued in 
short periods such as eighteen to thirty-six months. 75 The shorter approval 
dates mean employers and workers must file renewals or extensions if 
available. In tum, processing the renewals increases the agency adjudica-
tion workload and expense. Employers and employees are forced to pro-
ceed almost immediately to the immigrant-visa track because they fear run-
ning out of non-immigrant work authorization before completing the 
immigration process. 76 If the permanent process was not so bogged down 
in slow multiple layers of adjudication, it might be possible to truly limit 
non-immigrant categories to a short period. However, limiting the duration 
of temporary visas without ensuring the efficient operation of the perma-
nent process is unfair to the participants in the system. 
b. Department of Labor Adjudication 
Before the company can sponsor Ms. Cheng for permanent resi-
73. Prior to this time, the INS had limited the visa duration by regulation alone. Many 
other non-immigrant categories contain no statutory caps, but the agencies begin to question 
the temporary nature of the status when stays extend beyond five or six years. See GORDON 
ET AL., supra note 72, at§ 20.06[3] (discussing non-immigrant intent). 
74. See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains 
From the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 395-
408 (1998) (discussing implications toward international trade of restrictive immigration 
laws in the United States, specifically employment-based and family-based immigration 
Jaws); Marjorie E. Powell, Note, Resolving the Problem of Undocumented Workers in 
American Society: A Model Guest Worker Statute, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 297 (1984) 
(discussing problems associated with guestworker programs); see also T. Alexander Ali-
enikoff, The Green Card Solution, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 1999, at 34-36 (arguing guest 
workers are few due to a plentiful supply of undocumented workers). 
75. It is difficult to generalize about the non-immigrant categories because the rules 
differ for each one. See, e.g., INA§ 214(a), 8 U.S.C. § l 184(a) (establishing time limits for 
admission into the United States for non-immigrants). Where Congress has not specified 
the exact length of time, the INS and Department of State either adopted regulations re-
garding the time periods or made ad hoc, case-by-case determinations. 
76. In 1999, Sun Microsystems testified that it might have to fire one hundred employ-
ees who had reached the end of their authorized stay before the agencies completed the im-
migrant related adjudications. See Congressional Field Hearing, supra note 61. 
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dence, CSI must prove to the Department of Labor that there are no quali-
fied U.S. workers willing to accept the position at the prevailing wage on 
the terms and conditions offered.77 The burden is on the employer to qual-
ify each position separately before the company can employ a foreign 
worker. 
U.S. immigration laws have long been concerned with the protection of 
American labor. At one time the law specifically prohibited the entry of 
non-citizens for whom work contracts had been arranged in advance.78 In 
1952, this system was repealed, and in its place Congress substituted the 
labor certification requirement. Originally, the statute authorized the Sec-
retary of Labor to preclude the entry of specific immigrants or classes of 
immigrants if the Secretary found they were coming for employment that 
would displace American workers or undercut wages and working condi-
tions of similarly situated American workers.79 In reality, the Labor Sec-
retary rarely issued certifications to exclude immigrant foreign workers. 80 
77. See INA§ 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing la-
bor certification and qualification requirements). 
78. See Act ofFeb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (enacting one-thousand dollar fine 
for every violation). However, the fifth section exempted four groups from the terms of the 
act: foreigners temporarily in the United States and engaging other foreigners as secretaries, 
servants, or domestics; skilled laborers; professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, or 
persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants; and assistance by a resident of a 
member of his family or a personal friend to come for the purpose of settlement. See id. § 5. 
For further account of this Act, see E. P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, 87-89 (1981) (describing immigration bills affecting con-
tract labor); 39 IMMIGRATION COMM'N REPORT 33-34 (1970) (describing historical events 
surrounding Act ofFeb. 26). 
79. Section 212(a)(l4) of the INA provided in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be 
ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United 
States: 
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or 
unskilled labor, ifthe Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary 
of State and to the Attorney General that (A) sufficient workers in the United States 
who are able, willing, and qualified are available at the time (of application for a visa 
and for admission into the United States} and place (to which the alien is destined) to 
perform such skilled or unskilled labor, or (B) the employment of such aliens will ad-
versely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States 
similarly employed. 
INA. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 182-83 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)). 
80. Only six negative certifications were issued between the years 1957 and 1961, and 
a total of fifty-six were issued from the years 1957-1965. Initially, the Secretary of Labor 
issued a certification only when an employer was visibly using foreign workers to lower la· 
bor standards or to break a strike, and a complaint, generally, was filed by the union. See 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act of 196581 shifted the burden to the 
sponsoring employer to secure a labor certification before an individual 
could be admitted to the United States. The stated purpose of this shift was 
to protect the U.S. labor market from the influx of both skilled and un-
skilleq foreign labor.82 This converted the labor certification from a pas-
sive requirement, to be fulfilled only if the Secretary of Labor demanded it, 
to an active requirement, to be fulfilled by all employers seeking to hire 
immigrants. 83 
c. Defining the Job Requirements 
CSI must begin the process by describing, within the confines of the 
proscribed Department of Labor form, the permanent position job duties. 84 
Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Impact of Immigration on the American Labor Market, 27 
RUTGERS L. REv. 245, 252-53 (1974) (explaining labor certification program concerning 
immigrants). 
81. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of8 U.S.C.). 
82. See Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 83-84, 92 (1965) (statement of Hon. W. 
Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor). 
83. Section 212(a)(l4) was amended in section IO of the INA of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
236, § 10, 79 Stat. 911, 917, and now provides: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of excludable 
aliens who are ineligible to receive visas and who shall be excluded from admission 
into the United States: 
(14) "Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled 
or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the 
Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient work-
ers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of 
application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place to which the 
alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment 
of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the 
workers in the United States similarly employed. The exclusion of aliens under this 
paragraph shall apply to special immigrants defined in section 10l(a)(27)(A) (other 
than the parents, spouses, or children of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully 
admitted to the United States for permanent residence), to preference immigrant ali-
ens described in section 203(a)(3) and (6), and to nonpreference immigrant aliens de-
scribed in section 203(a)(8);". 
INA§ 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § l l 82(a)(5). 
84. The heart of successful labor certification drafting requires careful attention to the 
job duties and requirements. See generally AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN c. BELL, 
LABOR CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1997) (summarizing labor 
certification requirements and process); Lenni B. Benson & Roxana C. Bacon, A Practitio-
ner's Guide to Successful Alien Labor Certifications, 88-5 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1988) 
(providing advice on drafting a successful labor certification application). 
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They must also define the minimum education, training, and experience re-
quirements necessary to perform the job. 85 The second part of the form re-
quires Ms. Cheng to describe her education and work experience.86 
CSI recruits at the nation's top engineering programs. Ms. Cheng pos-
sesses unique knowledge about a new programming language. She gained 
this knowledge while working toward her master's degree. It took months 
to find Ms. Cheng and she is the only person CSI believes to be qualified 
for the job. 
Before CSI submits the labor certification application to the Department 
of Labor Regional level, they first submit the forms to the local State Em-
ployment Service Agency (State Agency) for processing. The State 
Agency has contracted with the federal Department of Labor to supervise 
the job requirements and recruitment for the position, and to determine the 
prevailing wage.87 To protect U.S. workers from foreign labor willing to 
work at reduced rates, the statute requires that the Department of Labor 
certify that the employment of the foreign worker will not harm U.S. wages 
or working conditions. Thus, the determination that CSI will pay the pre-
vailing wage is a key aspect of the certification process. 88 
Further, the Department of Labor mandates the firm only requires job 
related education or experience qualifications that reflect CSI' s minimum 
requirements. In other words, CSI may not use the certification process to 
seek the most qualified or even those equally qualified to Ms. Cheng. 
Rather, they must open the position to all minimally qualified applicants. 
The State Agency reviews the forms and determines if the educational re-
quirements and job experience complied with the usual requirements for 
the occupation. If the State Agency finds that the requirements were higher 
than those set as the norm for the industry and occupation, the State 
Agency might instruct CSI to modify the forms to allow a broader pool of 
85. The Department of Labor regulations require that the employer state the minimum 
qualifications rather than the most desirable qualifications. The view of the Department of 
Labor is that to test the availability of qualified workers, the employer must state the mini-
mum qualifications. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process, 20 
C.F.R. § 656.2l(b)(5) (2001) (declaring employers must accurately detail minimum re-
quirements for job opportunities concerning aliens); see also Jn re Applied Magnetics Corp., 
90-INA-105 (BALCA 1991), available at 191WL224001 (denying labor certification). 
86. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(a) (detailing labor certification process for aliens). 
87. See In re Hathaway Children's Serv., 91-INA-386 (BALCA 1991) (en bane) (dis-
cussing prevailing vvage requirement); see also In rf! Abelardo Chaidez, 93-INA-256 
(BALCA 1994), reprinted in 13 IMMIGR. REP. B3-20 (discussing prevailing wage require-
ment concerning employer's incorrect calculations). 
88. The majority of denials and administrative reviews concern wage disputes. See 
GoRDON ET AL, supra note 72, § 44.05[2)[d) {describing how labor certification procedures 
affect U.S. labor and prevailing wage issues). 
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applicants to meet the qualifications.89 
CSI says it wants Ms. Cheng because of her high grades and her exper-
tise in the new programming language. However, the Department of Labor 
may consider that requirement a "special or restrictive requirement."90 If 
CSI submits the labor certification with the programming language re-
quirement, the Department of Labor will require CSI to prove why the lan-
guage is essential to the operation of the business. Similarly, CSI should 
drop the grade point average requirement unless CSI uses that criteria for 
all of it~ employees and can document how this requirement is necessary to 
its business operations.91 
Next, CSI must consider the necessity of the requirement of a masters 
degree in computer engineering. In many regions, the State Agency and 
Department of Labor insist that the employer open the job recruitment to 
engineers with a masters degree or with a bachelors degree plus three years 
of experience.92 The Department of Labor believes the masters degree re-
quirement is not really a minimum requirement because so many engineers 
learn skills on the job. Instead, the agency views it as a way to tailor the 
criteria to fit the foreign worker or to reduce the number of qualified appli-
89. The Department of Labor used several publications to determine the minimum re-
quirements for occupations. For many years the Department of Labor relied upon the Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to describe basic job duties for occupations and on the 
Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) to define educational, training, and work experi-
ence required to enter the occupation. See O*NET, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 
(JIST Works, Inc. 1998) (describing job descriptions of U.S. workforce); see also BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK-BULLETIN 
2450 (2000-01 ed.) (setting forth projections of various occupations). Obviously, these gi-
ant catalogs cannot keep pace with changing economies, technologies, and forms of educa-
tion. The agency has plans to replace the catalog with a computerized system called 
O*NET. 
90. All foreign language requirements are assumed to be unduly restrictive. See 20 
C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(2)(i)(C) (declaring job opportunity requirements cannot require knowl-
edge of a foreign language). Computer languages are treated more generously, but at times 
the Department of Labor has demanded extensive corroboration of the necessity of this re-
quirement. 
91. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(b}(2) (stating employer may only demand skills, knowl-
edge, abilities and conditions of employment, which are normally required to satisfactorily 
perform the job); In re Computer Programming & Sys. Inc., 97-INA-158 (BALCA 1998), 
available at 1998 WL 124747 (rejecting specific grade point average and course require-
ments as unduly restrictive). Similarly, the Department of Labor will only allow employers 
to use objective criteria. See also 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(6) (describing standards for the la-
bor certification process). Generally, standards frequently used in hiring decisions, such as 
"strong communication skills," cannot be required in a labor certification application. 
92. There are no regulations or cases which expressly document this agency interpreta-
tion. 
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cants.93 
Although CSI is at the step of obtaining the prerequisite labor certifica-
tion, the employer and employee anticipate that the INS will later classify 
the job in one of the immigrant preferences based on the stated minimum 
requirements in the labor certification application. The second preference 
category is reserved for non-citizens with exceptional abilities in the arts, 
science, or business, or those in positions requiring an advanced degree.94 
Although, as of the fall of 2001, most of the employment-based categories 
have no quota backlogs, several times over the past eight years, demand in 
the third preference category for professionals and skilled workers has had 
a significant backlog.95 
Inclusion in the higher preference category may mean Ms. Cheng avoids 
extra months, if not years, of waiting for permanent resident status. They 
may want to preserve the masters degree requirement because the INS will 
later refuse to classify the position in the employment-based second prefer-
ence visa category without it.96 Additionally, because Ms. Cheng was born 
in China, she could be subject to a longer wait due to the per country cap.97 
Ms. Jones decides to keep the degree requirement.98 
When examining the job requirements, particularly an advanced degree, 
93. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process, 20 C.F.R. 
§ 656.20(c)(8) (2001) (stating employer may not tailor job requirements to immigrant's 
qualifications). 
94. See INA§ 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining "ad-
vanced degree" as a degree of specialized study after completion of a bachelor's degree). 
95. See 8 VISA BULL. 16 (2000) (indicating no immigration quota backlog in March 
2000), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/2000-03bulletin.html. But 
see 8 VISA BULL. 30 (2000) (listing backlog of almost three years for China and two years 
for India in April 2000), available at http://www.immigration.com/newsletter/2001-04.html. 
96. See INS Immigrant Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) (2001) (defining "masters de-
gree" as the equivalent of a U.S. masters degree or a bachelors degi:ee and "at least five 
years of progressive experience" in the occupation). But see Letter from Flora T. 
Richardson, Chief of the Department of Labor's Division of Foreign Labor Certification, to 
Edwin R. Rubin, Esq., Rubin & Dornbaum (Apr. 30, 1993), reprinted in 10 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 922 (1993) (noting Department of Labor requires, for most positions, only three 
years of experience to meet the equivalent of a masters degree). This conflict and related 
litigation is discussed infra Part 11.C.2. 
97. See discussion of the visa category strategies, infra Part 11.C.2. 
98. The employer must determine the minimum job requirements, but obviously the 
employee is affected by the decision. It is not uncommon for an attorney to face contradic-
. tory demands from the employer _and employee. See Bruce A. Hake, Dual Representation 
in Immigration Practice: The Simple Solution is the Wrong Solution, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
581, 587 (1991) (discussing common ethical problems of these contradictory demands). For 
a bar opinion discussing the conflict, see Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., 
Formal Op. 465 (1991) (stating lawyers must obtain informed written consent to dual repre-
sentation of both employer and alien employee in labor certification). 
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the Department of Labor concerns itself with fraud. The Department of 
Labor believes that many of these positions would be suitably filled by 
U.S. workers without advanced degrees, but with experience in the field. 
In essence, the agency believes employers tailor job requirements, like ad-
vanced degrees, to fit only the non-citizen petitioner. However, employers 
face confusion in trying to satisfy the Department of Labor and at the same 
time accurately describe the job requirements. An employer filing a labor 
certification application is required by statute to have a non-citizen suitable 
for the position. Naturally then, the individual's qualifications meet the job 
requirements. Presumably that is why the employer hired her in the first 
place. The Department of Labor, however, is suspicious of any non-citizen 
employee that meets the exact job requirements. 
Furthermore, the Department of Labor makes a case-by-case adjudica-
tion to evaluate whether U.S. workers are available for the position. The 
statutory delegation is broad and contains few parameters. These case de-
terminations have, among other things, sought to define when a job re-
quirement is "normal and usual" for the position. The vagueness of this 
standard and its obvious dependence on the facts in the case combined to 
create a burdensome adjudication process. From its inception, the Depart-
ment of Labor program has been criticized for a lack of transparency and 
perceived lack of uniformity.99 When an agency chooses case adjudication 
it necessarily reduces the ability of participants to predict the outcome of 
any particular application, unless the participant has a great deal of experi-
ence in similar applications or the participant has studied reported decisions 
of the agency.100 In addition to the opaque nature of the substantive rules, 
the Department of Labor has rarely published detailed procedural rules. 101 
d. The Recruitment Phase 
Notwithstanding the difficult recruitment for CSI and Ms. Cheng's ex-
99. See Labor Department Creates New Procedures and Standards for Certification 
and Review of Applications for Alien Employment in Nonagricultural Occupations, 51 
INTERPRETER RELEASES l, 4 (1974) (stating "[tJhe need for more precise and definite infor-
mation ... is generally acknowledged."); see also Rodino, supra note 80, at 245-46 (noting 
growing impracticality of present labor certification program and lack of uniform standards 
among regional offices). 
100. Only administrative appellate decisions are reported in the labor certification con-
text. See discussion infra Part IV.8.3. 
IOI. The first published rules and the Technical Assistance Guidelines (TAG) were cre-
ated in direct response to intense criticism by members of Congress and the Administrative 
Conference. See Zengerle, supra note 26. Nevertheless, between the publication of the 
TAG and today, few rules have been promulgated under the AP A. Instead, the agency tends 
to rely on information memoranda to the field and General Advisory Letters. 
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traordinary educational achievement, the Department of Labor has tradi-
tionally disregarded all prior recruitment efforts.102 When an employer 
seeks a labor certification, the agency requires the sponsor to complete a 
new recruitment effort to prove that no qualified worker is wiJling to accept 
the offered position. There is no filing fee for the certification procedure. 
The costs, however, such as attorneys' fees, and the advertising directed by 
the agency, however, can be very high. In some cases, the Department of 
Labor requires multiple publications in specialty professional journals-the 
costs of such advertisements can range from $1,000 to $5,000.103 Even ad-
vertising in a newspaper of general circulation for the required three days 
can cost $850 or more.104 
CSI must file the application in California, the state where the job is lo-
cated. Labor certifications are valid only for the location or "metropolitan 
statistical area" where the case was initially filed. 105 The presence of a 
higher concentration of high technology industries or immigrant popula-
tions in some regions of the Department of Labor can increase the volume 
and cause delays in processing. Because there are many companies in 
Northern California hiring foreign workers, the Department of Labor's Re-
gion IX, of which California is a part, is one of the most backlogged. In 
1999 and 2000, the Department of Labor took three years to process a 
regular labor certification case there.106 In New York the delay was four 
102. In 1997, the Department of Labor expanded a program called "Reduction in Re-
cruitment." See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text (describing Reduction in Re-
cruitment program). Because it is not available in all cases, I have chosen to describe the 
traditional and default procedures. Moreover, the continued viability of the unsupervised 
reduced recruitment program is in question due to the 2001 downturn in the economy. 
103. There is little documented evidence of the costs of preparing labor certifications. 
One 1995 news story estimates attorney's fees range from $5,000 to $10,000 or more to 
prepare and file the labor certification. See Ann Davis, Skilled Foreign Recruits Could Face 
Higher Hurdles, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at Bl; see also Michael D. Patrick, Reduction in 
Recruitment, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1998, at 3 (illustrating through a hypothetical high expense, 
$20,000 per print advertisement, and low success of traditional methods to recruit for soft-
ware positions). Based on my own representation of clients and interviews with immigra-
tion attorneys, the advertising and legal fees range from $5,000 to $20,000 in most cases. 
These estimates do not include the time and other expenses spent by the human resources 
department Several people asked to remain anonymous when I asked about fees. At least 
one corporation budgets a minimum of $10,000 per immigrant for internal and external 
costs related to the immigration process. 
104. Several sources told me confidentially that advertising was approximately $1,000-
$1,500 per ,case. . 
105. See Employment & Training Admin. Temporary Employment of Aliens in the 
United States, 20 C.F.R. § 655.2 (2001) (discussing applicant's filing procedure). 
I 06. The vast majority of labor certification applications are filed in Region IX, which 
includes California. In the Reduced Recruitment adjudication, cases might be approved in a 
few months. However, due to expanded use the expedited process began to slow dramati-
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years, and in Boston nearly three. In contrast, Philadelphia had no signifi-
cant backlog and cases were adjudicated within a few months.107 
As stated above, the State Agency is responsible for instructing the em-
ployer about the quality and quantity of recruitment needed to document 
the lack of a qualified worker. The State Agency will instruct CSI to pre-
pare an advertisement listing all the essential information, except company 
identity on the ETA form in either a newspaper or a specialty journal publi-
cation.108 Instead of applying to CSI, the applicant would apply to a post 
office box at the State Agency. In this manner, the State Agency adjudi-
cator can theoretically monitor the qualifications of the people who applied 
for the position. The Department of Labor requires that all applicants who 
appear to meet the minimum qualifications be interviewed by CSI. 
Most employers find the interview stage to be one of the most difficult 
aspects of the labor certification process. They dislike interviewing appli-
cants for a position they perceive as "filled." In a sense CSI must seriously 
consider the qualifications of each applicant; but they are under no obliga-
tion to hire any of the applicants. If a qualified applicant is found, the labor 
certification cannot be issued. CSI, however, is not mandated to offer em-
ployment to the applicant. Instead, they could simply elect to continue 
with the temporary employment of Ms. Cheng and abandon the labor certi-
fication application.109 
The thirty-day recruitment period may also be a difficult period for Ms. 
Cheng. 110 She cannot play a role in evaluating or interviewing the appli-
cants, even if she knows that CSI is recruiting to fill her position. Attor-
neys also play a limited role in the recruitment. They can simply guide CSI 
to document each stage of the recruitment to establish contact with the ap-
plicants, but cannot control or conduct the interviews. Traditionally, attor-
neys counsel employers to use certified mail with return receipts for all cor-
respondence between applicants and the employer because the Department 
cally in early 2001. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del 
Rey, Bernsen & Loewy (July 2001 ). 
107. It is difficult to explain why delays varied so dramatically. Workload differences 
account for some proportion, but the regional office's application of substantive criteria 
could also explain longer processing times. Generally, regions with stricter standards took 
longer. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen 
& Loewy (Aug. 28, 2000) and other anonymous sources. 
I 08. The state agency also opens a local job order number at the same time the employer 
is advertising. At least theoretically, the job order posting allows the state agency to reach 
unemployed workers who might be seeking employment through its job offices. 
109. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent 
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.29(a) (2001) (requiring em-
ployer to wait six-months to file another labor certification application for this position). 
110. See id. § 656.24 (mandating length of recruitment and describing procedure for la-
bor certification determinations). 
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of Labor has often been suspicious about the good faith nature of the re-
cruitment. m 
Within forty-five days of the end of the recruitment period, CSI must 
submit a recruitment report to the State Agency.m In this report, CSI 
documents that their job requirements are reasonable and that no qualified 
applicant applied. The State Agency reviews the recruitment results and 
forwards the application to the federal regional office of the Department of 
Labor for final adjudication. 
At the regional office, a staff headed by a certifying officer reviews both 
CSl's original application and the State Agency activity and recommenda-
tions, and then makes a final evaluation about whether CSI has demon-
strated a shortage of qualified workers. The Certifying Officer (CO) is not 
bound by any of the recommendations or actions the State Agency took. If 
the CO finds that CSI has inadequately tested the market, 113 added unduly 
restrictive job requirements,114 or offered an inadequate wage,115 then the 
CO remands the case to CSI with a Notice of Findings.116 CSI can either 
accept the modifications ordered by the CO and begin a new recruitment 
period including new advertising, or rebut the notice of findings in an effort 
to convince the CO that the market test was appropriate. If the CO is ulti-
mately satisfied that the labor market test has been properly conducted, the 
Department of Labor affixes a multi-colored ink stamp to the original 
forms and returns them to CSL If the CO rejects the rebuttal, the labor cer-
111. Cf In re Ambros Trading Corp., 97-INA-406, 1998 BALCA LEXIS 488, at •3 
(BALCA July 27, 1998) (stating photocopies of metered postage stamp was sufficient evi-
dence of an employer's contacting applicants). 
112. The recruitment report must: (1) identify recruitment sources by names; (2) give 
the number of all U.S. workers responding to the recruitment; (3) give the name, address, 
and resume of all applicants; and (4) explain the objective job-related reasons for rejecting 
any qualified applicant. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(l)(i)(A)-(F); see also Technical Assis-
tance Guide (TAG) 64-65 (1981). 
113. See In re S. Balian Designs, 89-INA-299 (BALCA 1991) (indicating employer 
made inadequate efforts to contact applicants). 
114. See In re Info. Indus., 88-INA-82 (BALCA 1989) (finding certain job requirements 
are too stringent). 
115. Employers may offer a wage, within five percent of the prevailing wage, but it can 
only include guaranteed income. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.20(c)(3) (explaining wage is not 
commission, bonus, or incentive based). Industries where income is conditional upon per-
formance offer a greater challenge because the guaranteed wage may be low. If a position is 
covered by the Davis Bacon or Contract Service Act, the prevailing wage determination is 
much more restrictive . . See General Administrative Letter.2-98 (Oct. 31, 1997) [hereinafter . 
GAL 2-98] (designating Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) wage data as the pri-
mary required source for all wage determinations). 
116. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.25 (providing procedure for certifying officers when inade-
quacies are found); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 44.05[c] (describing process 
that is incurred by certifying officers). 
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tification is denied and, under current regulations, CSI may not re-file for 
the same position for six months.117 
If the certification is denied, then CSI could seek an administrative re-
view of the CO denial by filing an appeal with the Department of Labor's 
Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA).118 If the appeal is 
denied, they could file a petition for judicial review in federal district court 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).119 Nevertheless, employ-
ers never seek either administrative or judicial review of a denial of labor 
certification.120 
At this point, Ms. Jones asks whether this case is a good candidate for 
the Department of Labor Reduction in Recr;uitment procedures. Although 
the Department of Labor regulations had included a Reduced Recruitment 
procedure where employers could document adequate prior recruitment, the 
regional offices rarely used the procedure. Forced by an expanding 
caseload and significant budget cuts, 121 in 1997 the Department of Labor 
revived the Reduction in Recruitment procedures to streamline adjudica-
tion.122 By 1999, the Department of Labor was willing to accept evidence 
· 117. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.29(a) (establishing amount of time allotted to re-file for acer-
tain position). 
118. See discussion infra Part II. One attorney reported that BALCA routinely took 
twenty months to adjudicate an appeal. See Audio tape: Linda Rose, Remarks at the 2000 
American Immigration Lawyer's Association (AILA) National Conference, Chicago, Ill. 
(June 15, 2000) (on file with author). 
119. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Federal court jurisdiction is 
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). 
120. It would rarely be cost effective to seek such review, except if an employer could 
find no other way to conduct labor market tests. BALCA maintains the position that the 
non-citizen worker has no standing to seek review of a denied certification. See In re Pat's 
Pizza Ristorante, 97-INA-396, 1998 BALCA LEXIS 228 (BALCA Feb. 24, 1998). Some 
courts have allowed the employee to seek judicial review of the Department of Labor ac-
tions. See, e.g., Gladysz v. Donovan, 595 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (granting 
standing to alien to pursue claim). 
121. The drop in available funds for the labor certification program illustrates the De-
partment of Labor's resource problems. In FY 1993, $57 million were allocated for the 
alien labor certification program at the state agencies. The appropriations have dropped 
steadily since then, to $49.8 million in FY 1994, $51 million in FY 1995, $45.7 million in 
FY 1996, and $31.3 million in both FY 1997 and FY 1998. The amount budgeted for the 
administration of the labor certification program for the FY 1999 was $36.3 million, FY 
2000 was $40.9 million, and FY 2001 was $26.1 million. The decrease in the funds allo-
~ated to labor certification prompted reductions in staff and the flight of experienced staff at 
many state agencies. See Steven A. Clark et al., Labor Practice Advisory: Highlights of the 
April 3 AILA-DOL Liaison Meeting, 16 AILA MONTHLY MAILING 343, 345 (May 1997). 
122. See General Administrative Letter 1-97 (Oct. 1, 1996) [hereinafter GAL 1-97) 
. (providing information on how the Department of Labor made adjudication more efficient). 
See a recommendation for streamlining labor certification in VICE l'RESIDENT AL GoRE, 
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of past recruitment, provided the employer advertised for a minimum of six 
months and the employer documents that no qualified person applied for 
the position.123 The program dispenses with most of the State Agency's 
role in supervising wages and job requirements, as welJ as the State 
Agency's assessment of the adequacy of the prior recruitment. Both the 
State Agency and the Department of Labor prioritize processing of Reduc-
tion in Recruitment labor certifications. Although the Department of Labor 
refused to formally adopt regulatory change, through interpretive letters it 
has expedited the adjudication process for a group of large employers or for 
employers seeking specific job categories.124 
Various Regional offices of the Department of Labor were slow to adopt 
this procedure, including Region IX, which was one of the most cautious. 
The Regional offices originally authorized the procedure in limited occu-
pations where past experience suggested employers could document labor 
shortages. There was no, and continues to be no official list of occupa-
tions, only unofficial discussions with Regional COs and word of mouth 
communication among members of the immigration bar.125 The problem 
for employers selecting Reduction in Recruitment is that, should the case 
ultimately be rejected for unsupervised recruitment, the employer must re-
file the labor certification and proceed with new advertising as directed by 
the agency. The major risk of this procedure is that the employee's priority 
date, or place in line for an immigrant visa, will not be established as of the 
reduction in recruitment filing, but rather at the next regular application.126 
AcCOMPANYlNG REP. OF THE NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV. 41, 44 (1993) (noting report was 
instrumental in moving agency toward the reduced recruitment approach). See generally 
Gary Endelman, Through the Looking Glass: The Impact of GAL 1-97 and the Future of 
Labor Certification, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1461 (1997) (describing overall effect of 
labor certification regulations). 
123. Not withstanding the issuance of GAL 1-97, many regions of the Department of 
Labor did not immediately adopt the reduced processing according to interviews with attor-
neys throughout the United States, which confirmed the delay in implementation. 
124. See GAL 1-97, supra note 122 (establishing applications meeting a limited review 
criteria will be expedited for approval when they are received in the Regional Office); see 
also Lauretta v. Herman, No. 98-56061 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1999) (court order). 
125. The Department of Labor does not publish any list or criteria allowing employers 
to determine whether the position is eligible for the reduction in recruitment procedure. In-
stead, attorneys rely on informal communication with the agency such as quarterly liaison 
meetings or telephone calls. A non-specialist may not have any awareness of this proce-
dure. 
126. On July 26, 2000, the Department of Labor issued a proposed regulation to allow 
the retention of the first priority date and the transfer of a regular labor certification applica-
tion to the reduction in recruitment procedure. See Employment and Training Administra-
tion, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,081 (July 26, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656). The pro-
posed regulation, however, only applies to cases filed prior to July 26, 2000. The risk of 
losing a priority date can be especially significant for nationals of India and China because 
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Although Region IX is open to Reduction in Recruitment, CSI must con-
sider that the state agency in California has had a policy of limiting reduc-
tion in recruitment where the employer had any special requirements. 
Therefore, CSI might file for Reduction in Recruitment first. If the De-
partment of Labor denies the application, they may have to start over with a 
traditional labor certification filing. Although CSI would like to file both at 
the same time, the Department of Labor precludes simultaneous filings for 
the two procedures. 
Clients naturally ask the attorney to assess their prospects to obtain a la-
bor certification. Historically the rate of approval has been quite high.127 
For cases that are not withdrawn at the state agency level, the national 
agency approval rate is approximately ninety-six percent.128 Still, an em-
ployer will not reach the final adjudicatory stages if the labor certification 
is stalled at the state level because of agency suspicions that the labor tests 
were conducted unfairly. 
In recent years, the approval rate may have grown even higher, appar-
ently in response to pressure to reduce the growing backlogs. In June 1999, 
an official of the Department of Labor discussed the agency's push to re-
duce the backlog of labor certification cases. He said that the regional of-
fices had completed a "remarkable" number of cases, "well over 25,000 
processed in the last six months."129 He then paused briefly and said, 
"They're all approvals."130 He further commented, "I guess if you want to 
get a little more philosophical you can wonder . . . whether some un-
meritorious cases might be rolled into that but that's a philosophical issue I 
am not going to try to wrestle with right now."131 
The work necessary to approve a case is the ministerial placement of a 
stamp, and the work to deny a case involves the CO preparing a written 
Notice of Findings presenting the reasons the case might be denied. This is 
followed by consideration of the rebuttal evidence submitted by the em-
the employment-based visas have not consistently remained available for natives of these 
countries. 
127. See infra Figure 3, p. 240 (statistical data provided by Patrick W. Stange, Depart-
ment of Labor, Aug. 30, 2000, on file with author). See also PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-
LoEHR, supra note 60, at 154-55 (describing approval rates). 
128. See generally PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60 (discussing reduc-
tion in employment-based immigration). The Department of Labor has not regularly col-
lected statistical data about cases filed with the state agencies alone. See Interview with 
Harry Sheinfeld, Senior Counsel for the Employment and Training Administration of the 
Department of Labor (Sept. 6, 2000). 
129. Audio tape: Harry Sheinfeld, Senior Counsel for the Employment and Training 
Administration of the Department of Labor, Statement at the AILA Annual Conference, Se-
attle, Wash. (June 12, 1999) (on file with author). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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ployer, which is done prior to preparing a final written assessment of why 
the case should still be denied. Given this process, it is easy to see that de-
nying a case takes much more work than approving one. Thus, the pressure 
of the backlog and the tremendous amount of resources needed to complete 
a case-by-case adjudication ultimately led to what appears to have been 
summary adjudication or, as some who are critical of the program might 
say, the absence of any adjudication. This summary approach appears to 
be the best solution the Department of Labor can fashion. 132 
In 2000, the pace of reducing the backlog continued to be quite rapid. In 
June 2000, the Department of Labor reported on recent backlogs and 
workload reduction plans.133 The agency reported that in FY 1998 the 
agency processed over 40,000 labor certification applications and in 1999, 
over 72,000 cases.134 The backlog of un-adjudicated cases was 75,400 at 
the beginning of the fiscal year, and was expected to be at 40,400 by Octo-
ber 2000.135 This represented a large reduction from prior backlogs. The 
backlogs had grown dramatically even though overall filing rates remained 
relatively steady.136 
132. For several years the Department of Labor has mentioned a new streamlining pro-
cedure, which eliminates most of the role of the state agencies and may go further toward 
summary adjudication. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing streamlined electronic review pro-
gram). To be fair, the Department of Labor is operating under tremendous resource con-
straints. Agency requests for more resources or the statutory authority to charge a user fee 
have not been successful. The failure of Congress to allocate more funds to this agency re-
flects, at least in part, a lack of commitment to the supervised testing of the labor market. 
Here, the process failures signal a real failure of substantive policy as well. Of course, it is 
unlikely Congress wants to remove all labor testing because of the possible political back· 
lash. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing elimination of Department of Labor's role alto-
gether). 
133. See Memorandum from Raymond Bramucci, Assistant Secretary for Employment 
and Training, to Deputy Secretary Department of Labor (Feb. 24, 2000), reprinted in 77 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 796, 796-803 (2000) (stating if plan suggested is successful, backlog 
at Department of Labor will be reduced to z~ro by FY 2001, assuming no other immigration 
programs are implemented during this time). 
134. See id at 799 (examining amount of applications processed over a two year span). 
135. See id at 801 (estimating Department of Labor's backlog reduction goals). 
136. See id. (predicting 90,000 new filings for FY 2000). In FY 1999, the Agency com-
pleted 77,979 cases at the regional level. See id at 798. 
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Figure 3: Department of Labor Workload and Approval Rates 
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W. Stange, Department of Labor, Aug. 30, 2000 (copy on file with author). 
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In late 2000, Congress threw a major "monkey wrench" into the De-
partment of Labor's effort to reduce the backlog. For four months, Con-
gress revived a provision of the immigration laws which allows an individ-
ual who has worked without authorization, overstayed a temporary visa, or 
entered the United States without permission to seek permanent resident 
status, provided he or she is eligible under the family or employment visa 
categories.137 One of the ways to preserve eligibility to adjust status under 
the limited statutory provision was to file a labor certification application 
prior to the April 30, 2001 deadline. 138 In June, the Department of Labor 
reported more than 230,000 new labor certification applications filed with 
the state agencies during the four-month application period.139 The De-
partment of Labor estimated that the pending backlog of cases was close to 
300,000 as of June of 200 I .140 
Such erratic adjudication and workload greatly impacts other aspects of 
the system. For instance, delays in adjudicating labor certifications result 
in greater filings of temporary visa extensions, burdening other agencies 
and draining valuable time and resources from completing immigrant peti-
tions. Furthermore, large numbers of labor certification approvals follow-
ing long delay and backlog create distrust in the adjudicative process. That 
distrust is not just prevalent among potential immigrants, but also among 
137. See Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000, § l 102(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) 
(Supp. V 1999) (reviving the INA of 1952 § 245(i) on a temporary basis). 
138. See id. 
139. See Chief Dale Zeigler, Alien Labor Certification Program, Statement at the An· 
nual Conference of the AILA, Boston, Mass. (June 22, 2001) (notes on file with author). 
140. See id. 
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other agencies involved in later stages of the process. 141 
Based on the high overall approval rates, it is likely that CSI will suc-
cessfully obtain a certification for Ms. Cheng if the employer carefully pre-
pares the application and follows agency procedures. The more difficult 
question to answer, however, is when it will be issued. Notwithstanding 
the effort to reduce backlogs, in some parts of the country labor certifica-
tion applications still take several years to process unless the case fits into 
the Reduction in Recruitment criteria. Given the huge new filings made in 
spring 2001 and the recent downturn in hiring in the high-tech industries, it 
is unclear whether the Department of Labor will continue to offer a Reduc-
tion in Recruitment procedure for these or other cases.142 
e. Searching/or a Short-Cut: A Waiver of Labor Certification 
Given the cost and delay in obtaining the labor certification and the em-
ployer's natural reluctance to spend time on recruitment, an attorney will 
consider waivers of the labor certification requirement. Several statutory 
categories do not require labor certification, such as family-based immi-
gration or successful asylum applications. In the employment-based cate-
gories, there are labor certification exemptions for multinational executives 
and managers, for persons with extraordinary ability in the arts and sci-
ences, and for outstanding professors and researchers.143 The INS adjudi-
cates these applications directly, allowing a "waiver" of the labor certifica-
tion process. If Ms. Cheng fits into one of these categories, CSI would be 
exempt from filing the labor certification application. 
In addition, the Department of Labor created lists of occupations subject 
to special procedures granting persons a "short cut" through the labor certi-
fication process. The first occupational list known as Schedule A, identi-
fies four classes of employment that the Department of Labor pre-certified 
as labor shortage occupations.144 The Department of Labor cross-delegated 
141. See discussion infra Part IIl.B.3.e. 
142. See Chief Dale Zeigler, Alien Labor Certification Program, Statement at the An-
nual Conference of the AILA, Boston, Mas£. (June22, 2001) (notes on file with author). 
143. See INA § 203(bXl), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating excep-
tional ability may exist in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics); INS Immi-
grant Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) (2001) (defining exceptional ability in the sciences, 
arts, or business to mean "a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encoun-
tered in the sciences, arts, or business.''); see also Employment & Training Admin. Occupa-
tional Labor Certification Detenninati<?ns, 20 C.F .R. § 656.l 0 (200 l) (IJ1andating profes-
sions, abilities, and expertise as eligible for Schedule A classification). 
144. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (explaining original Schedule A listed twenty shortage oc-
cupations: Accounting and Auditing, Architecture, Chemical Engineering, Industrial Engi-
neering, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering, Metallurgy and Metallurgical Engineering, 
Mining and Petroleum Engineering, Nuclear Engineering, Nursing, Phannacy, Physical 
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to the INS the authority to determine whether the employment opportunity 
met the Schedule A criteria. Thus, an individual seeking this waiver of the 
labor certification process bypasses the Department of Labor and the first 
step altogether. 
The Schedule A occupations are registered nurses, 145 physical thera-
pists, 146 persons of exceptional ability in the arts and sciences147 and man-
agers and executives of multinational corporations employed outside of the 
United States by the multinational for at least one year. 148 Schedule A, 
adopted in 1976, continues in operation today, although exceptional per-
forming artists and the multinational executives and managers have been 
deleted.149 These individuals are now exempt from labor certification pur-
suant to statutory exemptions.1so If Ms. Cheng were in one of these occu-
pations, she would qualify to bypass the Department of Labor certification 
process.1st 
Therapy, and Physics); cf Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens 
in the United States, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,933 (Dec. 19, 1980) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.10, 
656.22) (stipulating numerical limitations on categories of visas under Act). 
145. See INS Documentary Requirements: Nonimmigrants; Waivers; Admission of 
Certain Inadmissible Aliens; Parole, 8 C.F.R. § 212.15(e) (2001) (designating only licensed 
registered nurses qualify for exemption). 
146. See id.§ 212.15(g)(4)(i) (stating physical therapists must also be licensed by state 
of intended employment and are subject to a foreign credentialing exam requirement). 
147. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Although this category uses language identical to 
one of the 1990 employment-based immigrant visa criteria, the regulatory definitions are not 
identical. Proving "exceptional" skills for the waiver is a higher standard than the standard 
to obtain inclusion as a second preference immigrant. Although the 1990 criteria created a 
number of statutory exceptions to the labor certification requirement for people who have 
demonstrated "extraordinary ability," or who can establish that they would contribute to the 
national best interests, Schedule A's "exceptional ability" standards remain a possible alter-
native. 
148. This Schedule A classification also parallels a category in the 1990 employment-
based preferences. Here the elements of the Schedule A pre-certification of labor shortage 
are identical to the requirements of the First Preference Employment-Based category for 
multinational managers and executives. 
149. See Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the 
United States; Implementation oflmmigration Act of 1990, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,244, 32,244-51 
(July 15, 1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656) (amending Schedule A in 1991). The re-
maining two groups on Schedule A include: Group I, covering licensed physical therapists 
and professional nurses, and Group II, covering aliens with exceptional ability in the sci-
ences and the arts (excluding aliens in the performing arts). See id.; see also AUSTIN T. 
FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVENC. BELL, LABOR CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK 1-1to1-19 (2000). 
150. See INA§ 203(b)(l)(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(l)(A), (C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
151. An analogy to Schedule A was developed in the labor market information (LMI) 
pilot program that was proposed in conjunction with the Immigration Act of 1990. See Im-
migration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 122(a), 104 Stat. 4994, 4994-95. The LMI 
would have eliminated the Schedule A occupations list by directing the Secretary of Labor 
to conduct a labor market information pilot program for employment-based immigrants to 
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At the same time that the Department of Labor and INS created the 
Schedule A shortcut, the Department of Labor introduced Schedule B, 
listing occupations the agency deems to be in oversupply. 152 The list, 
which may seem anachronistic today, having not been amended since 1976, 
is fairly lengthy. It generally includes low-skilled, entry-level positions. 
The Department of Labor believes U.S. employers can quickly train avail-
able U.S. workers to fill these jobs even where shortages may exist.153 
Thus, concegtually, Schedule B is a roadblock on the map or a "Do Not 
Enter" sign. ·s4 Clearly, Ms. Cheng's position is not a Schedule B occupa-
detennine whether the pennanent alien labor certification process could be streamlined by 
supplementing this case-by-case process with an approach utilizing lists of occupations in 
which there are labor shortages or surpluses. The legislation provided, under the pilot pro-
gram, a determination would be made that labor shortages or surpluses exist in up to ten de-
fined occupational classifications. The legislation, section 122(a) of the 1990 Immigration 
Act, required that in making these determinations, the Department of Labor consider occu-
pations that have been previously approved under the permanent alien labor certification 
program as well as labor market and other related information. The pilot program was set to 
sunset in 1994. See id. Although the Department of Labor issued proposed regulations, 
controversies over the market information methodology and opposition from a wide range 
of interest groups killed the pilot program. See also Gary E. Endelman & Robert F. 
Loughran, The Reality of Reliance: Immigration and Technology in the Age of Global Com-
petition, 93-7 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1993) (focusing on connection between foreign-born 
scientists and the immigration bar). 
152 See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent 
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.1 l(a) (2001) (itemizing Sched-
ule B occupations including: assemblers, gas station attendants, parking lot attendants, per-
sonal service attendants, amusement attendants, recreation attendants, bartenders, level II 
bookkeepers, caretakers, cashiers, charworkers and cleaners, chauffeurs and taxi drivers, 
hotel and motel cleaners, clerk typists, grocery clerks and checkers, general clerks, hotel 
clerks, short order cooks, counter and fountain workers, dining room attendants, electric 
truck operators, elevator operators, floorworkers, groundskeepers, guards, any industry 
helpers, household domestic service workers, housekeepers, janitors, key punch operators, 
kitchen workers, common laborers, farm laborers, mine laborers, loopers and toppers, mate-
rial handlers, nurses' aides and orderlies, packers and markers and bottlers, porters, recep-
tionists, sailors and deck hands, sales clerks, sewing machine operators and handstitchers, 
stock room and warehouse workers, streetcar and bus conductors, telephone operators, 
lesser skilled typists, recreation and amusement ushers, and yard workers). 
153. See id § 656.J(a) (indicating there must not be "sufficient [U.S.] workers who are 
able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into 
the United States" before certain foreign workers are admitted). 
154. See id.§ 656.ll(c); id§ 656.23 (2001) (informing prospective employers of possi-
bility of obtaining a labor certifi~ation for a Schedule B position when an employer justifies 
job duties or requirements which alter job). In reality, however, few employers seek Sched-
ule B certifications because these positions are categorized by the Department of Labor as 
requiring less than two years education or training. Accordingly, the INS will classify the 
immigrant petition in the employment-based third preference for "other workers." INA 
§ 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 211 (1994). This category is limited to 10,000 persons a year and 
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tion.155 
Ms. Cheng may also want to know whether she qualifies for the ''Na-
tional Interest Waiver." She has heard fellow Chinese students discussing 
this strategy as a way of bypassing the lengthy labor certification process 
and avoiding the recruitment of U.S. workers for her position. Congress 
created the national interest waiver in 1990.156 The waiver is theoretically 
available to any non-citizen with an advanced degree, or one who can es-
tablish that her credentials make her an alien of exceptional ability.157 Be-
cause of Ms. Cheng's advanced degree, the statute does not require that she 
prove she is "exceptional," but rather she and CSI must establish that her 
employment will make a significant contribution to the national interest of 
the United States. 
There is no regulatory definition of what constitutes immigration in the 
national interest. CSI must primarily rely on the decisions of the INS Ad-
ministrative Appeals Office (AAO). 158 Shortly after the passage of the 
thus, there is usually a multi-year wait in this category for immigration. See id. § 201. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to question the wisdom of the 10,000 visa cap for low-
skilled jobs. Moreover, beginning in FY 2000, 5,000 of the 10,000 visas are reallocated to 
immigrants receiving benefits under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Re-
lief Act of 1997. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 202, 111 Stat. 2193 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). For a discussion of the need for these workers compare PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-
LOEHR, supra note 60, at 144-64, with AILA, ESSENTIAL WORKERS KEEP TIIE ECONOMY 
GROWING (on file with author), available at http://www.aila.org (last visited Dec. 14, 2001). 
155. A third schedule, Schedule C, was promulgated in 1967, but only briefly imple-
mented. See Immigration; Availability of, and Adverse Effect Upon, American Workers, 67 
Fed. Reg. 887 (Jan. 25, 1967). The regulation was cancelled in 1971. Schedule C pre-
certified skilled and unskilled occupations found to be in short supply in certain regions, 
with the requirement that the alien work only in that geographic area. See id. 
156. See INA§ 203(b)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § J 153 {b)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (man-
dating Attorney General may waive labor certification when deemed to be in the national 
interest). However, the statute does not define "national interest" and the INS declined to 
define it in the regulations, preferring flexibility of a case-by case-basis, but stating that the 
alien "must make a showing significantly above that necessary to prove 'prospective na-
tional benefit' [required of aliens seeking to qualify as 'exceptional']." Employment-Based 
Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,900 (Nov. 29, 1991); see also Memorandum from R. 
Michael Miller, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications, INS, to Michael L. 
Aytes, Director, INS Service Center Operations, INS, File No. HQ 204.24-C (May 4, 1993), 
reprinted in 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1150, 1151 (1993) (stating "the AAU is not plan-
ning at this time on publishing a precedent decision on the [national interest waiver] is-
sue."). . . 
157. See INA§ 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(l)(A) (defining extraordinary ability 
attributes); see also INS Immigrant Petitions 8 C.F.R. § 204.S(h) (2001) (establishing pro-
cedure and evidence required to demonstrate exceptional ability). 
158. See generally INS Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Availability of Service 
Records, 8 C.F.R. § 103.l(f)(3) (2001); id: § 103.3(a) (mandating creation of AAO through 
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1990 Act, INS regulations stated the government thought the qualifications 
should be flexible and develop on a case-by-case basis of adjudication. 159 
This continued for several years until many of the INS adjudicators became 
uncomfortable with the Jack of consistency in the type of cases approved. 
In 1995, the agency proposed regulations restricting the category by re-
quiring proof of national, as opposed to regional or local contributions to 
the national interest.160 The INS also proposed several other narrowing 
qualifications.161 Commentators vigorously attacked the proposal as an 
extreme restriction of the category. The proposed regulations were allowed 
to die, and were never amended or re-proposed. 
In 1998, the Wall Street Journal published a long article discussing the 
national interest waiver and citing examples of approved cases.162 The 
story skeptically examined some of the approved cases. They included a 
photographer of people indigenous to the Amazon rain forest, but who 
drove taxis to earn a living; a novelist with a single publication of a science 
fiction novel including gay characters; an acupuncturist, who specialized in 
lower back pain; and a twenty-seven year old video filmmaker, who hoped 
to produce a '"youth-oriented global news network. "'163 The story docu-
mented the frustration within the INS concerning the lack of guidelines for 
adjudicating these petitions. Ed Skerrett, a senior INS examiner responsi-
ble at that time for review of these adjudications, was quoted as saying, 
"[s]ometimes we wondered ... 'how could they possibly approve a case 
like that?"'164 Further, the story reported that the inability of issuing regu-
lations providing more substance to the category was leading the AAO to 
issue a precedent decision aimed at giving more definition to the cate-
gory.165 In re New York Department of Transportation,166 set forth the 
Agency regulations). No form of administrative review is mandated in the INA. 
159. See Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,900 (stating each case will 
be "judged on its own merits."). 
160. See Employment-Based Immigrants, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,771, 29,776-78 (June 6, 
1995) (proposing four elements a petitioner must satisfy to qualify for national interest 
waiver). 
161. See id. at 29, 772 (proposing to clarify the "portions of the regulations which have 
been problematic for the Service and the public."). 
162. See Barry Newman, The 'National Interest' Causes INS to Wander Down Peculiar 
Paths: Or How a Roving Acrobat Got a Visa While Doctor Probing Cancer Didn't: Is the 
Curio Cabinet Closed?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1998, at Al (discussing disparity between 
those who are granted visas and those who are not). 
163. Id 
164. Id 
165. See id. (stating after members of the public objected proposed rules, "the INS 
backed off. Instead of defining the national interest officially, the INS set out to define it-
or so say its critics--by stealth."). 
166. No. 3363 (B.l.A. 1998) (interim decision) (providing factors to be considered in 
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same narrowing criteria which the proposed regulations championed.167 In 
other words, the INS made a change in the criteria through informal adjudi-
cation rather than rulemaking. 168 
In this first precedent decision, the INS began to define some of the 
qualifications for the waiver.169 The case established a three-part test for 
evaluating the non-citizen's potential contribution to the national interest. 
First, the employer must show that while the employee will make a contri-
bution in the "national interest," this contribution must be of such signifi-
cant magnitude to outweigh the governmental interest in requiring the labor 
certification market tests.170 The AAO acknowledged that the engineer in 
that case would make a contribution to the design of New York bridges, but 
the sponsor failed to show how that contribution substantially benefited the 
nation as a whole. Second, the employer must demonstrate that the alien 
has a proven track record of accomplishments and that she is individually 
important to the completion of the project or activity.171 Making a contri-
bution to a team of skilled professionals is not sufficient. 172 Third, the 
agency found that even where the employer documents a shortage of avail-
able workers, a labor shortage was not relevant to a determination of the 
national interest.173 
evaluating a national interest waiver request). 
167. See, e.g., Nathan A. Waxman, The New York State Department of Transportation 
Decision: The End of the Road for the National Interest Waiver?, 15 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1289 (1998) (discussing Wax.man's strategy in submitting successful national interest 
waiver cases prior to the issuance of the AAO decision). 
168. See David H.E. Becker, Judicial Review of INS Adjudication: When May the 
Agency Make Sudden Changes in Policy and Apply Its Decisions Retroactively?, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 219 (2000) (discussing New York State Department of Transportation case and set-
ting forth arguments for evaluating the legitimacy of the INS administrative decision in lieu 
ofrulemaking); see generally Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161 (1988) (discussing proposition that agencies are generally free to 
choose between rulemaking or adjudication absent specific statutory restrictions). 
169. See Adam J. Rosser, Note, The National Interest Waiver of IMMACT90, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 165, 166 ( 1999) (claiming case was first to address national interest waiver). 
170. See generally In re New York State Dep 't of Transp., No. 3363 (providing peti-
tioner's employment must be substantial and national in scope). 
171. This element makes it difficult for large employers with highly-skilled personnel to 
argue that any single employee is essential to the national interest. In many unreported de-
cisions, the INS has stated that the strength of the petitioner indicates that the firm will be 
able to continue without the services of the single individual unless that individual can be 
shown to be unique. See GoROON ET AL., supra note 72, § 39.04 (discussing cases where 
petitioning employees are professionals with exceptional ability). 
172. See id. § 39.04 (defining visa applicant's required exceptional ability). 
173. See In re New York State Dep 't of Transp., No. 3363 at 4 (stating waiver is not 
based only on a labor shortage, since "labor certification process is already in place to ad-
dress such shortages."). 
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To qualify for a national interest waiver, Ms. Cheng must meet this 
three-part test. Most likely, the INS will require a third-party expert affi-
davit about her achievements and contributions to the software engineering 
field. She must also have someone outside of her educational institution, 
and not personally interested in her employment, assess her contributions to 
the national economy and the development of this field. 
Determining an individual's chance for approval of a national interest 
waiver is difficult, as previous approvals are unreported. Furthermore, de-
nials of petitions at that level are unpublished and no opinions are prepared 
for approved cases. Although there is a lack of approved cases to serve as 
guidance, informal minutes of liaison meetings between the regional serv-
ice center personnel and the American Immigration Lawyer's Association 
(AILA}, along with word-of-mouth, are all one has to determine what crite-
ria the service center employs in adjudicating cases. Occasionally, a serv-
ice center prepares an informal memorandum discussing evidence or 
documentation needed to support the visa petitions.174 Similarly, but per-
haps more surprising, the AAO does not publish its non-precedent deci-
sions.17s A few publishers, however, gather non-precedent decisions and 
publish them.176 The AAO also designates very few of its decisions as 
precedent.177 Oddly, these cases are published with Board oflmmigration 
174. These infonnal memoranda are not published in the Federal Register, nor made 
public in any systematic way. The usual way to gain access to this infonnation is through 
the AILA publications or experienced immigration attorneys. See, e.g., Texas Service Cen-
ter, National Interest Waiver Advisory lnfonnation Memorandum of May 22, 1998, re-
printed in 17 AILA MONmLY MAILING 670-71 (July/August 1998); California Service 
Center Adjudicating Officers Comments Business Product Line Liaison Meeting on Sep-
tember 18, 1998, reprinted in HOT TOPICS IN EMPLOYMENT BASED IMMIGRATION 62-67 
(Martin L. Rothstein & James D. Acoba eds., 1999). 
175. Interview with Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of Counsel, Tree, Walsh & Miller, LLP, 
Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law School (Sept. 6, 2000) (describing procedures Mat-
thew Bender uses to obtain non-precedent AAO decisions) (notes on file with author). 
176. For example, INTERPRETER RELEASES, a weekly immigration newsletter periodi-
cally provides summaries of non-precedent AAO decisions. See, e.g., AAO Case Summa-
ries, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 183, 183-86 (2000). Matthew Bender also regularly solicits 
unpublished cases from its readers and occasionally publishes summaries of these cases in 
BENDER'S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN, a weekly immigration magazine. According to Daniel 
M. Kowalski, Editor-in-Chief of Bender's Immigration Bulletin, he receives approximately 
two cases a month. This publication is only available to subscribers or in libraries that have 
subscriptions. See Interview with Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of Counsel, True, Walsh & Miller, 
LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law School (June 15, 2000) (notes on file with 
author). 
177. In the past ten years, I could locate only six precedent decisions out of approxi-
mately 4,000 AAO cases per year. See Interview with Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of Counsel, 
True, Walsh & Miller, LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof, Cornell Law School (Sept 6, 2000) 
(notes on file with author). 
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Appeals (BIA) opinions.178 Attorneys specializing in immigration law 
sometimes request the non-precedent decisions under the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA),179 and try to discern trends or consistency in the 
various decisions. 180 Thus, due to the administrative set-up of immigration 
proceedings, it is extremely rare to seek judicial review of the denial of one 
of these waivers.181 
In the end, CSI could conclude that it might be worth the time and ex-
pense of pursuing both the labor certification and the national interest 
waiver simultaneously. There are no regulations precluding the company 
from filing for the labor certification with the Department of Labor, while 
at the same time filing for an exemption with the INS. 182 The company, 
however, may be hesitant to take this course of action, because other for-
eign workers might come to expect CSI to go to this expense for each of 
them. 
The national interest waiver exemplifies the problems that occur when 
Congress fails to set out clear criteria. The agencies involved in adjudica-
tion have little guidance and, therefore, make erratic decisions. The par-
178. Cf INS Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Availability of Service Records, 8 
C.F.R. § l03.9(b) (2001) (requiring retention of all unpublished decisions). The editors at 
Matthew Bender reported it sometimes takes months to obtain access to the unpublished 
cases even though all are supposed to be available at the national reading room. Approxi-
mately once a month they make a new FOIA request. See Interview with Stephen Yale-
Loehr, Of Counsel, True, Walsh & Miller, LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law 
School (Sept. 6, 2000) (notes on file with author) (stating "Matthew Bender uses FOIA to 
obtain non-precedented AAO decisions"); see also E-mail from Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of 
Counsel, Tree, Walsh & Miller, LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law School to 
author (Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with author). 
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
180. See STEPHEN y ALE-LOEHR & RACHEL Joy v ALENTE, TRUE, WALSH & MILLER, LLP 
NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVERS (May 13, 1999) (analyzing national interest waiver as another 
immigrant category), at http://www.twmlaw.com/resources/immigrant/immigrant9.htm; see 
also Phyllis A. Jewell, National Interest Waivers, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 30TH 
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 319, 330-31 (1997) (describing 
flexible approvals for a business executive, computer programmer, anthropologist, and gen-
eral managers). 
I 81. The expense and time involved in seeking judicial review is rarely worth it when 
there is no rule against the employer filing in a different category or even refilling in the 
same category with additional or different evidence. In one rare case, the alien, acting as a 
self-petitioner, successfully challenged the INS denial on the basis that the agency disre-
garded the testimony of experts presented without sufficient explanation of why the evi-
dence was not clear and convincing for eligibility of a waiver. See Laila Mnayer v. INS, 
No. 94-2673, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21932 {S.D. Fla. June 20, 1995). 
182. There are no limits on how many simultaneous petitions it may file with the INS. 
The company could file in the outstanding researcher category while filing in the national 
interest waiver. 
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ticipants, in turn, cannot be sure where their case will come out because the 
system lacks transparency. The lack of reported decisions in this area 
makes advising a client extremely difficult. No attorney can be sure 
whether a particular case will be approved for a national interest waiver be-
cause there are few decisions with which to compare the facts of their case. 
2. Second Stop-INS Immigrant Petition 
Following labor certification, CSI must file an immigrant petition with 
the INS. This petition is made on a form called 1-140. Throughout 1999 
and 2000, the California region of the INS routinely required nearly twelve 
months to adjudicate the immigrant visa petition.183 By the summer of 
2001, the INS reported that processing times were down to approximately 
seven to nine months.184 Added together CSI and Ms. Cheng have survived 
four to five years of waiting before the final stage, Ms. Cheng's individual 
immigrant visa application. This assumes traditional labor certification, 1-
140 processing, and does not take into consideration immigrant visa avail-
ability for second preference emigrants from China.185 As such, the waiting 
period in this second stop varies. 
CSI must file an I-140 petition on behalf of Ms. Cheng demonstrating 
that she is qualified to accept the certified position and that CSI can pay the 
certified wage before she can proceed with her individual application for an 
immigrant visa. The 1-140 petition gives the INS the opportunity to make 
an independent determination concerning Ms. Cheng's qualifications and 
the job as described by CSI in the original labor certification filing. It also 
determines the preference category into which Ms. Cheng will be placed. 
The INA contains five employment-based preference categories that in tum 
are subdivided into approximately twelve subgroups.186 After the filing, 
the INS assigns the approved 1-140 petition a formal "priority date." This 
date will later determine the individual's place in line for a visa under the 
quota limitations.187 For categories requiring labor certification, the INS 
allows the priority date to relate back to the date of the filing of the labor 
certification. For almost all other cases, the priority date is the date of the 
183. The delay rate was calculated by reviewing monthly progress reports published in 
AILA Monthly Mailings, entitled Immigration Today. Confirmation of the delays was con-
firmed by conducting interviews with attorneys in private practice. 
184. The California Region has jurisdiction over CSI's petition because the job is lo-
cated in California. 
185. The second preference is found in INA§ 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(2) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
186. See id. § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b). 
187. See Jay Solomon, Priorities and Preferences: Keeping Place in the Immigrant Visa 
Line, 92 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS l (1992). 
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filing of the I-140 petition.188 
A critical part of determining how long the process takes requires 
knowledge of the demand and quota limits on each of the immigrant visa 
categories. As explained earlier, almost all immigrants are subject to pref-
erence category quota limitations and individuals are further limited if they 
come from a country with high demand for immigration. Furthermore, the 
INA contains a category for employers to sponsor individuals who possess 
an advanced degree or exceptional ability in the arts, sciences, or business 
in a permanent position that requires the education and skill level. This 
category is called employment-based second preference (EB-2).189 Each 
year, a minimum of 40,040 of the 140,000 employment-based visas are al-
located to this category.190 
It is likely that Ms. Cheng, because of her master's degree, fits in this 
category. The INS ultimately determines whether Ms. Cheng meets the 
statutory qualifications for inclusion in this higher preference category. In-
clusion in a higher category may mean that Ms. Cheng avoids the potential 
of quota limitations which add to the processing delays she will have al-
ready experienced. For example, for most people, the employment-based 
second preference category is available regardless of the individual's prior-
ity date, but in the employment-based third preference the category has fre-
quently been subject to a several year backlog. Most importantly, because 
of high visa demand in India and China, these countries have experienced 
several quota delays in both the second and third employment-based pref-
erences. Unfortunately, Ms. Cheng is from one of these oversubscribed 
countries and, therefore, she will want to have as high a preference as pos-
sible. 
In an effort to ensure the earliest immigration date possible, CSI and Ms. 
Cheng will seek classification in the second preference based on CSI' s re-
quirement of a master's degree for the position. As stated earlier, the INS 
examines the job requirements as described in the initial labor certification 
to the Department of Labor. Therefore, it is important that CSI describe the 
position as one requiring an advanced degree. While the petitioning proc-
ess after the completion of labor certification takes twelve months, no one 
188. Learning to preserve, trade, and recapture priority dates is one of the prized skills in 
immigration law. See Dep't of State Visas: Documentation of Immigrants under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 42.53(b)-(c) (2001) (providing guide-
lines to obtaining different priority dates); see also Solomon, supra note 187, at 1-2 (ex-
plaining how priority dates are obtained, maintained, transferred, and lost). 
189. See generally GoRDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 39.04 (explaining EB-2 visa cate-
gory). 
190. See INA§ 201(d), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(d) (1994) (outlining calculation procedure for 
worldwide level of employment-based immigrants). 
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can predict exactly when Ms. Cheng's priority date will authorize her to 
apply for adjustment of status to become a permanent resident. Only when 
her priority date matches or precedes the dates listed by the Department of 
State can she move to the final stop on the immigration map. Furthermore, 
the INS could challenge the bona fide nature of CSI's master's degree re-
quirement, notwithstanding Department of Labor approval. 
Recently, this conflicting treatment of the master's degree requirement 
resulted in a class action lawsuit that required the INS to approve moot 
cases for EB-2 classification. The lawsuit arose because the INS began to 
reinterpret Department of Labor standard requirements for recruitment of 
positions requiring advance degrees. For a number of years Region IX191 
of the Department of Labor required employers to expand a master's de-
gree requirement to a master's degree or five years of progressive experi-
ence. The philosophy of the Department of Labor was to expand the pool 
of U.S. workers qualified for entry-level high-tech positions.192 When an 
employer insisted that only persons with master's degrees were qualified, 
the employer had to document why the degree was essential and that the 
requirement was a reasonable and standard requirement of the position. In 
some cases, the non-citizen did not have a master's degree but the em-
ployer wished to require a master's degree or work experience equivalent 
to more closely capture the minimum requirements of the position and also 
position the alien for qualification in the advanced degree preference cate-
gory. Hundreds of labor certifications stated that the employer's minimum 
requirement was a master's degree or progressive experience. For many 
years, the California Service Center of the INS approved I-140 immigrant 
petitions classifying aliens who had these labor certifications in the em-
ployment-based second preference category. 
In 1997, the California Service Center of the INS suddenly denied these 
I-140 petitions, stating the alien was not a qualified advanced degree holder 
or that the employer did not genuinely require an advanced degree for the 
position because the labor certification provided for an alternative. After 
denials, several employers and aliens successfully challenged the INS ad-
judication on a number of legal and procedural grounds.193 
191. Region IX includes California, Hawaii, and Arizona. In the most recent Depart-
ment of Labor reorganization, this region will expand to include Oregon and Washington. 
192. One of the contentions of the software engineering community is that employers 
discriminate against older software engineers in favor of foreign workers. Many critics of 
the immigration pol.icy allege that this discrimination keeps wages lower. See, e.g., Norman 
Matloff, Editorial, High-Tech Cheap Labor, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2000, at A35; Alexander 
Nguyen, High Tech Migrant Labor, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 1999, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/print/VI 113/nguyen-a.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
193. See, e.g., Chintakuntla v. INS, No. C-99-521 l MMC (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2000) 
(granting permanent injunction and class certification via court order). 
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What are the lessons of this litigation? While some might dismiss the 
INS' actions as a blunder or blame poor drafting of the labor certification 
by the employer, the conflict illustrates several problems. First, it signifies 
that the INS adjudicators are leery of basing immigration benefits on edu-
cational attainment. The INS took the ambiguous standard in the statutory 
provisions to mean second preference is not only limited to individuals 
with advanced degrees, but the offered position must itself require an ad-
vanced degree for performance of the job duties.194 Perhaps this is a rea-
sonable interpretation by the agency, but ifthe job requirements are of such 
significance, Congress should have been more explicit.195 Given there is no 
requirement that the immigrant remain in the position for any particular pe-
riod after immigrating, it would also be reasonable to assume that Congress 
sought to measure the value of the immigrant by their past academic 
achievements and not by the precise work to be performed.196 
More important, however, is the aspect of this litigation which demon-
strates how the lack of coordination between the Department of Labor and 
to: 
194. The exact language of the provision is that second preference visas may be issued 
[Q]ualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced de-
grees or their equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, 
arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cul-
tural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States, and whose services in 
the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an employer in the United 
States. 
INA§ 203(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 l53(b)(2)(A) (1994). 
This Article is not meant to debate the merits of the substantive provisions, people with 
high education versus lower education, etc. However, the story is an example that policy 
makers should heed if serious consideration is given to a point system. Today's agency ad-
judicators do not appear to value the degree as a clear dividing line among potential benefi-
ciaries. Cf PAPADEMETRJOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60, at 144 (advocating selecting 
immigrants for their skills rather than tying immigration to any particular job offer given 
reluctance of Congress to mandate remaining same position). 
195. For example, where Congress was skeptical about the value of degrees standing 
alone, they specifically said so. Consider the provision concerning the definition of"excep-
tional ability:" 
In determining under subparagraph (A) whether an immigrant has exceptional ability, 
the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, uni-
versity, school, or other institution of learning or a license to practice or certification 
for a particular profession or occupation shall not by itself be considered sufficient 
evidence of such exceptional ability. 
INA§ 203(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1 J53(b)(2)(C). 
196. Designing time requirements for any position is problematic and undoubtedly con-
troversial because it would create a form of "indentured" employment. However, the con-
tinued delays and obstacles in processing immigration cases are creating de facto forms of 
indentures. 
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the INS adjudications resulted in conflicts for the agencies and for the par-
ticipants in the system. Certainly the class action resolved some of the is-
sues, but the litigation was years in formation. 197 Hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands, of employers considered these conflicting adjudications and decided 
how to handle the problem in the preparation of the labor certification and 
visa petitions. The turmoil and uncertainty resulted in additional costs and 
added months to the processing times because adjudicators more closely 
examined the employer's criteria for employment. The fact the litigation 
was decided adversely to the INS also harms the system in that it may en-
courage other challenges to the agency interpretations, or, at least, it makes 
the participants in the system Jess trustful of the agency interpretations. 
By delegating the labor certification to the Department of Labor, with its 
mission of broadening the recruitment in search of qualified workers, and 
the role of visa petition adjudication to the INS, which is concerned with 
the over expansive use of the higher preference categories, Congress 
planted the seeds of conflict. Often the procedures implementing the adju-
dications reflect little awareness of the other agencies' adjudication proce-
dures or even of the documentary record submitted in the first adjudica-
tion.198 Instead, Congress should have provided for some high level of 
oversight, policy development, and strategic planning necessary to the 
communication of the rules to the participants and to an expeditious and 
consistent adjudication. 
3. Third Stop-Visa Petition in Hand 
Following approval of the 1-140 procedure, Ms. Cheng may adjust her 
status when her priority date is current. Each month the Department of 
State reports the current priority dates for each of the visa categories. An 
experienced attorney can usually approximate the visa movement based on 
past experience, but cannot guarantee that the quota wil1 be available on 
any particular date.199 For example, in 1998 and 1999 the EB-2 category 
J 97. The INS did not amend its regulations; however, it did adopt a policy memorandum 
seeking to clarify the standards for advanced degree requirements. See Memorandum from 
Michael D. Cronin, INS Acting Associate Commissioner Office of Programs, and William 
R. Yates, INS Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner Office of Field Operations, to all 
Service Center Directors and all Regional Directors (Mar. 20, 2000), reprinted in Opportu-
nity to File Untimely Motions to Reconsider Decisions Denying EB-2 Immigrant Visa Peti-
tions, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,093, 41,095 (July 3, 2000) ,(clarifying requirements, which govern 
immigrant visa petitions under second preference category). 
198. See infra Part III (discussing similar conflict between Department of Labor and 
INS treatment of past employment experience). 
199. The Department of State does not publish estimates of waiting times. Rather, it 
provides a monthly VISA BULLETIN listing the dates of the petitions currently being accepted 
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became backlogged for people born in China or India but remained current 
for all other countries. 20° For several months of both fiscal year 1999 and 
2000, the Department of State reported that the EB-2 category was over-
subscribed because of the country quota limitation. 201 As the fiscal year 
progressed and the Department of State realized fewer visas had been is-
sued to nationals of India and China in this category, the Department of 
State removed the two year wait and listed the category as immediately 
current for the last month of the fiscal year.202 Although many individuals 
filed for adjustment of status or immigrant visa processing in that final 
month, not all visas could be issued under such short notice. As a result in 
fiscal year 1998, despite qualified immigrants from India and China, only 
14,384 of 40,040 EB-2 visas were issued.203 These low numbers worsened 
in 1999, when only thirty-eight percent of all the employment-based visas 
were actually used.204 
The EB-2 backlog of 1999 demonstrates that often the procedures put 
into place to implement the adjudications reflect little awareness of the 
other agencies' adjudication procedures or even of the documentary record 
submitted in the first adjudication. The lack of high-level oversight, policy 
development, and day-to-day coordination exacerbate the problems created 
by the statutory requirements. 
Was this erratic EB-2 visa movement due to the substantive limits of the 
for processing. A prediction of future visa eligibility is technically impossible but trends in 
quota delays can be guessed at by observing months, if not years, of prior movement. See 
State Dep 't Explains Immigrant Visa Numerical Control System, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
901, 913 (2000) (defining key terms essential to understanding priority date movement). 
200. See 8 VISA BULL. (1999) (listing EB-2 visa applicants from India and China as 
oversubscribed and thus rejected during the month of July), available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/9907bulletin.html. 
201. See id (indicating establishment of quotas for nations from which number of visa 
applicants received exceeded statutory or regulatory limits). Visa applicants who created 
demand in excess of their respective nations' quota resulted in that foreign state being 
deemed "oversubscribed." See id. 
202. Telephone Interview with Charles Oppenheim, Chief of the Immigrant Visa Con-
trol and Reporting Division, Department of State (July 17, 2001) (explaining his office has 
no hard data from INS about approved immigrant visa petitions). The INS does not main-
tain a nationwide inventory broken down by visa preference category, and aggregate data is 
not useful. The Visa Office makes the calculation of visa availability based on the actual 
number of visas issued in the prior months. Moreover, simply knowing the total number of 
approved visa petitions is rather like knowing how many ticki;:ts have been issued but does 
not predict whether or when. the sponsored indjvidual will actually choose to use the visa. 
See id. 
203. See supra Figure I, p. 215. Immigrants admitted by major Category of Admission: 
FY s 1995-98. As of September 2000, the 1999 information has not been released although 
the fiscal year ended in September 1999. 
204. See supra Figure 1, p. 215 (depicting gap in visa issuance). 
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quota numbers and country origins or was it due to process failures within 
the agencies responsible for calculating visa movement? At least in part, 
the perceived backlog was due to a failure of the INS to timely adjudicate 
and report 1-140 immigrant petitions. The Department of State received a 
large number of approvals from the INS in the spring of 1999.205 Accord-
ingly it predicted larger annual demand and moved the visa processing date 
backward to avoid issuing visas in excess of the annual cap. However, the 
increase in approval rates did not signal a new and higher demand for visas, 
but rather, the inefficiency and inconsistency of INS adjudication. The 
process failure of one agency and lack of information about the failure, led 
another agency to a second process dilemma which in turn has generated a 
third process problem. 
Delay distorts the entire immigration system. One of the most dramatic 
examples is the erratic movement of the quota dates. When the INS does 
not process adjustment of status cases at the rates nonnally expected, or in 
205. Here is text from a 1995 VISA BULLETIN, which illustrates the problem: 
NOTE ON FUTURE PREFERENCE VISA AVAILABILITY 
Cut-off date movement in several immigrant categories during the first five 
months of FY-1995 has been greater than might ordinarily be expected. This is be-
cause fewer applicants are appearing for interview or obtaining visas at consular posts 
abroad as a result of the 1994 amendment to the adjustment of status provision in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). (Most qualified immigrant visa applicants 
who are in the United States may now seek adjustment of status through INS even if 
they are not in lawful nonimmigrant status; previously, most applicants who were not 
maintaining lawful visa status were prohibited from such adjustment at INS and had 
to travel abroad to make their formal immigrant visa applications. Further, the INA 
now stipulates that most persons who are NOT in lawful nonimmigrant status at the 
time of departure from the U.S. cannot be issued immigrant visas at a consular office 
abroad within 90 days of such departure. These provisions taken together have re-
sulted in fewer immigrant visa applications at consular offices since October 1994 
and more applications filed with INS for adjustment of status.) 
Although visa number use at consular offices has thus declined, the corresponding 
increase in INS number use has not yet become apparent, since INS offices will need 
time to process the adjustment of status applications. The result has been a temporary 
decrease in visa number use, which has permitted faster cut-off date movements. 
Once the cases of the additional adjustment of status applicants begin to be 
brought to final action in large volume, there will be a significant increase in INS visa 
number use and cut-off date movements will necessarily slow or stop. Moreover, in 
some categories (such as the "Other Worker" category, for instance, where there has 
been particularly rapid recent cut-off date movement), cut-off date retrogression is a 
defi.nite possibility. . 
Interested parties should be aware that the recent rate of cut-off date advances will 
not continue indefinitely, but it is not possible to say at present how soon a signifi-
cantly increased INS number use will influence the cut-off date determinations. 
7 VISA BULL. 46 (1995), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/ 
9502bulletin.html. 
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some cases, suspends adjudication altogether because the officers are 
working on other types of petitions, the Department of State has no way to 
predict future visa availability.206 The Visa Office predictions of future 
availability are necessarily conservative for there is no data source, which 
tells the officers how many people will apply for immigration in any one 
month.207 Although the Visa Office knew hundreds of approved immigrant 
petitions awaited action in pending adjustment of status applications, the 
office bases its calculation of visa movement on the demand in the prior 
month.208 The Visa Office then predicts future visa demand based on the 
prior month movement and adjusts the priority dates accordingly. When 
the INS is not processing cases or is doing so very slowly, the demand ap-
pears to fall and the Visa Office reports no backlog in the category. But, as 
the INS adjudicates cases in large batches, the Visa Office suddenly reports 
a multi-year delay in the category. Although the Visa Office tries to warn 
those waiting that movement may be erratic, it takes an experienced ob-
server to understand the movement of the visa backlogs. This problem was 
particularly acute from 1995 through 1998 when the second and third pref-
erence categories appeared to be current, only to retrogress several years 
for nationals of India and China due to batch processing by the INS.209 
206. In an August AILA liaison questions and answers session with the Vennont Serv-
ice Center (VSC), AILA asked, "Why has the processing ofl-130's remained stagnant for at 
least the past five months?" The VSC answered, "A while back, HQ provided the VSC with 
a list of priorities, i.e. I-90's, TPS, 765's, etc. I-130's were not considered a priority at that 
time; consequently we have not touched these." See AILA's 1999 Annual Conference on 
Immigration Law, available at http://www.alia.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2001). 
207. Simply counting the number of approved immigration petitions is not sufficient, for 
people sometimes do not choose to pursue immigration at the time their petition is approved 
or for some other reason they are temporarily ineligible to immigrate. Because dependent 
family members are also counted in this immigrant category, but the I-140 petition does not 
identify the total number of family members, who will accompany the immigrant, there is 
no way to predict the exact number of visas required even if one could count I-140 petitions. 
208. The Visa Office measures demand by recording phone call requests from INS offi-
cers to the Visa Office. Demand is also measured by visa issuance at the posts around the 
world. The Visa Office makes its calculation during the first week of each calendar month 
after the visa use of the prior month is tallied. See, e.g., 8 VISA BULL. 24 (2000) (describing 
visa availability and publication dates), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_ 
bulletin/2000-IObulletin.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2002). 
209. See 8 VISA BULL. 21 (2000) (reporting employment based petitions in second pref-
erence category are current only for petitions with priority dates before April 15, 1998, and 
in third preference :wait goes back to petitions which. predate June 1, 1997), available .at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/2000-08bulletin.html. The backlogs for India 
are similar: second preference requires a priority date of prior to September 15, 1999, and 
for third preference before February 1, 1997. See id.; see also 8 VISA BULL. 14 (2000) 
(showing no backlog in this category), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/ 
visa_bulletin/2000-0lbulletin.html; 8 VISA BULL. 23 (2000) (indicating there is only a 
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Furthennore, the inability to estimate the demand meant the Visa Office 
sometimes had to aim short, resulting in fewer visas being issued in the 
year than authorized by the quota.210 In an effort to fix the problem, Con-
gress created a "band-aid" approach by recapturing the unused visas of fis-
cal years 1999 and 2000 and adding them to the per country cap in an at-
tempt to restore the level of some of the employment-based visas.211 
Whenever the State Department indicates the numbers are current for a 
visa category, or moves the quota priority date significantly, individuals 
waiting in the backlog can immediately file for either adjustment of status 
or immigrant visa processing.212 If the quota subsequently retrogresses and 
the individual's priority date is no longer current, they are not denied ad-
justment or visa processing, instead the adjudication of their individual pe-
tition is held in limbo. 
Moreover, for non-citizens seeking adjustment of status, like Ms. Cheng, 
the limbo status is not necessarily a benign state. Dependent family mem-
bers are not entitled to work authorization and may need pennission to 
travel outside the United States while the adjustment of status application is 
pending. If the limbo continues for a long period, and in some situations 
the retrogression has lasted an entire fiscal year and in other cases, a period 
of many months, Ms. Cheng may need renewal of the work authorization 
and travel pennission. Another typical headache of the limbo status is that 
several pieces of evidence necessary to the adjustment application become 
stale or unusable. Fingerprints required to detennine if the applicant has a 
criminal record are valid for fifteen months, while medical exams com-
pleted with designated physician remain valid for only twelve months. 
Thus, both the Department of State and INS have to keep track of and 
hold in indefinite status these limbo cases. Due to the large number of vi-
sas allocated for fiscal year 2001 and the inability of INS to give estimates 
of anticipated demand, the Visa Office opened the employment-based cate-
gories in July and August of 2001.213 By posting these categories with no 
current backlog, any worker in any employment-based category could file 
for adjustment of status or overseas visa processing. Suddenly, individuals 
who thought they had to wait years for an immigrant visa were now eligible 
backlog for nationals of India and China in this category), available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/2000-09bulletin.html; see generally 8 VISA 
BULL. 16 (2000) (describing erratic movement of priority dates), available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa _ bulletin/2000-03 bulletin.html. 
210. See supra Figure I, p. 215. 
211. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 § 102(b) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of8 U.S.C.) (discussing purposes for Act). 
212. See id 
213. See 8 VISA BULL. 23 (2000), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_ 
bulletin/2000-09bulletin.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
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to file for immigration. If thousands of people take advantage of this new 
eligibility and file, the INS will face large new workloads. Eventually as 
the agency reports this new demand, the Visa Office will reestablish the cut 
off dates in some, or potentially all categories. Another side effect of 
posting open visa categories is that it could lead to the erroneous perception 
by some employers or non-citizens that the easy way to immigrate to this 
country is through employment. The Visa Bulletin cannot give an accurate 
picture of the real demands because there is no statutory mandate that the 
INS report accurate or necessary information to the Visa Office. 
If Ms. Cheng navigates the labor certification process or the waiver, and 
successfuJiy obtains the right I-140 preference classification, she can at last 
proceed to her individual application for permanent resident status. If she 
has managed to retain her non-immigrant status through the many years of 
processing and has never violated her status with unauthorized work or 
travel, she can apply for adjustment of status, a procedure which will allow 
her to transfer from non-immigrant to permanent resident.214 
In major U.S. cities, the adjustment of status procedure requires a wait of 
twelve to thirty-six months. During this wait, Ms. Cheng may not travel 
outside the United States without permission.215 However, she and her de-
pendent family members may receive work authorization during the ad-
justment application period. If she determines that overseas immigrant 
processing in her native country might be more expeditious, she can pursue 
that route. However, if Ms. Cheng failed to identify that choice at the time 
CSI filed the I-140 petition, she may face an additional twelve-month delay 
before the INS notifies the Department of State of her eligibility for immi-
grant visa processing. Even assuming she originally selected the overseas 
214. Cf INA§ 245(k), 8 U.S.C. § 1221(k) (1994) (discussing exception). See INS Ad-
justment of Status to that of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 245.2 
(2001) (discussing criteria for exemptions). 
215. The INS amended the regulation to allow H-IB and L-1 non-immigrants to travel 
provided that the underlying non-immigrant petition was valid at the time they seek reentry. 
See Adjustment of Status; Continued Validity of Nonimmigrant Status, Unexpired Em-
ployment Authorization, and Travel Authorization for Certain Applicants Maintaining 
Nonimmigrant Hor L Status, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,208-12 (June 1, 1999) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 
214.2, 245). The requirement of obtaining advanced parole for all travel, while an individ-
ual is going through the adjustment of status procedures, has been one of the most criticized 
requirements. The INS has maintained that once an individual files an application for ad-
justment of status she has demonstrated an intent to remain permanently in the United States 
and thus, the INS cannot allow readmission using a non-immigrant visa. A second rationale 
for requiring parole is that an individual who enter the U.S. territory under a grant of parole 
has not clearly been admitted and thus may be subject to exclusion rather than deportation. 
Given the 1996 amendments which in many respects unified the exclusion and deportation 
procedures into single removal procedures, there no longer appears to be a sound rationale 
for requiring the parole procedure. See Part IV.A for a related reform proposal. 
2002] BREAKING BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS 259 
adjudication process, delays at some posts are more than six months and in 
countries where immigration demand is high, a wait of one year is not ex-
ceptional. 
However, the decision to choose overseas processing is also subject to 
timing and adjudication risks. Let us imagine that Ms. Cheng, in an effort 
to avoid the multi-year delay for adjustment of status in the United States, 
requests processing of her immigrant visa petition in her home country. In 
several countries, notwithstanding the size of the territory or the popula-
tion, the Department of State only authorizes a single post to issue immi-
grant visas. In China that post is Guangzho. The workload at these posts 
varies, but in most situations, the Department of State reports that immi-
grant visa processing can be scheduled within two to four months of re-
ceiving the approved 1-140 petition. At times, Department of State re-
sources have not been sufficient to meet demand and at some posts, the 
delays can approach one year.216 
Even when her interview date is reached, Ms. Cheng may face another 
re-adjudication of her eligibility for inclusion in the employment-based 
second preference. It is possible for a consular officer to return a petition 
to the INS for reassessment of the bona tides of the petition.217 The consu-
lar officer may be skeptical of the employee's qualifications for the labor 
certification or of the company's ability to pay the wage certified in the pe-
tition. CSI, as a large employer, should not face this problem, and Ms. 
Cheng's U.S. master's degree also mitigates against consular suspicion, but 
the consular officer does have the power to return petitions to the INS for 
investigation or reconsideration for revocation.218 These overlapping juris-
216. Haiti is an example of a post that has experienced long delays. See Interview with 
Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, 
Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on file with author). 
217. While the consular officer does not have the authority to revoke the immigrant pe-
tition, the consul may refuse to issue an immigrant petition where the evidence suggests that 
the employer could not prove it can pay the certified wage. See Dep't of State Visas: 
Documentation of Immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 
C.F.R. § 42.81 (2001). While the regulations state the consular may not re-adjudication pe-
titions, the consular can refuse to issue the immigrant visa unless the INS reaffirms its ap-
proval of the immigrant petition. See DEP'T OF STATE. 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANuAL § 42.43 
(2001), available at http://www.foia.state.gov/fam/fams.asp?level=2&id=IO&fam=O. The 
Department of Labor has granted the INS and consular officers the authority to invalidate 
labor certifications where they believe the certification was secured by fraud or misrepre-
sentation. See Employ~ent & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent 
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.JO(d) (2001). The problems 
create by these overlapping jurisdictions are considered in Part Ill. See infra Part III.B.1 
(discussing sources of process obstacles). 
218. See INS, Revocation of Approval of Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 205 (2001) (promulgating 
requirements for revocation of immigrant petitions); see also 20 C.F.R. § 656.JO(d) (reiter-
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dictions and redundant adjudications are usually justified as necessary to 
detect or deter fraud. Even if a consular officer issues an immigrant visa 
stamp in a passport, when Ms. Cheng arrives at the U.S. border, the INS 
inspector may once again make an independent detennination about her 
eligibility for the visa classification and her admissibility.219 
Still, the clients want to know how long the process will take.220 No one 
can predict the exact processing times because of system complexity and 
the lack of infonnation from the·agencies. The best anyone can do is ex-
plain the basic patterns and time frames experienced by similarly situated 
clients. Adding all of these procedures together, CSI and Ms. Cheng may 
wait several years for the labor certificate, unless Ms. Cheng qualifies un-
der some of the streamlined procedures. Then, they could potentially wait 
one year for the immigrant visa petition and one to two years to complete 
the adjustment procedures or overseas processing. The bottom line is, it 
ating consular revocation authority). See, e.g., Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 
425 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding INS has independent authority to determine whether factual 
inaccuracies in labor certification meant the immigrant obtained his visa by fraud or misrep-
resentation-remanded for inquiry). Immigration attorneys have been very critical of this 
procedure because the result of a referral to the INS is that the case usually falls into a 
"black hole." See Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, 
Regulations and Advisory Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on 
file with author). Attorneys regularly file mandamus actions to force the Department of 
State to adjudicate the case as approved by the INS because the INS takes no action on these 
returned cases. See id. This is an obvious example of a problem for the government sys-
tems as well, because there is no clear authority or procedure established for the handling of 
suspicious or fraudulent cases. See id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing recommendations 
for fraud investigations). 
219. The most likely ground of inadmissibility would be an allegation of fraud or mis-
representation in the visa application. See INA§ 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). Immigration law contains multiple grounds of exclusion, which may bar a 
person's entry to the United States. See id. These include criminal conduct, terrorist activ-
ity or affiliation, past immigration violations, poverty, illness, and the examiner's assess-
ment of the person's intentions regarding their stay in the United States. See generally id 
§ 1182(a). 
220. Some employers have already encountered employees who select job offers based 
on the ability of that employer to expedite the immigration process. See Interview with 
Margie Jones, Immigration Specialist, Intel Corporation (Aug. 15, 2000) (on file with 
author). The clients will also ask how much will it cost. Most attorneys who specialize in 
immigration law charge a flat fee for the various steps in the immigration process rather 
than a charge for the hours spent in pursuit of the client's goals. As process obstacles have 
multiplied, attorneys have sometimes added hourly or additional fees when a client requires 
that the attorney try to expedite the. petition or hound the agency in. the hope that the 
"squeaky wheel" will make the adjudication proceed more quickly. In addition, the clients 
will undoubtedly face additional procedural costs due to the need to extend or renew non-
immigrant status or to pursue interim work authorization or permission to travel during the 
last step in the immigration process. See Interview with Attorney Frances Berger, Law Of-
fice of Frances Berger (Aug. 8, 2000) (on file with author). 
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takes a total of four to seven years for completion. Lastly, CSI must con-
tinue to offer Ms. Cheng the same position throughout this process. Fur-
thermore, Ms. Cheng must accept the terms and conditions of employment 
as described in the underlying petition, regardless of the length of time re-
quired to complete the adjudication procedures. A simple promotion or 
change of job location could invalidate the entire petition. 
As previously mentioned, if CSI wants to ensure the recruitment will 
satisfy the Department of Labor, they will choose the regular labor certifi-
cation process. This process typically requires three to four years in most 
of the busy regions. If they are willing to gamble that the prior recruitment 
is sufficient, or are willing to invest six months of recruitment designed to 
satisfy the Reduction in Recruitment criteria, they may get a result within 
two to four months.221 However, process delays are not limited to the De-
partment ofLabor.222 They are only the first stop on the immigration map. 
Moreover, the entire petition is predicated on the concept that Ms. 
Cheng is going to accept a specific job with CSI.223 The employer must 
remain a viable business and must continue to offer the position certified 
by the Department of Labor or approved by the INS. Since even relatively 
minor changes can invalidate the petition, the participants in the process 
often feel ethically bound to continue outmoded employment relationships 
solely to aid the individual in completing the immigration process. In other 
situations, the parties will simply agree not to inform the government about 
the changes. The ethical pressures put on all the participants, are caused 
largely by the lengthy process, and are enormous.224 
. Long processing times for adjustment of status also exacerbate hardship 
to the applicant if the application for adjustment of status is ultimately de-
nied. The family can rarely be returned to the prior non-immigrant status 
22 l. See supra Part Il.C. l.d (discussing Reduction in Recruitment). 
222. As will later be shown, the Department of Labor appears to be on the verge of im-
plementing dramatic streamlining of its adjudication approach in an effort to eliminate all 
backlogs. See infra text accompanying notes 272-81 (discussing Department of Labor proc-
essing and reforms). 
223. Although the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act created 
some limited options for non-citizens to change employers, in general, the worker is de-
pendent on the employer to continue to offer the job throughout the entire long road to im-
migrant status. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, 
§ 104, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (Supp. V 1999) . 
. 224. It is a common theme in ethical literature designed for use by immigration lawyers 
to discuss how to handle the situation where either the employer or the employee has in-
formed the attorney of an intention to terminate or alter the employment relationship. See, 
e.g., AM. IMMJGR. LAWYERS Ass'N, Ennes AND YOUR IMMIGRATION PRACTICE: HAVE YOU 
CONSIDERED .... (Alfonso Caprara et al. eds., 1998). See also supra note 98 and accompa-
nying text. 
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due to the long processing delay and so, if a family is denied adjustment of 
status processing, they may face a period of unauthorized presence in the 
United States. Although denials of adjustment of status in business immi-
gration cases are fairly rare, the hardship mounts when there is a delay in 
the adjudication of the original application.225 
Obviously, the effect of the erratic processing is confusion, lack of pre-
dictability, and aggravated participants. The less obvious impact is that 
people can get caught in the middle of immigrant processing and, as was 
previously explained, the Jong period of "limbo" increases the need for the 
INS to make repeat adjudications of the essential elements of the adjust-
ment of status application. 
III. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM AT ITS ROOTS 
A. Integrity, Efficiency, and Transparency: The Essential Process Values 
Where did all of the delay, confusion, and redundant procedures come 
from? Why is it so difficult for attorneys, let alone the immigrants, to un-
derstand how to get from there to here.226 The process obstacles are largely 
the result of the fundamental structure of the immigration adjudication 
system. 227 This structure is built out of the substantive statutory provisions, 
the tripartite delegation to agencies with conflicting missions, and the spe-
cific culture of the immigration adjudication system. In combination, or 
separately, these fundamental structural elements undermine the essential 
values that are necessary to promote an effective and strong adjudication 
system.228 I describe each value briefly before examining the sources of 
225. The INS Yearbook reports that the traditional denial rate is seven percent of all 
adjustment of status applications. See 1997 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 17. 
226. As will be discussed later, these problems also frustrate people within the agencies 
and unnecessarily complicate the adjudications. 
227. Following in the tradition of administrative reform papers sponsored by ACUS, I 
have both identified structural and statutory factors that contributed to the problems in the 
adjudications and developed paradigmatic criteria essential to effective reforms. Professor 
David Martin identified similar structural problems in his analysis of the INS adjudication 
of political asylum claims during the late 1980s. See generally Martin, supra note 26 (ar-
riving at similar conclusions by attributing problems in process to its fundamental structure). 
228. Professor Martin also identified four key objectives of a good asylum adjudication 
scheme: speed, fairness, accuracy, and consistency. See Martin, supra note 26, at 1322-36. 
Professor Martin referred to these criteria as key objectives, I will borrow the term process 
values from Jerry Mashaw. See MASHAW, supra note I, at 88; see also Robert S. Summers, 
Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. 
R.Ev. I, 3 (1974) (attributing rationality, humanity, and regard for dignity and privacy as 
"process values"). Although Summers and Mashaw grounded the process values in the re-
quirements of Constitutional Due Process, I use the term more broadly to reflect those val-
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process failures, and the way in which these values are inadequately fos-
tered and protected. 
The first of these values, and the most essential to the ability of the ad-
ministrative adjudication to conform to the substantive law, is integrity. 
The integrity of the adjudication system measures the degree to which it 
produces accurate, consistent, and fair results. Accuracy ensures the law is 
being carried out, and not undennined through error or fraud. 229 Consis-
tency, not only of outcome, but also of treatment along the way, is required 
to maintain fairness among and between participants, and thus, is necessary 
to foster respect for and trust in the system.230 In addition, consistency al-
lows the agency to anticipate and manage workloads, as well as to evaluate 
agency perfonnance. 
Obviously the need to protect the integrity of the decision making is a 
difficult task. As will be discussed below, the desire to produce accurate 
and correct adjudications must be balanced against the burdens on the ap-
plicants and the resources available to fund the agency operations. Frankly, 
the fear of fraud is one of the single most important aspects of immigration 
adjudication and any procedural reforms must give adequate consideration 
to this concern. 
An efficient system successfully manages the agency resources to com-
plete accurate.adjudications by acting in a timely manner. Efficiency also 
refers to the ability of the system to carry out congressional mandates with-
ues and other qualities that are important while not constitutionally required. 
Similarly, Professor Stephen Legomsky evaluated the existing forms of administrative 
and judicial review of a wide range of immigration related adjudications. See Legomsky, 
supra note 26, at 1313 (citing Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The 
Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REY. 108, 
111-12 (1964)) (discussing three goals of any administrative process). Legomsky focused 
on essential process values or goals of good administrative process: accuracy, efficiency, 
acceptability (meaning perceived fairness), and the requirement of consistency. See id He 
emphasized the need to integrate the study of adjudication objectives with an understanding 
of the attributes of the cases and the attributes of the organization making the adjudication. 
See id. To choose the optimum forum, the administrative process designer must consider 
both the task and the organization. See generally David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Ju-
dicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (1975). 
229. Accuracy alone is insufficient From the agency perspective, preventing "false 
positives" is one of the most important design features. See Martin, supra note 26, at 1267-
70 (using this term). 
230. When the 1986 legalization programs ~ent into operation, the low level. of evi-
dence needed to qualify for amnesty as a Seasonal Agricultural Worker may have contrib-
uted to the distrust the adjudicators demonstrated in reviewing the applications of many 
groups. The claims of black Haitian agricultural workers were denied at a rate many times 
greater than the denial rates of white workers. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 962 (11th 
Cir. 1984), modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
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out unnecessary duplication, delay, and costs. Efficiency is important to 
any adjudication system, but it is doubly so here where the decisions con-
trol the lives of the immigrant and her family and may be of central eco-
nomic importance to the sponsoring employer. The lack of resources or the 
mismanagement of resources has led to long processing delays and redun-
dant procedures. In a system with so many parts, efficiency requires that 
resources be distributed fairly and appropriately. Moreover, efficient man-
agement would integrate the operation of each part with the whole. 
Transparency ensures that participants in a system are able to understand 
both its substantive legal requirements and the processes employed to attain 
them.231 It refers, as well, to the participant's abilities to predict with rea-
sonable accuracy the likely outcomes of proceedings. It is of especially 
great importance in a system administered by three agencies that play dif-
fering, but related, roles.232 Systems that lack transparency are likely to 
lack consistency as well, thus, undermining the system's integrity and; 
therefore, respect for the system. Lack of transparency also impedes effi-
ciency by creating increased numbers of appeals and reviews, as well as in-
appropriate applications and requests.233 
B. Process Values Undermined: Three Sources of Bureaucratic Borders 
1. Process Choices in Substantive Statutory Provisions 
Statutes sometimes specify the procedures to be followed in carrying out 
231. Other writers have used the term transparency as the measure of clarity in the sub-
stantive provision of law. Transparency is an important factor in measuring the precision of 
the Jaw. See Diver, supra note I, at 76 (focusing primarily on the transparency of substance 
rather than on the clarity of the procedures used); see also MASHA w, supra note I, at 90 
(stating "the transparency of a decision process-its openness and comprehensibility-will 
make a worthwhile contribution to the sense of self-respect of any participant .... ''). 
232. Because the three agencies should coordinate actions, the lack of transparency in 
procedures makes it more difficult to manage that coordination. Moreover, the technologi-
cal systems of the agencies are so poor that it is extremely difficult to locate and track indi-
vidual petitions. When agency managers cannot estimate the workload or productivity of 
existing adjudicators, it is extremely difficult to reduce backlogs, or identify necessary im-
provements. Even when the GAO or Congress is critical of one of the agency's systems and 
workload management, the critic rarely considers the larger inter-agency complications. 
See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 28. The report does not mention the need for the INS to 
coordinate technological systems with the Department of State or the Department of Labor. 
233. Professors Diver and Sofaer concluded that the vague standards in the adjustment 
of status provisions and the failure of the INS to either adopt rules or to publish cases con-
cerning the exercise of discretion in these applications led to wasted resources within the 
INS and to a high rate of reversal upon administrative or judicial review. See generally 
Diver, supra note 1; Sofaer, supra note 26. 
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statutory mandates, albeit, in quite general tenns. A statute could mandate 
that an agency establish and publish rules, or it might create the structure 
for a "trial-like" adjudication system.234 Frequently, Congress leaves open 
the issue of how the agency will conduct its adjudications.235 Providing for 
flexibility in developing procedures is not, in and of itself, a design flaw. It 
is the lack of specificity in the INA that makes the agencies' interpretations 
very important. The divided responsibility, discussed in the next subsec-
tion, compounds the problems of infonnal interpretations and lack of trans-
parency in the adjudication criteria. Each agency has different approaches 
to its adjudications. The three do not necessarily share the same adjudica-
tion priorities and they vary in the frequency with which the agency will 
promulgate regulations or issue precedent decisions. 
In business immigration, Congress has done little beyond delegating re-
sponsibility to a three-headed monster. It has not only failed to specify 
details of the adjudicatory system, but also has left to the agencies the job 
of delineating the specific content and definition of far too many vague 
substantive categories. Vague standards necessitate a process to determine 
who qualifies under the standard. Thus, the process itself becomes a more 
significant factor in the outcome of the adjudication. Like many other 
agencies, the INS, Department of State, and Department of Labor chose to 
implement the law through informal adjudication. These adjudications are 
exempt from the quasi-trial type procedures of the APA.236 To guide the 
informal adjudications, agencies may promulgate regulations, publish ad-
ministrative decisions, or adopt guidelines and infonnal policy statements. 
In many situations, agencies use a variety of informal procedures. How-
ever, in the business immigration arena, the task of determining the "law" 
and understanding the procedures is more complex because the three agen-
cies have completely separate approaches to the development of the law 
and have no formal coordination amongst themselves. For example, the 
Department of State routinely promulgates regulations under the full rule-
making procedures of the APA and publishes a Foreign Affairs Manual 
(FAM) containing instructions regarding the application of the regula-
tions.237 The manual also documents procedures for Department of State 
234. See, e.g., INA§ 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (explaining statutory 
structure mandating immigration hearings for the removal procedures). 
235. In some situations, where Congress has required a "hearing on the record," courts 
have required formal adjudication procedures under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-
557 (1994 & Supp. V 199.9). The INA does not include a re!luirement of a hearing for any 
of the business immigration procedures discussed in this Article. 
236. See id § 553 (authorizing informal agency adjudication). See Verkuil, supra note 
45, at 740 (inferring AP A and Due Process Clause provide only minimal requirements for 
most informal adjudication). 
237. See DEP'T OF STATE, 1 FOREIGN AFF. MANuAL § 000, available at 
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adjudications.238 The Department of State regularly publishes copies of its 
memoranda to the field regarding changes in procedures or noting special 
emergencies.239 However, there is no administrative or judicial review of 
Department of State regulations and adjudications.240 
In contrast, the Department of Labor rarely issues formal rules and pub-
lishes few memoranda or informal policy statements. Yet, its administra-
tive review procedures of denied labor certifications are the most formal 
adjudications made by any of the three agencies. When a labor certifica-
tion is denied by the Regional Certifying Officer, the employer may appeal 
to a board of administrative law judges assigned to the area. This Board of 
Alien Labor Certification Appeals issues three times the number of INS 
precedent decisions. 
The INS, while publishing more formal rules than the Department of 
Labor, does not frequently publish precedent administrative decisions re-
garding adjudications under the regulations and has infrequently published 
material as "Operating lnstructions."241 Finally, even if the INS provided 
more detailed published regulations or more precedent decisions, the fail-
ure of Congress to provide a clear delegation of more precise standards 
may ultimately defeat the goal of flexibility in the adjudication. The INS 
has a history of reducing broad standards to extremely narrow rules via its 
http://www.foia.state.gov/masterdocs/O 1 fam/O I mOOOO.pdf (explaining purpose and structure 
of the FAM) (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
238. See generally id. (describing procedural requirements consular officers must follow 
if the officer believes an applicant has made a fraudulent statement). 
239. The Department of State Cables are published on the Department website and re-
leased to a range of industry publications. See DEP'T OF STATE, CABLES, at 
http://www.state.gov. However, they are not published in the Federal Register. 
240. The decision ofa consular officer is immune from judicial or administrative review 
and meant to guarantee consular officers independence. See INA § 104, 8 U.S.C. § 1104 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). The only administrative actions of the consular officers that are 
subject to internal administrative process or review are cases where the visa is denied due to 
fraud or misrepresentation requires See, e.g., Dep't of State Regulations Pertaining to BotQ 
Nonimmigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 40.6 
(2001); DEP'T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL § 40.6, Nl.1, available at 
http://www.foia.state.gov/masterdocs/09fam/0940006N.pdf(last visited Jan. 29, 2002). The 
Advisory Opinions of the Visa Office are not published either externally nor are they inter-
nally circulated among consular officers. See also Nafziger, supra note 3. 
241. In the place of the Operations Instructions, the INS reported that it would be pre-
paring separate Field Manuals. See INS, OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS, at 
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphicsllawsregs/instruc.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). A pos-
sible disadvantage of separate Field Manuals could be a failure of the agency to ensure 
cross-training and wider gulfs of understanding could grow between INS enforcement and 
adjudication. The Field Manuals are not available online and are not routinely distributed to 
public sources. In some cases, the failure to publish informal policy memoranda would be 
considered a violation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
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regulations and interpretive decisions. The culture of the agency,242 dis-
cussed below, the history of the agency adjudications, and Congress's fail-
ure to insulate the agency from the political battles which face almost all 
immigration policy choices, encourage the agency to reduce the broad 
standards to narrow rules, such that they become of limited use. 
The INS also has an old pattern of failing to adopt regulations alto-
gether.243 For example, in 1979, the INS proposed a rule establishing stan-
242. See infra Part IIl.B.3 (discussing territorial culture of the INS). 
243. For example, the INS did not adopt regulations defining the non-immigrant inves-
tor (E-1/E-2) visa category until 1997. See Nonimmigrant Classes; Treaty Aliens; E Classi-
fication, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,138 (Sept. 12, 1997) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e)). The confu-
sion between the INS and Department of State adjudication of this visa category resulted in 
frequent inconsistencies. See In re Walsh & Pollard, 20 I. & N. Dec. No. 3111 (B.I.A. 
1988) (describing how Department of State granted E-2 status but INS refused admission 
because it interpreted the category more narrowly and how interpretations were not sup-
ported by any published regulations). 
Another important example is the INS failure to adopt sufficient regulations defining the 
scope of permitted activity under the business visitor visa. The minimal definitions that ap-
pear in title 8, section 214.2, of the Code of Federal Regulations primarily describe special 
situations. This non-immigrant visa category may be the single most important tool for in-
ternational business people, but the limits on the business activity permitted under this visa 
category have never been defined in the regulations. There have been few precedent deci-
sions issued over the years. See, e.g., In re Cote, 17 I. & N. Dec. No. 336 (BJ.A. 1980); In 
re Hira., 11 I. & N. Dec. No. 1647 (BJ.A. 1966); In re W, 6 I. & N. Dec. No. 2783 (B.I.A. 
1955). While some might argue that the lack of regulations adds flexibility for case-by-case 
consideration of admission at the border, the lack of clear standards makes it nearly impos-
sible for a businessperson to argue for admission at the border and it makes it difficult to 
provide legal guidance to business clients. Because the INS is now empowered to summa-
rily exclude even people with valid visas if the inspector believes the visa was obtained 
based on fraud, misrepresentation, or because the officer believes the individual holds the 
wrong visa category, the issue is of more pressing concern. The new expedited removal 
procedures do not provide for administrative or judicial review of the removal decision. See 
Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Im-
migration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1449-52 (1997) (discussing controversy 
surrounding lack of administrative and judicial review for persons subject to new expedited 
removal provisions). In one case, the INS denied admission to a Chinese businesswoman 
who presented a valid B-1 visa, maintaining that she needed a different visa stamp. There 
may be other cases, but the inability of scholars to study this procedure makes it difficult to 
measure its impact. See Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Study: Report on the 
First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PuB. PoL'Y 1 (2000) (examining INS expedited removal proceedings since 1997). 
1'.he INS has also refused to allow l!lw professors or non-profit organizations to observe 
these expedited proceedings. See INA§ 235(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999). While the INS is required to produce information under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), section 552 of the AP A states that there are bona fide exceptions to releasing 
information. See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 8.3 
(1995). Some statistical information was ultimately obtained after prolonged negotiations 
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dards for detennining when an applicant should be granted adjustment of 
status as a matter of discretion.244 The INS later withdrew its own proposal 
stating it would be impossible to foresee all the necessary relevant factors 
needed to create a comprehensible list and any list created would be unnec-
essarily rigid.24s While flexibility may be a noble and equitable principal, 
the INS worried that clearly stated standards would result in increased liti-
gation.246 Writing about this failure to promulgate rules, Professor Colin 
Diver rejected the INS assumption of increased litigation because most ap-
peals of denied applications were granted.247 Therefore, he believed the 
INS could achieve greater unifonnity and operate more efficiently if the 
agency promulgated rules.248 Further, clearer rules would create stronger 
precedent and reduce the amount of cases requiring "elaborate ad hoc justi-
fication. "249 
The lack of clear rules in adjustment of status is even more troubling to-
day. At the time Professors Diver and Sofaer were studying the procedure, 
the INS processed fewer than 200,000 applications for adjustment of status 
between the INS and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See UNIV. OF CAL., 
HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY, at http://www.uchastings.edu/ 
ers (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
244. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing adjustment of status). It is the process where an 
individual converts from non-immigrant or unlawful presence to permanent resident within 
the United States and thus does not have to complete her immigration at a U.S. consular post 
abroad. Professor Diver documented this example of the INS' rejection of the regulatory 
approach. See generally Diver, supra note I (providing a discussion on INS rule making). 
245. See Factors to be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Decision, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 9119 (Jan. 28, 1981) (indicating the cancellation of proposed rule). 
246. See id.; see also Diver, supra note 1, at 94-95; Sofaer, supra note 26. Technically, 
there is no right to an administrative appeal of a denial of adjustment of status. See INS 
Adjustment of Status to that of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii) (2001). Applicants request reconsideration or may push for referral to the 
District Director or the Regional Service Center Director who has the authority to overturn 
the individual examiner's refusal. See INS Powers and Duties of Service, Department of 
Justice, 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 (2001). Many courts have ruled that when the INS denies adjust-
ment of status, the court lacks jurisdiction due to a failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies, because the INA allows renewal of the application in removal proceedings. See, e.g., 
Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000); McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F.3d 985, 986-
87 (7th Cir. 2000). The government has also tried to argue the 1996 statutory amendments 
bar review of denied adjustment of status applications. See, e.g., Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 
286 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting limit on subject matter jurisdiction). 
247. See Diver, I note 1, at 95. 
248. See id 
249. See id.; see also Verkuil, supra note 26; cf. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the 
Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TUI.. L. REV. 
703 (1997) (discussing problem of exercise of discretion in immigration removal proceed-
ings). 
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per year.250 In December of 1999, the INS reported more than 1,001,550 
permanent resident adjustment applications were awaiting adjudication.251 
Moreover, in the employment-based adjustment of status application, the 
adjudication is made at the Regional Service Center without any individual 
interview of the immigrant. 252 Thus, one of the most important stops on the 
route to immigration is conducted by a nameless, faceless bureaucrat solely 
on the basis of the forms and supporting documentation submitted. Finally, 
the stakes have risen since the prior studies of the adjustment of status pro-
cedure. Prior to 1996, if the INS denied an application for adjustment of 
status in the exercise of discretion the immigrant could renew the applica-
tion overseas at a U.S. consulate.253 This continues to be true, however, for 
any person who has acquired more than 180 days of unlawful presence in 
the United States. Departure from the physical territory of the United 
States triggers the operation of a new multi-year bar to immigration.254 
Given the huge volume, the absence of a personal interview, and for some 
people, the importance of the decision, the continuing failure of the INS to 
promulgate clear rules is irresponsible. To compound the difficulties, for 
more than five years, the INS has failed to issue even proposed rules de-
fining "unlawful presence."255 The lack of regulations makes it difficult for 
INS examiners and participants, but raises a particular problem for the U.S. 
consular officers who must make a case-by-case determination of inadmis-
sibility due to the period of "unlawful presence."256 This one example il-
lustrates the problems created by a lack of rules and the way this problem 
intensifies due to the multi-agency delegation.257 
These differences in promulgating rules or publishing policy may seem 
one of style, however, they are more significant. The manner in which an 
250. See generally Diver, supra note l; Sofaer, supra note 26. 
251. See INS, INA STATISTICS, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/ 
index.htin (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
252. In a few cases, the Regional Service Center may refer the case for interview at an 
INS District Office. See Interview with Frances C. Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of 
Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2000) (notes on file with author). 
253. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 72, at§ 51.01 [l][b], [2][c], [3). 
254. See INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Unlawful 
presence of more than 180 days bars the individual from reentry for three years. If the indi-
vidual has acquired more than 365 days of unlawful presence, the bar increases to ten years. 
See id. 
255. The INS has issued a myriad of informal memoranda and opinions from its Office 
of General Counsel. See PAUL W. VIRTUE, INS, INS ADVISES. ON UNLAWFUL PRESENCE, 
available at http://www.aila.org (last visited Dec. 24, 2001). 
256. See DEP'T OF STATE, CABLE No. 36, reprinted in 3 IMMIGR. BULL. 438 (May I, 
1998) (issuing a general cable providing an interim preliminary interpretation of INA 
§ 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(9)). 
257. This problem is discussed more fully in the next subsection. See infra Part Ill.B.2. 
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agency develops rules, whether by rule making or adjudication, shapes the 
information available to both the public consumers and the officers work-
ing within the agency. Moreover, the rulemaking or adjudication initiatives 
of one agency may conflict with or alter the policy choices of another 
agency. This was clearly the case in the master's degree employment-
based second preference litigation discussed above.258 Yet beyond litiga-
tion, these differences and failures to coordinate policy can lead to distrust 
between government actors regarding the accuracy of other agencies' adju-
dication because the standards, rationale, and procedures used to make the 
initial adjudication are unclear. 
Consider the example of the INS adjudication of "National Interest 
Waiver."259 Congress gave no express definition in the INA, thus, inviting 
the INS to determine whether the adjudications should be bounded by de-
fining regulations or left open to case-by-case adjudication.260 Because 
there are few published opinions describing approved cases, the outsider 
has few clues regarding the quality of the adjudication or the standards ap-
plied. We can see from the earlier discussion that the value of transparency 
has been left out of both the Congressional and agency choice. Ultimately, 
the client filing an application cannot know whether she meets the defini-
tion. 
The lack of transparency means that businesses are unable to determine 
whether to go to the expense and trouble of filing such petitions. Individu-
als are uncertain as to the likelihood their petition will be granted and are 
unable to plan their lives, make living arrangements, give notice at existing 
jobs, and make judgments about alternative job offers in countries through-
out the world.261 
Of course, the INS response to this critique will be that they purposely 
did not adopt regulations because the agency wanted to leave the greatest 
possible flexibility in the adjudication of qualifications.262 While this is a 
noble goal, the agency could have adopted regulations giving the public 
258. See Chintakuntla v. INS, No. C 99-5211 MMC (N.D. Cal. May4, 2000). 
259. See INA § 203(b)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(2)(D) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); INS 
Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 (2001). 
260. In a sense, this distinction is not so pure, for even when the agency published 
regulations, each case is still resolved based on the individual adjudicators application of the 
regulatory criteria to the facts of the case. 
261. In the cases of persons likely to fit the "national interest" category this is no small 
matter, for they are likely to have skills and expertise which cause them to be in great de-
mand. If it is truly in the interest of the nation to bring them into the United States, such 
lack of transparency harms the national interest, because they are hardly likely to tolerate 
the uncertainty, duplication, and delay that characterize the current process. 
262. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 29,771, 29,776 (June 6, 1995) (setting forth INS preamble to 
rules discussing flexibility by not providing definition). 
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guidance but preserving adequate room for the exercise of discretion. In 
fact, in the INS' own regulations concerning qualifications for "Aliens of 
Extraordinary Ability in the Arts, Sciences or Business," they set forth de-
tailed examples of qualifying evidence,263 but retained flexibility by pro-
viding that if the prior standards "do not readily apply to the beneficiary's 
occupation, the petitioner may submit comparable evidence to establish the 
beneficiary's eligibility."264 
Furthermore, from the national interest example we can see how Con-
gress failed to consider efficiency in the operation of the process. If the 
Department of State or Department of Labor begin to perceive this category 
as a "loophole," they may pressure the INS to restructure the adjudication 
standards or, in the case of the Department of State, find ways to force the 
INS to re-adjudicate approved petitions.265 Further, the other agencies 
could call for the INS to require greater documentation from the applicant 
to prove, to their liking, that she meets the definition. These pressures bur-
den the system in general and lead to delays. 
Perhaps more importantly, Congress's failure to specify the nature of the 
process for the labor certification application severely undermines the in-
tegrity, as well as the transparency and efficiency, of the system. The INA 
states that the Secretary of Labor grants a labor certification, but the statute 
is silent about how that adjudication process must proceed.266 Originally, 
the Department of Labor tried to adjudicate the labor certification cases by 
comparing the application to general labor market information. If the De-
partment had no statistical information indicating shortages in the occupa-
tion, the agency denied the certification. Employers challenged the agency 
procedure because the statute refers to certification of no "able, willing, 
qualified ... and available" U.S. workers.267 The employers successfully 
argued that unless the Department could ~oint to an available worker, the 
employer was entitled to the certification. 68 The Department of Labor re-
263. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) (including standards such as: "(i) Documentation of the 
alien's receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excel-
lence in the field of endeavor; ... [or] (viii) (e]vidence that the alien has performed in a 
leading or critical role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputa-
tion"). 
264. Id.§ 204.5(h)(4). 
265. This type of distrust in the quality and accuracy of INS adjudication of EB-5 in-
vestor petitions leads directly to criticism of the program by the Department of State and the 
referral of cases back to INS headquarters. Eventually, the INS suspended the adjudication 
of its own petitions based on concerns about the quality of the adjudications taking place at 
its service centers. See infra Part IV.D.5 (discussing EB 5 adjudications). 
266. See INA§ 212(a)(5), 8U.S.C.§J182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
267. Id. 
268. See, e.g., Digilab, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 495 F.2d. 323 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding 
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sponded by requiring, in almost all situations, case-by-case supervised re-
cruitment to ensure no such worker existed.269 Thus, Congress's failure to 
more carefully consider the procedural implications of its statutory certifi-
cation resulted in litigation and ultimately a cumbersome, difficult, and ir-
rational procedure of trying to measure individual market failures.270 
Setting aside that classic example of the failure to design a process ade-
quate to the task, the labor certification process has operated basically as a 
case-by-case test of the bona fides of the employer and the job conditions 
since 1977. For nearly a quarter of a Ct(ntury, the INS and Department of 
State have assumed the Department of Labor is making an adjudication of 
the working conditions and prevailing wage. The failure of Congress and 
the Department of Labor to adequately address the implications of the labor 
certification adjudication led to the horrific processing delays and expen-
sive advertising and professional costs described previously. And while the 
obstacles and hurdles of the labor certification process clearly forced some 
cases out of the system, the overall approval rates were extraordinarily 
high.271 Given the frequency of approval, it is difficult to understand why 
employers and employees should have to endure $10,000 or more in adju-
dication costs and years of waiting. 
As explained in Part II, in many parts of the country the delays in labor 
certification climbed to three and four years.272 Congress became frustrated 
with the operation of the program and began to dramatically reduce the la-
bor certification program budget.273 The belt tightening and political pres-
sures forced the Department of Labor to fashion expedited adjudication 
systems.274 The Department of Labor revived preexisting (but rarely used) 
Reduction in Recruitment regulations.275 Under those regulations, as de-
tailed in Part II, employers submit evidence of past recruitment (unsuper-
Department of Labor could not merely rely on general information about availability of 
electrical engineers to establish employer did not have a bona fide need for a specific engi-
neer.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Reddy, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (holding a similar rejection of agency methodology), reh 'g denied, 495 F.2d 
1372 (1974). 
269. See Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United 
States, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,933 (Dec. 19, 1980) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656). 
270. See infra Part IV for a discussion of eliminating the Department of Labor and the 
labor certification requirement. 
271. See supra Figure 3, p. 240 (explaining approval rates). 
272. See generally supra Part II (analyzing delays in labor certification). 
273. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (outlining drop in funds for labor certi-
fication program). 
274. See GAL 1-97, supra note 122 (providing information on how the Department of 
Labor made adjudication more efficient). 
275. Although the regulations authorized reduction in recruitment procedures, it was the 
practice of most regional officers to refuse the procedure in all cases. 
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vised by the Department of Labor or state agency) to prove the lack of 
available workers.276 However, the Department of Labor began an even 
more streamlined re-engineering of its procedures and proposed the devel-
opment of an automated adjudication procedure.277 The proposed system 
will ask employers to submit a form to be electronically scanned for an ini-
tial review by a computer.278 This procedure would rely on employer at-
testation without supporting documentation.279 If the answers provided in 
the new form match Department of Labor criteria,280 the case would be ap-
proved without participation by the state agency or the Regional Certifying 
Officer. One official estimated the new procedure might result in nearly 
eighty-five percent of all filings being approved without further inquiry.281 
These examples also demonstrate that the current system does not suffi-
ciently protect the value of integrity. As the Department of Labor stream-
lines its labor certification procedures, other agencies become concerned 
about "false positives." If the Department of Labor streamlines its adjudi-
cation to an attestation model where most cases pass through quickly with 
minimal review of the evidence, the other two agencies will become con-
cerned that some cases were approved erroneously. It is highly likely that 
without coordination and trust in the Department of Labor procedures, the 
other agencies will delay or intensify their adjudication of immigrant peti-
tions and individual visa applications to ensure the job offer is bona fide 
and the labor certificate deserved.m Thus, the drive to protect the system 
276. See discussion in text accompanying notes supra 122-26. 
277. See Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the 
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,777 (Aug. 25, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R pt. 656). 
This program is also discussed in Part IV.C.2. The announced notice of intent to propose a 
rule gives no details about the new program. The information discussed here is based on 
interviews with agency personnel and public comments made at the annual meeting of 
AILA held June 15, 2000, in Chicago, Ill. As of February 2002, the changes have not been 
implemented. 
278. Information obtained during interviews with agency personnel and public com-
ments made at the AILA's annual meeting. · 
279. See id. 
280. It is unclear whether the criteria would differ from the substantive criteria applied 
at the current time. It will be difficult to assess the impact of this change because the crite-
ria of the Regional Certifying Officers were not spelled out in detailed regulations and obvi-
ously adapted to changes in occupations or labor conditions. Thus a system which was al-
ready opaque may become impenetrable. In the past, attorneys often learned about current 
criteria through.informal conversations with the Regional Certifying officers or through at-
torney/agency liaison meetings. See discussion of these meetings infra Part IV. 
281. See Audio tape: Jim Norris, Special Counsel, Remarks at the American Immigra-
tion Lawyers' Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill. (June 16, 2000) (on file with 
author). 
282. See discussion of re-adjudication across agency operations, supra Part II. 
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decreases efficient operations and outcomes become more obscured as 
cases are shuffled back and forth between the agencies. This problem is 
discussed further in the next section, which considers the specific process 
problems generated by splitting responsibilities among the three agen-
cies.283 
The failure to adequately consider the process requirements of the sub-
stantive provisions is a problem in many areas of law. However, in the 
specific context of business immigration adjudications, the vague statutes 
work a particularly devastating blow to transparency, integrity, and effi-
ciency. 
2. Delegation to Multiple Agencies 
Many scholars have suggested, when Congress adopts vague standards 
and delegates adjudication to agencies, Congress is trying to look like it 
made hard policy choices while really shielding themselves from criti-
cism.284 The delegation of the final adjudication to the agency allows 
members of Congress to blame the agency for approving the wrong cases 
or for failing to approve the right cases.285 Here, the situation is made even 
more complex by delegating closely related responsibilities to more than 
one agency.286 Further, because it is a general tenet of administrative law 
that courts will generally defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute,287 
including agency interpretation of how to implement the law, the confusing 
structural delegation issues in the INA contnbute to immigration law's in-
sulation from judicial review. By selecting at least three federal agencies to 
implement the immigration laws without any one agency having authority 
over the other two, Congress laid the foundation for conflict and confusion. 
Of course, a chief executive wanting to control the three has authority over 
alJ, but the ability of the executive to continuously monitor the actions, 
policies, and management of immigration adjudications is obviously lim-
283. See infra text accompanying notes 284-314. 
284. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 119-34 (1993) (arguing only theory 
of agency delegative process may be better, but practice of agency process is subject to 
same political pressures and arbitrariness as regular congressional legislative process). 
285. See id. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (arguing in favor of broad delegations 
of authority to administrators). 
286. The situation, in many ways, parallels the confusion when Congress delegates re-
sponsibility to both state and federal agencies. 
287. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(assuming interpretation is not clearly in contradiction of statutory authority). Cf lNS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (finding INS had improperly interpreted statutory 
standard for asylum eligibility). 
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ited to larger policy concerns. The INA does not mandate coordination, 
nor does it contain a mechanism for uniform reporting or even establish 
formal mechanisms for communication.288 Yet, adjudication choices made 
in one agency can have a dramatic impact on the workload and operations 
of another. 
Structural delegation can at times leave one of the actors insufficient 
authority to act. The Department of State has limited authority to rescind 
or cancel visas if the consular officer and the Visa Office find that the 
beneficiary committed fraud.289 The consular officer may not revoke the 
underlying immigrant visa petition even if the consular officer has evidence 
to support a belief that the case was inappropriately approved. Instead, the 
consular will refer the case back to the INS for reconsideration or investi-
gation. However, the INS will not take any action in the case. The benefi-
ciary and petitioner become trapped in an administrative limbo.290 Setting 
aside the issue of which agency should have the authority to revoke a peti-
tion, the failure of the INA to consider the situation reflects a fundamental 
source of process problems that needs a remedy. The absence of clear 
statutory authority leaves the agency to battle out appropriate procedures 
and the varying priorities or resources of the agencies may leave both dis-
satisfied.291 Moreover, if the consular officer is not responsible for making 
the revocation decision, that officer may not feel accountable for his or her 
action. On the other hand, if the INS does not act on the revocation request 
or fails to inform the consular officer of the status of the case, the consular 
officer may distrust other agency adjudications or feel there is little point in 
288. Similarly, other reports discuss and evaluate the performance of the immigration 
function, noting that the policies seem to be in regular tension--sucli as conflict between 
admissions policies which seek to enhance competitiveness and those that seek to protect 
U.S. workers. Furthermore, these reports identify poor relations between the executive and 
legislative branches of government on immigration issues produce a congressional tendency 
to micro-manage the issue and undervalue the expertise and experience of the agency's 
managers and analysts. See DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEME'JRIOU ET AL., REoRGANIZING THE U.S. 
IMMIGRATION FUNCTION: TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILl1Y 28 (1998) 
(noting external accountability suffers in performance of immigration function). 
289. See Dep't of State Visas: Documentation of Immigrants under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 42.82(a)(I) (2001) (stating visa may be revoked if 
consular office knows or is satisfied after investigation that the visa was received fraudu-
lently). 
290. Interview with Nancy-Jo Merritt, Partner, Littler Mendelson in Phoenix, Ariz. 
(Aug. 15, 2000) (confirming it.is not uncommon for INS to fail ~o act upon referral from 
Department of State). 
291. Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and 
Advisory Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on file with author) 
(confirming consular officers became frustrated with lack of INS or Department of Labor 
resources to investigate fraud identified at overseas interviews). 
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challenging the INS action. 
Another clear example of confusing delegation to the three agencies 
concerns the intersection of the labor certification requirement and the im-
migrant petition. While the INA requires all employment-based immi-
grants to obtain a labor certificate from the Department of Labor, the stat-
ute is unclear about the authority of the INS (or the Department of State) to 
inquire into the legitimacy of the labor certificate. In some cases, the INS 
questions the wage rate certified in the petition.292 More commonly, the 
INS has limited its inquiry to whether the employer can prove it is eco-
nomically strong enough to pay the certified wage.293 In the rare cases 
challenging the authority of the INS to revisit the validity or terms of the 
labor certification, federal courts have had great difficulty in defining the 
scope and limit of the agency's authority.294 Over time, a line of cases de-
veloped holding that while the INS has the ultimate authority to determine 
if the immigrant is qualified for the visa category, the INS may not alter the 
job requirements certified by the Department of Labor.295 However, while 
attorneys and judges may be capable of parsing these cases, it is unclear 
that agency actors always understand the boundaries of their authority.296 
There are other examples in the INA. Section 204(b) of the INA in-
structs the INS to consult with the Department of Labor in adjudicating eli-
gibility for the immigrant visa categories.297 In reality, the INS does not 
consult with the Department of Labor at all. What did Congress mean by 
this consultation requirement? Does the Department of Labor have the 
authority to interfere with INS adjudications? It is impossible to answer 
this question with certainty and yet, this is the kind of important question 
that must be considered if the agencies are going to be able to reduce proc-
ess barriers. 
292. See, e.g., Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 742 F. Supp. 682, 684-85 (D.D.C. 
1990) (finding INS acknowledged Department of Labor determines prevailing wage but ar-
gued that prevailing wage had increased since adjudication of labor certificate). 
293. See In re Great Wall, 16 I. & N. Dec. No. 142 (B.I.A. 1977) (holding District Di-
rector determined petitioner had failed to establish he was financially able to pay the salary 
rate as established in the job offer); In re Sonegawa, 12 I. & N. Dec. No. 612, 615 (B.I.A. 
1967) (determining petitioner had ability to pay beneficiary stipulated wages of job offer 
and to meet conditions of certification). 
294. See Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 875 F.2d 898, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(holding INS may evaluate employer's ability to pay prevailing wage at the time of the ini-
tial labor certification application). 
295. See. e.g., Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting 
proper statutory division of authority between Department of Labor's labor certification de-
termination and INS preference classification decision). 
296. See generally Mashaw, supra note 285. 
297. See INA§ 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(I994). 
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All three of the essential process values are greatly compromised by this 
type of re-adjudication when the procedural limits and responsibilities of 
each agency are not well-defined. Perhaps the worst offense is the clear 
lack of efficient and effective adjudication. The agencies and the partici-
pants are demoralized when a case is kicked back and forth between the 
agencies and either falls into limbo or results in a lost immigrant visa. As 
discussed in Part IV, there may be times when the Department of State, due 
to its expertise in recognizing patterns of fraud in foreign countries, may be 
preserving the integrity of the immigration system by questioning the ac-
tions of the Department of Labor or INS.298 When those instances arise, the 
statute must provide a clear mechanism for resolving the issue and Con-
gress and the administration must support the agencies with adequate re-
sources to complete the investigations. 
There are other examples of direct conflict between the substantive in-
terpretations and procedural requirements of the three agencies. For exam-
ple, Congress authorizes multinational employers to transfer employees 
temporarily to the United States who have at least one year of experience 
with the multinational at a foreign location and who possess "specialized 
knowledge."299 "[A]n alien is considered to [have] ... specialized knowl-
edge with respect to a company if the alien has a special[ized) knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has 
an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the com-
pany."300 These multinational employees are generally not eligible for im-
migration as employment-based first preference or priority workers be-
cause they do not meet the statutory definition of manager or executive.301 
Accordingly, if the U.S. branch of the multinational wishes to sponsor this 
specialized employee for immigration, the employer wiH need to obtain a 
labor certificate. This seems to indicate that Congress meant to facilitate 
temporary admission of this category of worker but not necessarily to allow 
the employer to be exempted from a labor market test if the employer 
wishes to sponsor the worker for a permanent position. 
The Department of Labor has long held that employers may not request 
experience gained with the same employer as a minimum entry require-
298. See infra Part IV.D.S. 
299. INA § lOI(a)(IS)(l), 8 U.S.C. § I IOl{a)(l5)(L) (1994) (describing an alien em-
ployed continuously for one year who seeks entrance into the United States to render serv-
ices .in a managerial or executive capacity) .. 
300. INA§ 101(a)(44), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining spe-
cialized knowledge as advanced knowledge of company procedures). 
301. See. INA § 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (de-
scribing an alien employed for at least one year by a firm or corporation who seeks to en-
trance into United States to render services in a managerial or executive capacity). 
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ment for a labor certification position. The philosophy of the Department 
of Labor is that the employer cannot normally include this experience as a 
minimum requirement because if the employer initiaJJy hired the employee 
without the skills, then the employer can similarly train a new worker.302 
However, the Department of Labor had not routinely applied this same re-
striction to experience gained with a related entity outside of the United 
States.303 In 1990, the Department of Labor applied the rule against using 
prior experience to multinational employers.304 Today, training or knowl-
edge an employee acquired overseas cannot be used to justify the perma-
nent need for the employee. Thus, the very specialized knowledge that 
made the employee eligible for the L-lB temporary visa, becomes a disad-
vantage in the labor certification processing. Department of Labor person-
nel become suspicious of the employer's minimum requirements. From the 
employer's perspective, it feels as if the multinational corporation is told to 
prove one thing to allow the admission of the foreign worker by the INS 
and to disavow the very same characteristics in the petition with the De-
partment of Labor. Finally, assuming the labor certification is still issued, 
the INS becomes suspicious of the original finding that the employee was a 
person with specialized knowledge because that knowledge is not required 
in the labor certification and immigrant visa petition. 
Some of the conflict between the Department of Labor and INS in the 
example above is created by the failure to waive the labor certification re-
quirement for this group of multinational workers, and thus, the substantive 
statutory provisions can be blamed. A great deal of the confusion and con-
tradiction however, arises from the way the agencies handle the same fac-
tual information and the fact that the vagueness in the statutory criteria 
forces the agencies to re-fight the political policy choices that Congress 
should have made in the statutory criteria. 
The agencies have different agendas and thus, different concerns. While 
the agency differences are understandable, from the perspective of the par-
ticipants, the system is baffling. Unsophisticated participants do not under-
stand the intricacies of the agencies' policy goals. To them each stage of 
the process results in a change in the rules. 
302. The employer can challenge this rule by making a showing that the employer can 
no longer train for the position due to severe time or economic pressures. See Jn re Info. 
Indus. Inc., 88-INA-82, 1989 WL 250355, at *I (BALCA Feb. 9, 1989) (en bane) (defining 
business necessity ex,ception for this and other requirem~nts). 
303. By related entity I mean a subsidiary, affiliate, or branch of a multinational entity. 
See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(a)(l) (2001) (discussing foreign govern-
ment officials in general). 
304. See In re Inmos Corp., 88-INA-326, 1990 WL 598564, at *2 (BALCA June 1, 
1990) (en bane). 
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The delegation to multiple agencies without building in coordination 
simply complicates the communication between the agencies. For exam-
ple, the INS decided to process business immigration cases at the Regional 
Service Centers. This decision by one agency created a slow down in 
overall processing because the Regional Service Centers were unable to 
handle both the naturalization petition adjudication and the adjustment of 
status procedures with their existing resources. Moreover, the Regional 
Service Centers processed adjustment cases only if the employer and im-
migrant had first secured an approved 1-140. By separating the filing into a 
two-step procedure, the Service Center necessarily required some repetitive 
action and lengthened the adjudication process.305 As delays became more 
and more onerous, immigrants began avoiding the adjustment of status pro-
cedure and switched to overseas immigrant processing with the Department 
of State. However, if at the time of original filing, the petitioner employer 
indicated that the immigrant would complete the final stop via adjustment 
of status processing, no formal notice of the 1-140 approval is sent to the 
Department of State. As explained, many consulat~s will not accept copies 
of approval notices mailed to the employer. Before the Department of 
State accepted jurisdiction over the case, the employer must file a request 
for the INS to issue a written notice, directly to the Department of State, 
confirming INS prior approval. The INS requires the employer to file a 
form to obtain the notification.306 And, unfortunately, given the low prior-
ity of this type of petition, in some Regional Service Centers delays grew to 
twelve months or more simply to get this verification issued.307 
305. Until 1996, the INS had utilized a one-step procedure for immediate relatives and 
employment based cases where there was no current backlog in the visa category. In the 
one-step procedure, the immigrant petition and the adjustment of status application are ad-
judicated simultaneously. 
306. See INS, FORM 1-824, APPUCATION FOR ACTION ON AN APPROVED APPLICATION OR 
PETITION, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-824.htm (last 
modified Jan. 29, 2002) (verifying to Department of State that INS has approved the visa 
petition). 
307. Not all of the Regional Service Centers became this backlogged, but the lack of 
consistent processing between the Service Centers contributed to other problems. Some at-
torneys found it faster to file a new 1-140 petition requesting overseas processing. The INS 
then had to adjudicate the same case twice. Apparently, the INS database does not neces-
sarily signal to the examiner that this is a duplicate filing. See Interview with Frances 
Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (Sept 3, 2000) 
(reporting comments made .bY immigration attorneys at AILA meetings). In addition to the 
duplicate filing, attorneys have also contacted consulates directly to see whether, and under 
what circumstances, they would accept the original INS issued approval notice with an at-
torney certified copy of the 1-140 petition. Where this was allowed the immigrant could 
pursue both adjustment of status and immigrant visa processing, completing the process that 
resulted in the fastest decision. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Attorney, Fragomen, 
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Figures 4 and S, 1-824 Processing Time Lines 
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•Yearly averages based upon incomplete reporting. Figures are based on Service Center reported proc-
essing times, and reports of actual processing times ftom immigration attorneys. 
Available reports include: 1997: November, December; 1998: May, November, December; 
1999: February, March, April, July, August, October, November, December; 2000: January, March, 
May. 
1-824 Processing Backlogs (In months) 
-+-Neb. Service Center -Tex. Service Center _._Vt. Service Center 
•Yearly averages based upon incomplete reporting. Figures are based on Service Center reported 
processing times, and reports of actual processing times from immigration attorneys. 
Available reports include: 
1997: NE-December. TX-December. VT-October, November. 
1998: NE-February, March, May, July, October, December. TX-January, April, May, July, August, 
October. VT-March, April, May, August, October, December. 
1999: NE-January, March, April, July, August, October, November, December. TX-January, March, 
April, May, July, August, September, October, November, December. VT-February, June, July, 
August, September, October, November, December. 
2000: NE-March, April. TX-January, March, April. VT-January, March, April. 
2001: NE-January, February, March, April, May, June. TX-January, February, March, April, May, . 
June. VT-January, February, March, April, May, June. 
Del Rey, Bem~n & Loewy {Sept. 3, 2000). 
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By delegating power to three agencies, Congress failed to consider the 
good operation of the system as a whole. When no agency is in control of 
the entire process, the decision of one to require a new filing or original ap-
proval notices, complicates and expands the work of another agency. 
Moreover, the tremendous backlog in adjustment of status cases has trig-
gered a marked increase in the Department of State's immigrant visa proc-
essing workload. The agency could not anticipate this increase based on 
historical trends. 
On one level, this example illustrates failure to communicate between 
agency databases.308 On another level, it is an extreme example of what 
happens when two agencies have authority over the immigration adjudica-
tion function, but have little or no cooperation between their operations. 
Further, attorneys and employers hoping to minimize delays in last stop 
adjudication, filed duplicate petitions or requested special processing and 
then abandoned the slower track application creating even more unneces-
sary work for the agencies.309 
In a few rare situations, the agencies negotiate adjudication procedures 
minimizing redundancy or streamlining the procedures. For example, the 
Department of Labor delegated to the INS the determination of which im-
migrants qualified for the exemption from labor certification found in 
Schedule A.310 The recent INS delegation of the adjudication of temporary 
agricultural worker petitions (H-2A) to the Department of Labor is another 
positive example.311 Delegation can save time in simply transmitting paper 
and information between the agencies. On the other hand, in some situa-
tions, the special expertise of the agency may be lost if it gives up its adju-
dication role. While the agencies should certainly consider these cross 
delegations, in some situations, it is more appropriate for Congress to make 
308. Although the Department of State receives electronic infonnation about the ap-
proval of I-140's, the infonnation is so often filled with errors that the agency insists upon 
written fonnal notification. See Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of 
Legislation, Regulations and Advisol)' Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 
29, 2000) (on file with author). 
309. Interview with Frances C. Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, 
New York, N.Y. (Aug. 8, 2000). 
310. See Employment & Traning Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent 
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (2001) (noting Director de-
tennined there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available 
for occupations listed on Schedule A). . 
311. See Delegation of the Adjudication of Certain Temporal)' Agricultural Workers (H-
2A) Petitions, Appellate and Revocation Authority for Those Petitions to the Secretary of 
Labor, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,528 (July 13, 2000) (describing delegation of authority to Secretal)' 
of Labor). The effective date of this regulation was delayed by the INS until October I, 
2002. See 66 Fed. Reg. 49,514 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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a careful assessment of the purposes of the adjudication and which agency 
is most likely to have the resources and skills to make the accurate deter-
mination. 
Part IV of this Article suggests some structural reforms aimed at lessen-
ing the duplicative delegations and eliminating conflicts.312 Undoubtedly, 
new issues will arise so long as multiple agencies share responsibility for 
the immigration function. Unless measurement and feedback mechanisms 
are fully developed between the actors, the tripartite delegation will con-
tinue to be a main contributor of interior process borders. 
3. Territorial Culture 
Many of the process failures arise from the failure of Congress and the 
agencies to adequately contend with the internal and external forces that 
shape the agency culture. 313 Although many of these factors operate in 
other areas of administrative law, several are particularly strong in immi-
gration law. The failure to plan for and counteract these forces, has directly 
contributed to the erosion of the essential process values. 
a. Congressional Mandates and Dictated Priorities 
Congress must bear a large part of the responsibility for the crisis in im-
migration adjudications.314 Congress mandated express and implied priori-
ties in the statutes315 or demanded prioritization of specific programs with 
312. See infra Part IV.B. 
313. See JAMES Q. WJLSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIBS Do AND 
WHY THEY Do IT 91 (1989) ("Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, pat-
terned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationship within an organi-
zation."). Wilson goes on to note that many organizations have multiple cultures and the 
relationship of the agency culture(s) to the agency mission may dramatically impact the ef-
fectiveness of the organization. See id. at 91-92. Here I am using culture in a broad manner 
to encompass both the internal and external forces that shape the organizations. 
314. Politics presents a treacherous double-edged sword for the lNS' efficient and ap-
propriate facilitation of immigration. The highly political debate persists about how vigor-
ously the lNS should control illegal immigration. When the lNS engages in activities such 
as surprise work-site inspection, criticism immediately flows from immigrant groups and its 
conduct is subject to congressional scrutiny and investigation. Yet, on the other hand, if 
lawmakers perceive the lNS as remiss in their duties, they immediately capitalize on the 
agency's. unpopularity by encouraging reseµtment against it as congressional .elections ap-
proach. A similar situation plagues other agencies, such as the IRS. See GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 12; see also Laurent, supra note 12, 13-18 (outlining 
Government Performance Project in detail). 
315. See lNA § 214(c)(2)(C). 8 U.S.C. § I 184(c)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (man-
dating thirty day processing for H-1 B and L-1 petitions). 
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the threat of reduced funding or of imposing new statutory mandates.316 
For example, some statutory limits force an allocation of resources to a 
particular visa category without adequate consideration of how the alloca-
tion might disadvantage or paralyze a separate function. Two of the most 
obvious examples are the naturalization and H-1 B petitions. When Con-
gress pressures INS to reform and expedite its naturalization backlogs, the 
Service Centers move personnel away from the adjustment of status proc-
essing and the processing of the employment-based immigrant petitions.317 
The limitation of the total number of H-IB visas, necessitated that the INS 
put auditing procedures in place to be sure they did not approve more H-1 B 
visas than the statute allowed.318 Employers worrying about the cap filed 
large numbers of petitions in the winter and early spring to avoid being shut 
out of the category altogether.319 Moving adjudicators to meet the thirty-
day deadline meant other visa petitions had to sit waiting for adjudication. 
Although Congress did not intend the agency to suspend other opera-
tions, the management of the agency responded to congressional and com-
munity pressure. However, the failure to adjudicate one type of petition 
means that pressure will mount in other categories or unnecessary work 
will be created. For example, if the immigrant petition cannot be processed 
in time, the employee will need a renewal of non-immigrant status. The 
extension petition could have been eliminated altogether if the INS had 
been able to process the l-140 in a timely fashion. The failure to adjudicate 
the adjustment of status applications meant that fewer people became per-
manent residents and a push to rush through cases created a bulge in the 
workflow. The sudden increase in workload resulted in delayed process-
ing. Delayed processing means the initial grants of work or travel authori-
zation expire. To obtain extensions of these, the individual must make a 
formal request and the INS has more work for its adjudication officers.320 
One bulge can build into a tidal wave five years later. In 1986, Congress 
authorized a legalization program resulting in more than three million peo-
316. See Dep 'ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judici-
ary Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 183-213 (2000) (tran-
scribing detailed questioning of how appropriated money to INS will be spent). 
317. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85 and 215-16 (discussing current backlog 
problems). 
318. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting numerical 1imitations imposed by 
statute). 
319. Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, 
New York, N.Y. (July 8, 2000). 
320. See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (2000) (detailing general re-
quirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status). 
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ple becoming permanent residents over a five-year period.321 Because 
permanent residents cannot apply for naturalization until they have com-
pleted five years of resident status,322 the INS began to experience an up-
swing in the number of naturalization applications.323 If the INS allows 
backlogs to grow, and then, through special initiatives, completes the ad-
justment of status applications for record numbers of people, the bulge will 
reappear a few years later in naturalization applications and in relative pe-
titions for the employees' family members who have not yet immigrated to 
the United States. 
The executive branch can also pressure the agencies to shift priorities 
without adequate time to retool the process. More commonly, in immigra-
tion law, it is the failure of the executive branch to coordinate the priorities 
among the agencies involved in the adjudications that contributes to the 
process failures. While executive branch interference is undoubtedly a 
powerful source of process confusion, it lacks the permanence of a statu-
tory mandate and therefore, should be more easily controlled within the 
administration. 
Obviously, these mandates, interfere with the good operation of the ad-
judication system when the agency has insufficient time to anticipate the 
new programmatic priority. But perhaps less obviously, the attempt of 
Congress or the executive branch to control the adjudication priorities of 
the agencies can have an effect on the integrity of the agency operations. 
In some cases, the mandate results in a decrease in the accuracy and quality 
of the adjudications. In others, Congress or the executive may perceive an 
inappropriate rate of false positives in agency adjudications and craft con-
trols, which dramatically slow down the adjudications in an effort to reduce 
error rates. Most recently, the operation of the naturalization program was 
a victim of the tug of war between the Executive's desire to expedite natu-
ralization and Congress's move to tighten the quality controls because of its 
321. See INA§§ 210, 245A, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1255a (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 
Rep. Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, A Permanent Fixture?: Analyzing Current Trends in 
Legal Immigration, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES I065, 1066 (1997) (indicating under Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 2.7 million undocumented people were 
granted amnesty). 
322. See INA§ 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1994). The residency requirement is only 
three years for people married to U.S. citizens. See INA § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) 
(1994). There are other special exceptions. See generally id. § 319(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) 
(eliminating a residency requirement for applicants who are married to U.S. citizens who are 
government employees or are otherwise employed by a U.S. corporation); id. § 328, 8 
U.S.C. § 1439 (stating other exceptions for applicants who have served in U.S. Army). 
323. See INS, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
SERVICE, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/natz99tables.pdf 
(showing increase in number of petitions filed after 1991) (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). 
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perception that too many unqualified people became citizens.324 
b. Resources and Resource Allocation 
If asked why the agency cannot produce efficient and rapid adjudica-
tions, agency management will always cite a lack of resources.32' How-
ever, this problem is more subtle than a mere lack of resources. Resources 
placed in the wrong places or inappropriately prioritized also affect agency 
operations. In some cases, Congress has given the agencies processing 
deadlines or authorized user fees but limited the program's ability to apply 
the fees to its operations.326 The natural result of interest group politics has 
led to statutory priorities that may not allow the agency to make the most 
appropriate management choices about spending. In other cases, it is not 
Congress but the administration that is directly responsible for sabotaging 
the agency operations by failing to adequately support the program or by 
diverting agency resources to other priorities. 
In one detailed study, the National Academy of Public Administrators, 
concluded that the complex system of appropriations and user fees was di-
rectly responsible for management and performance failures within the 
INS.327 The Department of Labor lacks the statutory authority to charge 
user fees and due to large budget cuts, has extremely limited resources.328 
These funding complications, particularly the lack of control, make the 
adjudication tasks more difficult. 
324. In a sense, this is an inappropriate example because of the high political stakes in 
citizenship. Some critics perceived the controversy surrounding naturalization programs as 
a politic battle involving a democratic administration, which was rushing naturalization to 
gain new voters in the 1996 elections, and a Republican Congress, which was trying to taint 
the Clinton administration with claims of fraud on the system and to slow down the creation 
of new Democratic voters. See, e.g., David P. Schippers, Abusing the INS, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 23, 2000, at A22 (discussing politicization of INS by Clinton administration). Setting 
aside the very real political concerns, the naturalization program adjudication operations 
stole resources from other programs and the backlash against senior managers within the 
INS created problems for the implementation of other program reforms. See also Interview 
with senior INS examiner (July 28, 2000) (regarding impact of naturalization audits and pri-
orities on overall adjudications in the employment-based categories). 
325. I have never heard an agency manager publicly report that the agency was fully 
staffed and. that all equipment and facilities were ready to handle the work assigned. Of 
course, lack of resources is a common problem in administrative agencies. 
326. See Immigration and Naturalization Service User Fee Advisory Committee: Meet-
ing, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,980 (Aug. 23, 1999). 
327. See id 
328. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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c. Agency Training and Strategic Planning 
Again, the existence of three separate agencies with diverse missions, 
hiring, and training practices exacerbate and complicate the equation. It is 
a difficult job to train agency adjudicators in substance and procedure, but 
the failure to educate agency personnel about the operations and procedures 
of the other agencies can produce miscommunication, poor strategic plan-
ning and even such basic problems as computer systems that do not "talk" 
to one another. 
Even within the confines of a single agency, the context factors are often 
the single most significant factor in creating process failures. The INS has 
been studied, audited, and criticized numerous times in the last several 
years. INS management constantly reacts to the audits and criticism and 
perhaps has not had sufficient time to develop long term strategic planning. 
The agency seems to jump from crisis to crisis: a new emergency, a new 
program, a new mandate from Congress or the auditors.329 However, even 
when planning initiatives were implemented they often were abject fail-
ures. The INS publicly stated the 1997 computer software system it devel-
oped to allow it to obtain meaningful information is incapable of keeping 
up with or providing accurate information for its workload in 2000.330 The 
inability to reasonably forecast work flow and user fee income meant the 
agency was improperly staffed and adjudication authority was not appro-
priately delegated when crunch times occurred. In the last few years, the 
crunches came in unprecedented waves.331 
On August 1, 2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a re-
port criticizing INS management for failing to establish an enterprise ar-
chitecture.332 "Enterprise Architecture" refers to both the operational 
329. The Inspector General of the Department of Justice testified that more than fifty 
percent of its resources were spent on INS audits alone. See Immigration Reorganization 
and Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 20 (1999) (statement of Michael Brom-
wich, Inspector General, DOJ). 
330. See 146 CONG. R.Ec. 87778-80 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (containing debate re-
garding the CLAIMS system regarding religious workers fraud). 
331. And the waves may be just beginning. Congress may soon consider a new amnesty 
program. If it is adopted the INS may be asked to adjudicate millions of new applications in 
a short time period. In the last formal amnesty program, the INS processed more than five 
million requests for legalization. Moreover, the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, have renewed pressure on the INS. 
332. "INS recognizes that it does not have an enterprise architecture and has taken some 
limited steps to develop one. . . . Moreover, its current approach to managing the develop-
ment of its architecture lacks fundamental controls." GAO REP. GAO/AIMD-60-212, 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: INS NEEDS TO BETTER MANAGE THE DEVEWPMENT OF ITS 
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 2 (2000) [hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY]. 
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structure of an agency and its technological resources.333 The goal of the 
plan is to identify both the current and target operating environments of the 
agency and how the business and technological functions will work to-
gether.334 Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or-
dered all federal agencies to develop enterprise architecture plans.335 The 
GAO found INS management had no ability to measure workload and ex-
isting technological databases were created in a "stovepipe" fashion and 
were impossible to coordinate.336 The GAO report was highly critical of 
the Office of Information Resource Management's lack of coordination 
with the business operations of the agency.337 The report chronicles several 
years of management and technological problems within the INS despite 
large amounts available for systems development.338 
There can be other obstacles to training and retraining personnel. The 
union agreements may carefully define the job duties of various agency 
employees, and the collective bargaining agreement may not allow a 
change in duties without intensive negotiations. Similarly, the agency may 
have a subcontractor handling aspects of the procedure and changes in 
forms or filing requirements also requires re-negotiation of these public 
contracts. 
Even locating adequate facilities to conduct training can be an enormous 
challenge. Shortly after David Martin became General Counsel of the INS, 
he planned to conduct significant training for the hundreds of new border 
patrol officers.339 Although he located a former military base which could 
be used to house the attorneys and to conduct the training, the training 
333. See id at 4. 
334. See id. at 8-10. 
335. See Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
106, § 5125(b), 110 Stat. 679, 685 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (Supp. V 
1999)); see also Memorandum from Franklin D. Raines. Executive Office of the President, 
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, M-97-02 
(Oct. 25, 1996); Memorandum from Franklin D. Raines. Executive Office of the President, 
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. M-97-16 
(June 18, 1997). 
336. See GAO REPoRT, supra note 28, at 9. 
337. See id at 2-3. 
338. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 332, at 4-7. These problems have per-
sisted despite huge capital outlays. "For example, INS plans to spend about $11 million in 
FY 2000 and another $10.5 million in FY 2001 to continue development of its CLAIMS 4, 
which supports the proc;essing of applications and petitions for immigrant benefits and is 
intended to fully replace CLAIMS 3." Id. at 5. Millions more are to be spent on other 
agency operations regarding enforcement and for maintenance. In FY 2001 the total budget 
is $288 million on information technology. See id. 
339. Interview with David Martin, Former General Counsel of INS and current Profes-
sor ofLaw, Univ. of Va. (Sept. 15, 2000). 
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plans were stalled because of the General Services Agency (GSA) contract 
• 340 
reqmrements. 
Strategic planning is essential to efficient agency operations, but beyond 
the dictates of efficiency, the very integrity of the agency adjudications is at 
risk when the personnel are ill-prepared for the job at hand. Poor adjudica-
tions resulting in appeals or re-adjudication at later stages are both a waste 
of resources and a factor that builds distrust of the entire immigration sys-
tem. 
d. The Sophistication of the Participant 
The vast majority of people filing applications and petitions with these 
agencies for immigration benefits are unrepresented.341 Many of them may 
not be fluent in English, or may not have attended American educational 
institutions. The well-represented and sophisticated participants in the 
system, such as large multinational employers or certain industry sectors,342 
expect high levels of service and are frequently successful in gaining the 
ear of Congress or the agencies.343 Designing programs, forms, and infor-
mation comprehensible to the diverse populations served by these agencies 
is a monumental challenge.344 Procedure failures sometimes arise because 
the agencies fail to adequately consider these differences and try to design 
a "one-size fits all" system. The failure of the agencies to sufficiently 
study the consumers of their services may be one of the most significant 
contributors to endemic procedural problems. 
In a sense, the failure to adequately orient the agency operations to the 
sophistication of the participant diminishes the transparency of the agency 
340. The General Services Agency must approve real estate development for govern-
ment agencies among other aspects of general business operations. 
341. See supra Part II. 
342. A good example is the sheepgrower's association, which has successfully handled 
the H-2A and labor certification applications for sheepherders for more than thirty years. 
Although not on Schedule A, sheepherders receive a form of modified waiver of the labor 
certification requirement. 
343. A good example of special handling is found in the blanket L-1 petitions. In 1990, 
Congress authorized large multinational corporations to make one "blanket" non-immigrant 
visa petition, which became the mechanism by which the company can move large numbers 
of international personnel. See INA § 214(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § Jl84(c)(2)(A) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). Although this procedure is now formally part of the INA, the agencies es-
tablished the "blanket" petitions regulation. See GoRDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 24.08 
n.52; see also INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (2001) (discussing regulations 
regarding blanket petition procedures); Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 5742-45 (Feb. 26, 1987). 
344. Of course, other federal agencies face similar challenges. The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) must plan for the individual filing and the sophisticated corporate filer. 
2002] BREAKING BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS 289 
operations. In immigration law, it is insufficient to publish regulations and 
interpretive policy memoranda when the agencies know the vast majority 
of users are not represented by skilled mediators such as attorneys. While 
rulemaking theoretically increases the transparency of the agency opera-
tions, it does not do so for participants who cannot comprehend the pub-
lished rules. 
In tum, this lack of transparency may contribute to inadvertent abuse of 
various immigration categories or weak applications for immigration bene-
fits. Adjudicators become accustomed to weak applications, or to more 
egregious attempts to defraud the system, and therefore, tighten the adjudi-
cation standards and increase the processing demands for alJ participants 
resulting in less efficient operations. It is fundamental to the design of the 
agency adjudications that the agency attempt to evaluate the ability of the 
participant to understand both the substantive and procedural requirements. 
e. The Fear of Fraud 
Perhaps the one uniform concern in all of the immigration adjudications 
is the fear that the wrong people are "getting through" the system. Fear of 
false positives is endemic in all adjudication, but it is of particular concern 
in the distribution of limited benefits. Immigrant visas are most definitely a 
limited benefit.34s This fear is also appropriate because it is at least anec-
dotally true that people will try to defraud the immigration law to meet 
their personal goals. Marriage fraud is one of the most recognizable exam-
ples.346 At times the vague standards in the statutes combined with the 
agencies' failure to anticipate some kinds of fraud have led to wholesale 
suspension of adjudication.347 However, all too often, the agencies let the 
possibility of fraud drive the adjudication and fail to use measured ap-
proaches to adjudication which might both deter fraud and allow appropri-
ate corroboration of essential facts. Rather than do the wrong thing, the 
agencies sometimes do nothing. 
The fear of fraud is one of the most important features of the agency 
culture. If the agencies would increase the transparency of the procedural 
and substantive requirements, they would decrease the ability of the par-
ticipants to commit fraud. However, in several interviews with agency ad-
345. See discussion supra Part I. 
346. Of course, the government has often overstated the frequency of fraud. In litigation 
regarding the 1986 marriage fraud amendments, the INS admitted t):Jat the agency testimony 
that thirty percent of all marriage petitions were fraudulent. See INS Admits Fraud Survey 
Not Valid, 66 INTERPRETERRELBAsES 1011 (1989). 
347. The INS stopped adjudicating the millionaire investor petitions for more than two 
years because it believed the existing regulations and the prevailing adjudication standards 
were letting through unqualified investors. 
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judicators, I heard the opposite concern. The adjudicators feared that tell-
ing the participant what documentation was essential or necessary would 
lead to "tailor-made" applications.348 
The agency fear of fraud also cuts against efficient adjudications because 
the agencies sometimes layer the adjudications with demands for more or 
additional documentation or the Department of State may revisit factual as-
sertions accepted by the INS. Some of the recommendations in Part IV are 
designed to anticipate and address the fear of fraud directly.349 It is the 
failure to confront this fear that too often results in disorganized and dis-
jointed adjudications. 
f Anonymous Adjudications-Lack of Accountability 
Almost every adjudication made in the business immigration system is 
made anonymously. Petitions are "signed" by simulated electronic signa-
tures of Regional Service Center directors. Sophisticated attorneys recog-
nize initials if they are typed on the correspondence or, in the case of adju-
dications require an interview, they may have learned the names and titles 
of the individual officers. However, by and large, the process is anony-
mous to the participant. In some cases, the system may also be anonymous 
to the internal agency management. In several instances, the agencies ad-
mitted that they lacked adequate controls to identify the actions of individ-
ual examiners or the patterns of examiner behavior.350 
Even if this anonymity is sometimes appropriate for security reasons, the 
habit contributes to a culture within the agencies. Participants have diffi-
culty knowing whom to contact, whom to praise, or whom to criticize. 
Managers within the agencies have limited measurement tools for evaluat-
ing the officers' performance. Anonymity could lead to a culture which 
lacks accountability and thus, to process failures. 
IV. RADICAL REFORM V. INCREMENTAL PRAGMATISM 
A. Responses to the Process Borders 
Concern over immigration adjudication is growing throughout the 
348. Interview with INS adjudicator (July 28, 2000). For example, consular officers 
sometimes report the story of seeing the same gold necklace in dozens of interviews because 
someone counseled the applicant for a visitor visa that he or she had to appear wealthy to 
qualify for a non-immigrant visa. See id. 
349. See infra Part IV.C. 
350. See Exhibit 4: Immigration Services Division (/SD) Update-9110198, 17 AILA 
MONTHLY MAILING 937 (1998). 
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United States. One of the most dramatic examples arose in Iowa, tradition-
ally a state with few new immigrants. In May 2000, a gubernatorial com-
mission recommended that federal authorities authorize the State oflowa to 
immediately recruit new foreign workers.351 The commission called for an 
Immigrant Enterprise Zone, entitling the state to priority processing of im-
migrant petitions for people seeking to settle in Iowa.352 The Iowa com-
mission's recommendation reflects an appreciation of one of the largest ob-
stacles to new immigration, the process itself. Rather than focusing solely 
on new immigrant categories or the expansion of existing categories, the 
commission seeks to streamline the process.353 
In the face of bureaucratic borders built by congressional neglect and 
tripartite delegation, and compounded by the myriad of cultural and con-
textual factors I have detailed; how are the borders to be dismantled? What 
type of change can not only reduce these barriers but prevent them in the 
future? In this section, I briefly introduce some of the more radical re-
sponses which call for a wholesale change in the substantive policies. 
However, because I believe most of these types of reforms lack political 
support, at least in the short term, I will tum to incremental reforms, which 
can reduce the impact of the process borders. In some cases, these reforms 
may seem like I am merely redecorating the border walls; however, my 
emphasis on increasing the transparency of the entire immigration process 
will result in making the walls visible, a necessary first step to tearing them 
down. 
Given the horrible delays and wasted resources spent in trying to meas-
ure the labor market, several scholars and policy makers have suggested 
deregulating the entire immigration system.354 They prefer "market-based" 
351. See IOWA 2010, GOVERNOR'S STRATEGIC PLANNING COUNCIL, JANUARY 2000 
STATUS REl'ORT, available at http://www.iowa2010.com/news/status_report.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2002); see also Pam Belluck, Short of People, Iowa Seeks to Be Ellis Island of 
Midwest, N.Y. TlMEs, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al; Frank Trejo, Sowing Skepticism: Doubt Springs 
Up Over Iowa Panel's Proposal to Lure Immigrants for New Lives, Work in State, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, July 30, 2000, at IA. 
352. See IOWA 2010, GoVERNOR'S STRATEGIC PLANNING COUNCll.., THE NEW FACE OF 
low A (2000), available at http://www.iowa2010.com/Jibrary/reportl.html. 
353. Iowa is not alone. Canada is liberalizing its immigration criteria and procedures to 
expand the rate of immigration. See Julian Beltrame, Canada's Yawning Need for Immi-
grants Grows: Proposals Seek to Expand Pool of Skilled Workers, Bolster Social Programs, 
W AIJ., ST. J., July 10, 2000, at A24. The Canadian Government has also identified process-
ing delays as a major reason for lower immigration rate.s and is accordingly spending $40 
million to expand the number of overseas immigration officers responsible for making the 
entry detennination. Since 1998, Canadian provinces can adopt standards for immigration 
based on local rather than national needs, a concept that does not appear to be part of the 
Iowa proposal. See Immigration Act, R.S.C., c. I-2, § 6 (1985) (Can.). 
354. See infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text. 
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approaches to selecting and limiting the number of employment-related 
immigrants.355 They recommend abandoning the current immigration sys-
tem, substituting auctions,356 an optimal immigration tariff,357 or an immi-
grant tax surcharge358 as preferable methods of selecting immigrants. Oth-
ers recommend the United States adopt a "point system" where individuals 
who amass points for academic credentials, work experience, or other ob-
jective criteria receive a priority immigration status.359 Some advocate al-
lowing entry based on labor shortages in limited skilled occupations.360 To 
355. See id. 
356. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 365-74 (2d 
ed. 1999); see also Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for Immigrants-the Auction, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 14, 1992, at Al4; Gary S. Becker, Why Not Let Immigrants Pay for Speedy Entry?, 
Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1987, at 20. 
357. See Alan o, Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical 
Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 190-93 (Warren F. 
Schwartz ed., 1995); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic 
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1147, 1222-25, 1238-44 
(1997) (concluding liberalizing immigration policies, in conjuction with implementing fiscal 
policies, would serve the national interest); Rex D. Khan, The Variable Up-Front Per Cap-
ita Visa Tax: A Contractual Approach to Immigration Law, 13 GEO. IMMJGR. L.J. 409, 409-
10, 431-32 {1999) (proposing immigrants pay up-front visa tax to enter United States); see 
also Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, On the Choice Between Capital and Labour 
Mobility, 14 J. INT'LEcON. 209, 218-19 (1983) (showing policy ofoptimal taxation oflabor 
inflow dominates policy of optimal taxation of capital outflow). 
358. Former Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) introduced legislation that would have 
eliminated the labor certification process for employers willing to pay a large fee. Senator 
Simpson had initially proposed a fee of twenty-five percent of a worker's first-year salary, 
but the fee was lowered during the subcommittee markup to ten percent of the salary or 
$10,000, whichever was greater. The fees would be paid to private, industry-specific funds, 
which would expend half of the fee revenue for scholarships and fellowships for citizens 
and permanent residents studying "subjects of relevance" to the industry of which the em-
ployer paying the fee is a part; and the other half to be spent on training citizens and perma-
nent residents in skills needed by the industry. The legislation entitled The Immigration Re-
form Act of 1996, died in committee and .was never enacted. See S. 1394, I 04th Cong. 
(1995). The idea was revived, however, in the 1997 U.S. Commission on Immigration Re-
form recommendations for changes in the procedures used in testing the labor market im· 
pact of employment-based admissions. Rather than use the lengthy, costly, and ineffectual 
labor certification system, the Commission recommended using market forces as a labor 
market test, with businesses recruiting foreign workers paying a set per-worker fee in an 
amount sufficient to ensure there was no financial incentive to hire a foreign worker over a 
qualified U.S. worker. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN 
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 69 (1997) [hereinafter BECOMING AN 
AMERICAN]. 
359. See PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60; BORJAS, supra note 25, at 
290-99. 
360. The current immigration system theoretically facilitates immigration for a limited 
number of occupations where the Department of Labor has certified a shortage of workers. 
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some degree, one of the motivations for these proposals is to eliminate 
case-by-case adjudication and the concomitant confusion, delay, and costs. 
While their embrace of deregulation is understandable, many of these 
scholars fail to recognize the degree to which their solutions require a gov-
ernmental body to make determinations that cannot be accomplished fairly 
without some sort of adjudicatory process. Moreover, their proposals, thus, 
threaten to replicate some of the very process failures that have led them to 
embrace radical solutions.361 
For example, Professor Julian Simon, among others, proposes to auction 
the right to immigrate.362 Assuming he contemplates that Congress will 
establish limits on the number of allowable employment-based (or total) 
immigrants in any given year, and that visas will be auctioned to the high-
est bidders,363 considerable administrative procedure will still be needed.364 
If the auction is directed to employers who buy the right to sponsor a single 
worker, it is possible that Congress will want to limit the number of visas a 
single employer could purchase to prevent the development of secondary 
markets or to prevent monopolizing sources of critical workers.365 If on the 
See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Pennanent Employ-
ment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R § 656.10 (2001) (discussing Schedule A ex-
emptions for nurses, physical therapists, and persons of exceptional ability in arts and sci-
ence). The Department of Labor has refused to update the list and based on interviews with 
agency officials, proposing an update is a "non-starter." This attitude is, in part, based on 
the difficulty of measuring labor shortages in a national economy. See PAPADEMETRIOU & 
YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60, at 123 (discussing problem of Labor Market Infonnation Pilot 
(LMI) measurement). Compare Immigration Act of 1990, § 122(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 
104 Stat. 4978, 4994 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (creating LMI 
Program for employment based immigrants), with Immigration and Nationality Technical 
Corrections Act of 1994, § 219 (f), Pub. L. No. 107-48, 108 Stat. 4305, 4319 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (striking LMI program). See generally Endelman & 
Loughran, supra note 151 (explaining agency and political opposition prevented the pro-
gram's success). 
361. It is not my purpose to methodically discuss the merits or disadvantages of all of 
these alternatives; but rather to identify the likely intrusion of process in almost every 
scheme. 
362. See SIMON, supra note 356, at 357-63 (indicating such a plan would (I) recruit 
younger immigrants, (2) allow for more equitable entry process into the United States, and 
(3) increase the overall economic welfare of the sending country). 
363. Simon does not provide sufficient detail to know precisely what he contemplates, 
but this is a likely interpretation of his general proposal. See id 
364. See id. He does not address whether only employers will qualify to participate in 
th~ auction and I will assume that he would allow both employers and. self-sponsoring im-
migrants to compete. If family categories remain outside the auction, it is possible that 
more affluent families would use the auction to bypass the lengthy quota delays in many of 
the family-based categories. 
365. Secondary markets refer to the ability of the purchases to resell the visa slot. Con-
gress and the agencies have .become increasingly concerned about the growth of "job 
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other hand, families are included in the auction, the political ramifications 
of limited immigration, based on access to capital, raises serious political 
and social considerations. Of course, our current system is not cost-free. 
Many families are unable to sponsor immigrants because of the 1996 
statutory amendment, which requires that the sponsor have an income 
greater than 125% of the poverty level.366 This economic requirement ap-
plies to family based immigration and in any employment case where the 
employee is related to the sponsor.367 It will be necessary to ensure that 
bidders truly have the requisite funds,368 as well as to ascertain the bona fi-
des of bidders, to ensure they are not engaging in smuggling or fraud.369 
Any limit on the allowable number of bids or on visa resale will necessitate 
regulation and auditing as well. 
Thus, even putting aside the distastefulness of placing the American 
dream on the auction block,370 the system is less efficient than proponents 
shops." A job shop is a sophisticated temporary employment agency that uses non-
irnmigrant visas to import workers who are later subcontracted to U.S. employers. 
366. See INA§ 213(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth re-
quirement sponsors must agree to support aliens at income levels not less than 125% offed-
eral poverty line). 
367. See M. FIX & w. ZIMMERMAN, WELFARE REFORM: A NEW IMMIGRANT POLICY FOR 
THE UNITED STATES (1997) (indicating based on 1993 Census data, an estimated fifty-seven 
percent of Mexican or Central American families would be unable to meet this standards), 
available at http://migration.uni-konstanz.de/german/veranstaltungen/mm21/Fix.htrnl; see 
also INS Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 8 C.F .R. § 213a. l (2001) (defining 
federal poverty line as the level of income equal to the poverty guidelines as issued by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with certain guidelines). 
368. In most governmental bidding schemes as well as other auctions involving large 
amounts of money, bidders are pre-screened to ensure their ability to carry out the bid. 
369. See generally PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LABOR (1998) (describing organized smuggling, extortion, and 
related abuses committed upon victims). Without screening and investigation, criminal 
syndicates might bid on the visas, and then re-auction them at higher prices, or indenture 
those to whom they are given. As Peter Kwong describes in his book, recent reports esti-
mate that many Chinese nationals pay from $35,000 to $50,000 to organized smugglers who 
bring them to the United States. The victim pays part of this fee as a down payment and 
then must repay the "loan" over many years or face physical harm or harm to his or her 
family. In many situations, the smugglers arrange the employment and the wages are paid 
directly to the smuggler and only a stipend to the victim. In the recent past, the INS and 
Department of State have become particularly cautious about the sources of funds used to 
sponsor the "millionaire" investors. See In re Ho, Dec. No. 305 l, 1998 BIA LEXIS 29, at 
*12-14 (B.I.A. July 31, 1998). This visa program is also discussed briefly in Part IV.C.5. 
370. See 135 CONG. REC. S57,769 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (describing how Congress 
perceived the millionaire investment program, which allowed millionaires to immigrate to 
the United States, as a program which facilitated the "selling of citizenship"); see also 
David Hirson, Immigrant Investors: Five Years After, 95 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS I (1995) (ex-
plaining program became more politically palatable once advertised as a job creation pro-
gram). 
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claim. While it appears that government need not ascertain anything other 
than who has the highest bid, in fact the government will have to engage in 
considerable administration and policing. 
Among the central arguments for an auction are the assumptions that ra-
tional bidders would only sponsor desirable immigrants and that the auc-
tion would remove unnecessary government micro-management of em-
ployment decisions. It is not entirely clear all employment or immigrant 
decisions are purely rational. They may be made for emotional or political 
reasons. And while an auction may reduce the adjudication role of gov-
ernment, it is unlikely that Congress would completely eliminate the third 
stop of adjustment of status or visa processing where an individual immi-
grant must prove he or she is admissible. Further, an auction may be unfair 
to religious or nonprofit organizations or to other segments of society, who 
might not have the ability to compete in the purely economic realm of an 
auction. 
Allocating immigrant visas by lottery is a close cousin to the auction, but 
without its economic attributes. The United States currently uses a lottery 
that allows 50,000 people per year to immigrate.371 The lottery visas are 
called "diversity visas" because this program limits immigration to people 
from countries designated "low admission states."372 If a country has more 
than 50,000 immigrants over a five year period, the nation cannot partici-
pate in the diversity visa lottery.373 Assuming the lottery would replace the 
current employment-based categories, would the lottery have entry criteria 
such as a job offer or proven skills and educationr74 If there are no quali-
fying criteria the system may be free of the general adjudication headaches, 
but is the system then a rational substitute for the selection of employment-
based immigrants? It is difficult to imagine a political acceptance of pool-
371. One of the benefits of an auction or of the tax system discussed next is the ability 
of the government to recoup costs of the immigration system or to defray costs of new im-
migration. Theoretically, the lottery could also charge for "tickets" and thus more closely 
emulate the auction or tax alternatives. 
372. See INA§ 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § l l53(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
373. See id. (outlining how visas should be distributed among natives of foreign states). 
In recent years, Congress has eliminated 5,000 of the diversity visas and allocated these to 
limited legalization program for certain Nicaraguans, Cubans, and people from former East-
ern Block nations, see District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
100, 111 Stat. 2160. 
374. See. INA § 203(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 1~3(c)(2) (providing diversity visas are only 
available to individuals who completed equivalent of a U.S. high school education or who 
have at least two years experience in a job). Under the current employment-based third 
preference, even if an employee has a labor certificate, if the job is considered to require less 
than two years training or experience, the individual will be characterized as an "other 
worker" and only 10,000 visas per year are available for this category. 
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ing in a single lottery the petitions of software engineers and medical re-
searchers with specialty cooks or nannies. But perhaps it is no less rational 
than the existing lottery. 
Professor Howard Chang and others have instead suggested a "head tax" 
or optimal tariff.375 Immigrants wjth high skills, important jobs, or who 
demonstrate special attributes would pay a low fee, while immigrants who 
are relatively unskilled or likely to contribute less to the public weal would 
pay a higher tax.376 The empirical support for the proposition that lower-
skilled workers use more resources than they contribute is, of course, hotly 
contested.377 Leaving aside the political battling over the taxation scheme, 
such a system would require a significant adjudicatory bureaucracy to as-
sess, inter alia, the skills, education, training, experience, and available job 
opportunities of the taxed applicant. 
Former Senator Alan Simpson and the Commission on Immigration Re-
form both have proposed that employers pay a tax in lieu of fulfilling labor 
certification requirements. Initially in the Immigration Reform Act of 
1996, Senator Simpson set the fee at twenty-five percent of the proposed 
salary or $25,000 whichever was higher.378 It is unlikely that the propo-
nents of the optimal tariff meant to quantify all human accomplishments 
into rigid tariff rate schedules. The designers would probably want to en-
sure flexibility and discretion in the adjudication. Indeed, one of the theo-
ries of the tariff is that the schedules could recapture the cost each immi-
grant would impose on the U.S. economy. How would this be measured? 
Annually, weekly, locally, regionally, nationally? The efficiency and 
transparency of the system are greatly reduced as the tariff scheme is al-
tered to recapture the substantive goal it meant to reach.379 
375. See Chang, supra note 74, at 380 (arguing private sector would benefit from elimi-
nation of all restrictions on immigration oflabor). Head taices have an ugly racial and ethnic 
history in our country and for reasons similar to the auction, the scheme is likely to be per-
ceived as a method of buying your way in if you are rich or resourceful. 
376. Seeid. 
377. Compare BORJAS, supra note 25, with SIMON, supra note 356. 
378. See S. 1394, 104th Cong. (1995) (indicating taJC rate should be either twenty-five 
percent of the proposed salary or $25,000, whichever is higher). See generally BECOMING 
AN AMERICAN, supra note 358 (recommending strategies to prevent exploitation of immi-
grant workers and to facilitate a more efficient system in which to employ immigrant work-
ers). Both proposals are aimed at streamlining the immigration process and recapturing 
some of the resources spent on lawyers, advertising fees, and internal costs spent in com-
pleting the existing cumbersome system. 
379. For example, in an article which attempts to set up a variable tariff, Rex Khan sug-
gests that the INS would measure several personal characteristics in order to set the appro-
priate tariff. He recommends such criteria as measuring health, education, language, job 
experience, education, intellect, and emotional intelligence. He acknowledges that he does 
not know of objective tests or measures for several of these criteria. See Khan, supra note 
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To the extent the tax is meant to serve as a disincentive to using immi-
grant, rather than American, workers, the effectiveness, however, requires 
varying the tax by job, employer, and potential immigrant.380 This tax as-
sessment would entail considerable administrative process. To prevent 
employers from passing on tax costs to the foreign worker or making the 
system a covert purchases of immigration benefits, some sort of investiga-
tory or grievance system would need to be administered. Any type of tax 
is, of course, vulnerable to the same issues of fraud, smuggling, and politi-
cal distaste as the other proposals. 
Another prominent proposal, one which has been adopted in part in Can-
ada and Australia, is known as a "point system," and operates by allocating 
points for desired qualities such as skill, education, job experience, net 
worth, existingjob offers, and the like.381 The notion is that if the point of 
allocation is well designed, the government can quickly and clearly identify 
desirable immigrants.382 Plainly, such a system requires considerable ad-
ministration and adjudication, for not only do the bona tides of claims to 
points need to be established, but also administrators must compare educa-
tional accomplishments among different educational systems, as well as 
training and skills which are differently understood and labeled.383 Moreo-
ver, measuring even Jess precise criteria, such as "past work experience" or 
individual "personal suitability,"384 requires a great deal of case-by-case 
357, at 412-16. 
380. Some employers would be dissuaded at costs much lower than twenty-five percent 
of salary, others would value the immigrant in other ways not necessarily reflected in the 
base salary. For example, the foreign worker may be expected to generate new sources of 
income for the employer or add a status or cache to the employer's workplace. 
381. See generally PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR., supra note 60. 
382. Advocates of this system suggest that an immigration scheme which focuses on the 
selection of skilled individuals who have demonstrated the ability to compete, to change, 
and to continue a pattern of "life long learning" are the type of immigrants we need in our 
society. See, e.g., PAPADEMETRJOU & YALE-LOEHR., supra note 60, at 162 (attempting to 
substitute past measurable achievements as a way to prove quality of adaptability). 
383. For instance, questions will arise about whether a Class A welder in France is 
equivalent to a Class A welder in the United States, and so forth. Nor do all point systems 
rely on strictly objective criteria such as age or a score on a standardized language exam. 
See id. (suggesting a sliding scale of points be awarded for immigrants who demonstrate 
training or work experience which establishes individual's potential to adapt in changing 
economic and technological environments). 
384. See Benjamin J. Tristler, Canada Continues to Toughen /ts lmmigration and Citi-
zenship Laws, in IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL11Y HANDBO!JK II 435 (2000-01) (explaining 
points for this category are awarded based on the visa officer's impressions of the appli-
cant's adaptability, motivation, initiative, and resourcefulness). For description and chart 
illustrating the Canadian point system see CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. CAN., CANADA'S 
IMMIGRATION LAW, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/immlaw.html (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2002). 
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adjudication.385 The reform most likely to gamer political support involves 
enhancing the flexibility for the Department of Labor to pre-certify occu-
pations and to create blanket waivers for persons qualified to enter those 
occupations.386 Yet this solution, too, continues to require considerable 
administrative process. Indeed, it was the Department of Labor that un-
dermined the most recent effort to implement a shortage occupation ap-
proach.387 
So, at least for the moment, it is worth pursuing incremental, pragmatic 
reforms which might minimize or alleviate some of the worst of the failures 
of process by increasing the transparency of agency action, preserving the 
integrity of agency adjudications, and balancing the need for timely adjudi-
cation with orderly procedures. I have grouped these recommendations 
into several areas: structural or substantive reforms, measuring perform-
ance, and incentives for improved performance. 
B. Structural and Substantive Changes 
1. Create a Coordinating Authority 
Far too many of the problems illustrated in this Article result from a lack 
of coordination of policies and priorities. Although the president could or-
der coordination by the Attorney General, Secretary of Labor, and Secre-
tary of State, it is, perhaps, politically expedient to allow immigration adju-
385. See, e.g., PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60, at 144-70 (proposing 
specially trained INS adjudicators be responsible for implementing selection criteria). Gen-
erally speaking, the book largely focuses on the substantive requirements of the point sys-
tem and its relative advantages over other selection criteria. Moreover, it appears to suggest 
a trust in the administrative expertise of the INS adjudicators that I do not completely share 
without more procedural protections. See infra Part IV.A (critiquing point system adjudica-
tion); BORJAS, supra note 25, at 194-95 (acknowledging potential for bias in criteria in a 
point system and suggests a similar potential for bias in how the adjudicator applies system). 
In my view, this type of adjudication is more rationally related to the goals of the immi-
gration system than attempting to conduct artificial tests of labor shortages. However, it is 
not inevitably adequately transparent or efficient, and attention to process is essential to 
making it so. Among other things, ensuring integrity will require that training and moni-
toring take place to avoid the likely tendency of adjudicators to make decisions biased to-
ward the type of education and skills they personally value. The more the system is de-
signed to ensure its substantive goals, the less likely it is that it will operate without 
substantial administrative adjudication. 
386. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent 
Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (2001) (listing Schedule A occupations, 
which provides a limited example of the pre-certification, blanket waiver approach). 
387. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing rationale and history behind 
the proposed LMI program). 
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dication to remain a divided task. The reason for this is that it becomes 
more difficult to blame any single agency for program failures or for each 
agency to point fingers at the others.388 Also, each agency fears control by 
the other and, therefore, the cabinet level officers each want to protect their 
administrative turf. 
Either Congress or the president should establish an authority to coordi-
nate these functions. Ideally, the president would create a cabinet level of-
fice to coordinate the immigration function and Congress would Support 
this structure with appropriate statutory reforms.389 The INS, standing 
alone without regard to the Department of State and Department of Labor, 
is a large federal agency employing over 25,000 people and operating with 
an annual budget of 3.9 billion dollars.390 Beyond mere size and expense, 
388. At an August AILA liaison questions and answers session with the Vennont Serv-
ice Center, AILA asked, "We also understood that ifan applicant had a pending I-140 and 
was about to reach the end of six years under an H-IB, this too would be a basis to request 
an expedite. Could you elaborate on the criteria used to detennine when an expedite would 
be appropriate, i.e., what specific factors must be established to qualify for an expedite un-
der those circumstances?" The response was, "As you know, the issue usually driving this 
is not ours [INS], but rather it is a factor of the large backlogs at the DOL, which can vary 
over the passage of time and by jurisdiction. For that reason, we do not consider these re-
quests to be an 'automatic' expedite approval. That is not to say that all similar requests of 
this type are the result of DOL processing delays. Therefore, each request is looked at, as 
you know, on a case-by-case basis and we will continue to treat them that way. AILA might 
want to bring some of its considerable influence to bear on the DOL for if their backlogs 
were reduced, many of these problems would disappear." See AILA, VSC LIASON 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, at http://www.aila.org (on file with author). 
389. Others have suggested the creation of a cabinet level office or a new independent 
agency. See PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 288, at 27-28 (recommending either an in-
dependent agency or an elevation of the function within Department of Justice). See gener-
ally Mn.TON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION: THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY (1985) (calling 
for either an independent agency or elevating INS within Department of Justice). I am not 
recommending an independent agency because the political issues that dominate immigra-
tion politics require leadership from an accountable executive. I realize others may view 
independent agencies as more likely to act without regard to politics and therefore to be 
more able to effect policies articulated in the statutes. I would prefer, however, to test the 
ability of the executive branch to maintain and achieve policy and thereby make at least one 
branch of government more accountable for its operation of the immigration function. For a 
discussion of the role of independent agencies see Symposium, The Independence of Inde-
pendent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L. REv. 215. 
390. See INS, STATISTICS, available at www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/ 
index.htm (describing statistics on employees and budget operations) (last visited Jan. 12, 
2002). When the personnel and resources of the Department of State and Department of 
Labor are added, the commitment of resources to the immigration adjudication is even more 
significant See PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 288, at 37 (comparing several agencies 
by size of workforce). 
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the immigration operations touch millions of lives.391 As the economy 
continues to globalize, immigration policy will become more integrated 
with international trade policy. It is definitely time to prioritize immigra-
tion policy and if policy is to be implemented, then the administration of 
the immigration agency operations deserves equal attention. 
Others have provided thoughtful reasons for the elevation of the immi-
gration function to a cabinet level office.392 Rather than repeat those rea-
sons, let me briefly clarify that I recommend placing all immigration re-
lated activity within this single new agency. Thus, for business related 
immigration, such a move would include the visa adjudication of the De-
partment of State, the labor certification and temporary certifications of the 
Department of Labor, and all INS functions. While this Article focuses 
solely on business immigration, my recommendation applies equally to 
other aspects of immigration law, such as border inspections or the removal 
process. Accordingly, I would move all of the enforcement immigration 
operations into this same agency.393 While there are currently several calls 
for separating the benefits adjudication from the enforcement operations, 
the benefits of a unitary agency under the supervision of a cabinet level of-
ficer should be carefully examined before separating these functions.394 
The unitary executive and agency structure should also increase ef-
ficiency in immigration adjudications because procedures could be fully 
designed and implemented within the same "shop." Many of the cultural 
factors mentioned earlier, such as the fear of fraud or lack of coordinated 
priorities, would have a reduced ability to frustrate the adjudication opera-
tions. Minimizing these should also lead to greater integrity in the process. 
While transparency is not necessarily increased by folding the operations 
into a single agency, efforts to make the process more transparent will not 
391. See discussion supra Part I. 
392. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. Many of the benefits of a unitary man-
ager are discussed in the Ash Commission Report. See Glen 0. Robinson, On Reorganizing 
the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REv. 947 (1971) (citing THE PRESIDENT'S 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXEC. REORGANlZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: 
REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 27 n. 7 (1971 )). 
393. These include the border patrol, Executive Office for Immigration Review, cur-
rently within the INS, and the Customs Service, currently within the Department of the 
Treasury. 
394. To the outsider, the adjudication of legal immigration benefits and the enforcement 
of the borders and removal statutes may seem completely unrelated. However, many others 
and I perceive the system as an interconnected web. Moreover, as I discussed in Part II, a 
main factor in the culture of the immigration law adjudications is a fear of fraud. Separating 
the benefits section from the tools and resources of the enforcement section may unneces-
sarily complicate the adjudicator's responsibility to deter and detect fraud. See generally 
PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 288, at 18 (recommending, with minor exceptions, a 
separation of functions but retaining both operations inside the immigration agency). 
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be hampered by the failure to integrate discussion of the other agencies' 
roles. As I have described, current participants in the system have little un-
derstanding of the way in which the adjudication of one agency impacts the 
other, how the pieces fit together, or when the immigration process will 
come to an end. While creating a single agency with a high level executive 
will not solve all of the problems articulated in this Article, it is my belief 
that this change would go a long way to eliminate or reduce many of the 
process borders. 
2. Eliminate Department of Labor Role, It Is Not Essential 
As this Article has shown, the Department of Labor processing delays 
approached three to four years in many regions and pushed the agency to 
adopt alternatives to the regular processing procedures. In 1999 and 2000, 
the Department of Labor completed record numbers of adjudications by 
relying heaviJy on the Reduction in Recruitment procedure.395 Neverthe-
less, the Department of Labor continues to face increasing filings with de-
creasing resources. Within the last five years the budget for the program 
has been cut in half.396 Facing these huge cuts, the Department of Labor 
began to investigate a concept called Program Electronic Review Manage-
ment System (PERM).397 The idea behind the program is to supplement the 
state leve] of review and the case-by-case adjudication by Regional De-
partment of Labor staff with an automated computer review of forms sub-
mitted by the employer.398 These forms would require the employer to 
make an attestation as to recruitment conducted in the past and the terms 
and conditions of the job. As described in an official notice and in recent 
public meetings, the Department of Labor anticipates this would be an ad-
judication without supporting documentation.399 Originally, the Depart-
ment of Labor had anticipated seeking statutory authority for post-approval 
auditing and sanctions for violations of the attestation requirements.400 In-
395. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. 
396. See supra note 121. 
397. See supra note 272-81 and accompanying text. 
398. See Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the 
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,777-79 (Aug. 25, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R pt. 656). 
Despite this announcement, as of February 2002, the regulations have not been modified in 
any relevant manner. 
399. See Audio tape: Statement of Jim Norris, Special Counsel, Employment and 
Training Administration, at meeting of the AILA Annual Conference, Chicago, Ill. (June 
2000) (on file with author). 
400. Based on my participation in agency discussions, I had understood the agency in-
tended to follow the pattern in the non-immigrant H-IB visa attestation on the Labor Condi-
tion Application (LCA). The Department of Labor makes no adjudicatory decisions when 
the LCA is filed, but may pursue complaints or investigations regarding the validity of the 
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stead, however, the agency determined that for cases not clearly meeting 
the program criteria, the Department of Labor would either require addi-
tional evidence concerning the fabor recruitment efforts or would require 
the employer to conduct supervised recruitment.401 One of the immediate 
questions about the post-approval audits would be the impact on the indi-
vidual beneficiary of the labor certification.402 
The goal of PERM is to allow 80% to 85% of the cases to pass through 
the automatic review without further inquiry by a Department of Labor 
employee.403 Approximately 15% to 20% of the cases would trigger indi-
vidualized adjudication and review.404 Some of these cases would be se-
lected at random as a quality control.405 Others would be selected for re-
view based on characteristics of the application.406 
attestations. The Employment and Standards Administration of the Department of Labor 
has the responsibility for these investigations and enforcement actions. The INS authorizes 
both fines and debarment penalties. See generally Angelo A. Paparelli & Catherine L. 
Haight, Avoiding or Accepting Risks of H-JBILCA Practice: Part I, 92 lMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 
15 (1992). As of February 2002, no post-approval audit has been announced by the De-
partment of Labor. 
401. See Labor Certification Process for the Pennanent Employment of Aliens in the 
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,777-79. 
402. It would be very disturbing if an employer's failure to comply with all attestations 
resulted in the loss of pennanent resident status for an employee who may not have had any 
power to control the employer. However, it would also be problematic if an employee, who 
might have colluded with an employer to obtain a fraudulent labor certification, did not face 
a rescission of pennanent resident status. Current statutory and regulatory authority would 
allow the INS to bring rescission proceedings within five years of the grant of pennanent 
resident status. 
403. See Audio tape: Statement of Jim Norris, Special Counsel, Employment and 
Training Administration, at the AILA Annual Conference, Chicago, Ill. (June 2000) (on file 
with author). In subsequent interviews, several Department of Labor officials stated that the 
program might have this capacity but it was not the goal of the system. Rather, establishing 
the PERM system would allow regional certifying officers to prioritize their adjudications 
and devote more time to cases requiring supervised recruitment. These officials vigorously 
denied that there was any quota or processing goal for the program. Nevertheless, in several 
public meetings where the Department of Labor presented the concept of PERM, the offi-
cials repeatedly stated that they were forced into this system because they had to complete 
more adjudications with fewer funds. At several meetings the figure of 80% to 85% was 
announced and the Department of Labor published the figure of 80% automated-approvals 
in a "power point" slide. See DIV. OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, DeP'T OF LABOR, THE 
PERM SYSTEM POWER PO!NT PRESENTATION (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter PERM 
SYSTEM]. 
404. Seeid. 
405. Seeid. 
406. As of the writing of this Article, the Department of Labor has not released details 
of the adjudication triggers. I participated in several task force meetings with members of 
affected industries, special interest groups, and high level Department of Labor policy ana-
lysts. Many suggested that factors such as an awareness of a work stoppage in an industry, 
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While the PERM adjudication model may be a modern and intelligent 
response to the adjudication requirements of the INA, it is unclear why the 
best agency to handle this adjudication is the Department of Labor. At 
least in cases that pass the automated adjudication, the process might be 
streamlined by allowing the INS to handle the entire operation. Cases trig-
gering audits could be referred back to the Department of Labor for case-
by-case adjudication.407 
More radically, I question the continued need for participation by the 
Department of Labor altogether.408 If the substantive goal of our law was 
to measure labor shortages and to find U.S. workers for open positions, it is 
time to call the program a failure. In an economy of more than 140 million 
jobs, the 65,000 average labor certifications issued per year represent less 
than half of one thousand percent of the total jobs.409 Before the 1990 
limitation on the "other worker" or low skilled category, labor certification 
might have been a more important restriction on the entry of lesser skilled 
workers.410 Given that we continue to restrict the total number of employ-
ment-based visas, is the labor certification essential to the proper allocation 
of the potential pool of 80,800 visas in the employment-based second and 
third preference categories?411 Moreover, obtaining the labor certificate in 
no way ties the immigrant to the specific job. Therefore, it would be more 
rational to measure the qualities of the immigrant rather than the job it-
evidence of high unemployment in an occupation, or knowing that the job was currently 
held by a non-citizen worker might trigger case-by-case review. See PERM SYSTEM, supra 
note 403. 
407. There is precedent for this cross-delegation betWeen agencies. Since the 1970s the 
INS has evaluated whether individuals qualify for the Schedule A waiver of labor certifica-
tion. 
408. Several years ago the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform similarly called for 
reorganization of the agencies responsible for the immigration function. See BECOMING AN 
AMERICAN, supra note 358, at 48. In addition to recommending a reorganization of the 
overall immigration agency functions, the Commission, in its final report, recommended 
eliminating the Department of Labor from the immigrant visa adjudications. The Commis-
sion, however, favored creating an enforcement role for the agency, allowing for greater in-
vestigations of fraud and enforcement of the wage and hour laws and the employer sanctions 
provisions. See id 
409. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE A-1. EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS OF nm CIVILIAN POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.tOJ.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). As of August 
2000, the economy contains 146,742,000 jobs. . 
410. See supra note 152 (describing Schedule B occupations as a deterrent to employ-
ers). Although waivers of the Schedule B bar to certification could be obtained whenever 
the employer could establish the complete absence of qualified, available workers. See 
GoRDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 44.04[2]. 
411. All other immigrant categories are exempt from the labor certification requirement. 
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self.412 
Even if we wanted to retain a labor market test, the INS might, in con-
sultation with the Department of Labor, develop criteria for labor certifica-
tion adjudication similar to the proposed PERM program. The INS can 
learn to identify the cases where an employer has insufficiently tested the 
available market or is not offering the prevailing wage.413 
Assuming Congress wishes to retain the basic substantive provision re-
quiring employers to prove the U.S. labor market cannot provide a quali-
fied, willing, and available worker, the key issue in reform will be integrity. 
If a streamlined adjudication proposal allows employers to inappropriately 
certify shortages, eventually the public or the agencies will come to distrust 
the system. Even ifthe program were folded into tqe INS, the reality is that 
the substantive standard is susceptible to manipulation or fraud. If the pro-
gram continues to be handled by the Department of Labor and labor certifi-
cations are issued, which the INS mistrusts, then the efficiency of the entire 
system will be impaired. Understandably, the INS slows down adjudica-
tion of the immigration visa petition in an effort to "hold the line" and deter 
visa fraud. As currently described, the transparency of the proposed PERM 
program is difficult to measure because few details have been released. 
But, it does appear the Department of Labor is unlikely to give employers 
advance guidelines about which occupations are appropriate for attestation 
approval or the necessary measure of recruitment. If the occupations were 
named and the recruiting standards spelled out, the agency is likely to feel 
that employers would tailor labor certification cases to fit the "approvable 
profile." 
412. This is the approach taken by Canada and Australia. See generally 
PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-Loam, supra note 60 (recommending similar approach). In each 
of these points systems, employment sponsorship and occupation are relevant to the points 
allocated to the individual but the job offer does not in and of itself control the entire immi-
gration process. 
413. Department of Labor specialists can train INS adjudicators or personnel already 
trained in this area can be relocated to the INS. To some degree Congress has already man-
dated that several of the immigration related adjudications are tied to information provided 
by other divisions of the Department of Labor. For example, the determination of the pre-
vailing wage has been tied to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Sta-
tistics (OES) database. See DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCuPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, 
FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/ 
wageinfo.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); see also GAL 2-98, supra note 115. OES is un-
fortunately a very limited database that contains fewer than nine hundr~d job categories and 
few allowances for skill level differences in the database. ·Tue Department of Labor has 
tried to put some flexibility into prevailing wage determinations by allowing employers to 
submit private surveys. But the INS should be capable of replicating this adjudication to the 
degree that most cases are automated and hard cases appear to need local state agency 
evaluation rather than the national office. 
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Perhaps no agency could design a labor certification adjudication model 
which preserves the integrity of the decisions, and operates efficiently in a 
transparent manner. At root, the difficulty in fashioning the ideal system 
lies with the particular character of the substantive requirement. By re-
quiring employers to identify the immigrant beneficiary before commenc-
ing the labor market test, the system seems to ignore the conflict employer 
and employee must feel from the beginning. True reform of employment-
based immigration adjudication will undoubtedly require serious reconsid-
eration of this substantive requirement. 
3. Elevate Administrative Appeals 
The administrative appellate function must be improved and made more 
transparent. More than ten years ago, Professor Stephen Legomsky com-
pleted a study for ACUS concerning the optimal forum for review of im-
migration related adjudication.414 This comprehensive report discussed a 
wide variety of adjudications, from the trial type proceedings in deportation 
and exclusion hearings to the informal administrative review of visa peti-
tion adjudications. In that report, he explored a framework for selecting the 
appropriate forum for administrative review allowing the agency to balance 
efficiency with accuracy in adjudication.415 He specifically recommended 
that the Administrative Appeals Office416 be separated from the INS adju-
dications function to foster greater independence in decision making and to 
allow for more formal reporting of the decisions of this office.417 These 
recommendations have not been acted upon. The Administrative Appeals 
Office is under the control of the INS Associate Commissioner for Exami-
nations and the hearing officers, while they may be senior INS examiners, 
are not necessarily lawyers and are not Administrative Law Judges. 
As was previously mentioned, the decisions of the Administrative Ap-
peals Office are not reported unless the decision is a precedent case. The 
current volume of appeals appears to be approximately 4,000 per year.418 
Publishing the decisions of the INS at the appellate level is an obvious first 
step in making the adjudications more transparent. Publishing this small 
414. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1297. See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY 
SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL 
THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION (1990). 
415. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1312-14 (discussing general criteria for choosing 
a review forum). . 
416. It was then called the Administrative Appeals Unit 
417. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1336-38. 
418. There is no official reporting of the workload of this office. These numbers are 
based on an interview with attorney Nancy-Jo Merritt who has studied the operations of this 
office in connection with her representation of clients. 
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volume of cases would not be burdensome419 and should be even more 
valuable and less burdensome given the smaJJer volume of cases. 
In its final report, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform simi-
larly called for improvement in the appellate review of agency adjudica-
tions.420 The Commission called for the creation of a separate agency to 
handle review of the decisions made in connection with immigration law.421 
In addition to review of the INS adjudications, this agency would also have 
jurisdiction over the decisions of the Department of State visa refusals. 422 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to reconsider the pros and cons of 
requiring administrative or judicial review of all decisions of the Depart-
ment of State. The common objection to administrative review of these de-
cisions is that because the consular officers consider millions of non-
immigrant visa applications, the volume of cases would be so high that any 
administrative review would be extremely costly and cumbersome. Yet this 
is a much smaller pool of cases and obviously involves significant interests 
of the U.S. business or family member. 
The real value of administrative or judicial review to the operation of the 
administrative process is its ability to preserve integrity and to increase 
transparency in the operation of the system. Serious evaluation of the 
benefits and costs of review should be a fundamental part of administrative 
reform. 
419. The INS has decided to publish all precedent decisions of the Board oflmmigration 
Appeals. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DOJ, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 
APPEALS PRECEDENT DECISIONS, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/ 
biaindx.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2001). The Department of Labor publishes all of the en 
bane decisions of the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals and the Office of the Ad-
ministrative Hearing Office for Immigration Related Employment Discrimination Practices 
publishes all of its decisions. Both of these administrative appellate agencies operate sepa-
rately from the agency itself and are staffed by Administrative Law Judges. 
420. See BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 358, at 175-83 (1997). 
421. See id. 
422. The need for some sort of external administrative or judicial control over Depart-
ment of State decisions has been debated for many years. See generally Nafziger, supra 
note 3 (discussing value of judicial review of consular decisions). More recently, the Com-
mission on Immigration Reform found that while judicial review might be expensive and 
burdensome, administrative review would be beneficial to the participants and to the agency 
itselfb~ause of the resulting protections for consistency, accuracy, and faimei;s. 
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4. Privatize Aspects of Adjudications423 
Some adjudications the INS and other agencies must make in immigra-
tion cases require the agencies to be sophisticated analysts of a wide array 
of information. For example, the INS must evaluate whether a foreign 
educational credential is the equivalent of a U.S. degree.424 Currently, the 
agencies often request and rely upon third party evaluations of these de-
grees made by experts in the education related industries.425 Two of the 
most popular categories of non-immigrant visas, the foreign student and 
exchange visitor, are in a sense privatized, or the sponsoring institution se-
lects the non-immigrant and issues the primary essential documents.426 
While the government has not always monitored the private institutions 
sufficiently, in large part the programs operate in an effective manner.427 
It is difficult to see why separate agency adjudication of the qualities of 
the individual are essential if the sponsor is held accountable for the selec-
tion of qualified candidates. This model of private actor selection might be 
expanded to select non-immigrant or immigrant categories.428 Where Con-
gress believes it is appropriate to test the bona tides of the individual's 
competence or qualifications, it may be possible to use existing non-profit 
organizations, which already make substantive evaluation of individual 
merit. Such repetitive adjudication is neither efficient nor transparent. Ab-
423. See generally Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation 
as a Regulatory Technique, 41 ADMIN. L. R.Ev. 171 (1995) (discussing benefit of similar 
privatization); Daniel W. Sutherland, The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy: The Achilles 
Heel of Immigration Reform, JO GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109 (1996) (calling for privatization of 
some immigration related functions). 
424. Of course, one of the fundamental problems in this area is that the INS and De-
partment of State must also determine ifthe degree certificates are fraudulent. 
425. There is nothing about these credential evaluators in the regulations, but experi-
enced participants know that the agencies frequently ask for this corroboration. 
426. These are not insignificant categories. Besides admitting a large number of people, 
many foreign students or exchange visitors, such as Ms. Cheng in the narrative discussed 
above in Part II, later change status to remain in the United States. 
427. Recently, the INS has undertaken a number of technological experiments to create 
a more integrated communication and record keeping system between the INS and the edu-
cational institutions using the student (F-1) visa. See Kate Zernike & Christopher Drew, A 
Nation Challenged: Student Visas; Efforts to Track Foreign Students Are Said to Lag, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al. At one time the GAO severely criticized the INS for lack su-
pervision of the student visa program. GAO, CONTROLS OVER NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS 
REMA.IN INEFFECTIV,E (1980), discussed in MILTON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION: THE 
BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 113 (1985). 
428. Congress already instructed the INS to consider the opinion of some private or-
ganizations in the adjudication of several non-immigrant visa categories such as the extraor-
dinary ability in business, arts or science (0 visa) or the outstanding entertainer or athlete (P 
visa). See INS Nonimmigration Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(0)-(p) (2001). 
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sent a negative private consultation, an individual could simply be issued 
the appropriate visa at the U.S. consulate. If a private organization issued a 
negative recommendation on the admission of the individual, then the INS 
could adjudicate the case to avoid undue private control and to ensure fair 
adjudication, thus fostering the integrity of the system. These same princi-
ples could be used to adjudicate the employment-based first preference ex-
traordinary ability in those cases where a private evaluation could be ob-
tained from a reputable non-profit organization.429 · 
The use of private parties does not mean that the agencies do not care-
fully design and oversee the private adjudications. It is unfortunate that re-
cently some INS attempts to privatize operations were unsuccessful. For 
example, the INS suspected that citizenship exams administered by certain 
private organizations were rigged to pass unqualified applicants. The use 
of private Qualified Designated Entities, assisting in the legalization pro-
grams of 1986, was not uniformly successful and in some cases may have 
inappropriately prevented a qualified applicant from obtaining beneflts.430 
Still, rather than reject all privatization, it would be more beneficial to ex-
amine the characteristics of the public/private adjudication that have oper-
ated well and to identify the missing safeguards in other operations.431 This 
kind of systematic analysis may allow the agencies to test and implement 
other appropriate programs. 
There may be other areas where the agencies could delegate adjudication 
429. In the interest of fairness, and to maintain control over the quality of the adjudica-
tion, the INS may want to establish an accreditation and record-keeping requirement similar 
to the exchange visitor program or the registration of blanket multinational employers for 
the L-1 visa. See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1), G) (2001 ). While the ac-
creditation process obviously necessitates an adjudication process, ideally it would be less 
cumbersome and result in economical adjudication of hundreds or thousands of individual 
petitions. Moreover, these private organizations would need to provide public infonnation 
about costs, standards, and procedures to ensure fairness and accuracy. See generally 
Tracking International Students in Higher Education: Policy Options and Implications for 
Students: Hearing Before the House Educ. Comm. Subcomm. On 21st Century Competitive-
ness and Select Educ., 108th Cong. (2001) (statement of Michael Becraft, Acting Deputy 
Comm'r, INS) (commenting on foreign student visas). 
430. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., 509 U.S. 43, 46 (1993) (vacating judgment on 
grounds record was insufficient to decide all of jurisdictional issues and remanding to lower 
court to determine which class members were front-desked); Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Thorn-
burgh, 956 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming lower court granting summary 
judgement); Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Meese, 664 F. Supp. 1378, 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (alle-
gation was QDE's front-desk qualified applicants inappropriately turning away some bona 
fide applications). 
431. By and large, the use of private physicians to conduct required medical exams has 
operated well for many years. The physicians must be certified by the Public Health Serv-
ice. See generally GORDON ET AL., supra note 72. 
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of some criteria to third parties. For example a private credit reporting 
agency might verify the viability of a business and the INS could find this 
sufficient to establish the company's ability to pay the offered wage in a 
visa petition. Congress and the agencies should consider the availability of 
private sector evaluators for a wide variety of the immigration-related 
functions. 
C. Measuring Performance and Bringing Process to Light 
Important to any true attempt at reform are mechanisms to measure the 
effectiveness of agency operations and a formalized structure for continu-
ous reporting, feedback, and re-engineering. In fact, the need for informa-
tion to allow for continued flexibility and adaptation is critically important 
if other reforms are to be sustained. The following recommendations are 
designed to increase the transparency of the process in operation. 
1. Create a Feedback Source to Keep Measurement and Accountability 
Paramount 
A number of mechanisms could be used to generate feedback and meas-
ure performance for each of the agencies involved in immigration.432 Some 
of the mechanisms, such as congressional oversight hearings or sunset pro-
visions that terminate programs, are so formal and highly visible that they 
actually might reduce the likelihood of objective and sober agency per-
formance evaluation. While congressional oversight will obviously con-
tinue through committee hearings and the appropriations process, each 
agency needs the resources and expertise to monitor its own performance 
objectively.433 Given the abysmal record of immigration adjudications, 
close congressional oversight is imperative at this time. However, devel-
oping agency competence and the ability to monitor and correct its own 
performance should be the long-term goal. 
In recent years, the INS hired outside consulting firms specializing in 
management and accounting systems.434 Congress should continue to ap-
432. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. I, 27 (1997) (discussing benefits ofpartcipation in a collective model); Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 578 (2000) (pro-
posing public and private actors negotiate over policy-making, therby decentralizing the de-
cisionmaking process). 
433. Congress has de!Jlanded a great deal of reporting from the INS in recent years, spe-
cifically information about the H-lB non-immigrant visas and the naturalization adjudica-
tions. The effect of pinpointing various visa or petition categories has the unfortunate effect 
of leaving other program areas to founder as the agency understandably reroutes time and 
resources. 
434. See 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1245 (1997) (confirming appointment of outside 
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propriate sufficient funding for access to such independent expertise. 
However, the consultants should be required to gather data and information 
about agency performance from sources external to government. These in-
clude major participants in the system, such as industries which regularly 
rely on business visas, academic, and policy observers of the system, for-
eign governments regularly called upon to address the complaints of their 
nationals, and selected representatives of the different streams of immi-
grants.435 
Currently, several informal feedback opportunities operate, with various 
degrees of effectiveness, to provide the agencies with information about 
process problems and potential solutions. As an example, the AILA holds 
informal liaison meetings with national and regional personnel.436 In-
creasingly, these liaison meetings have been essential in reporting on proc-
essing times, new procedures and in designing effective solutions to prob-
lems. The agencies also hold liaison meetings with other institutional 
representatives of the participants in its system, such as the non-profit pro-
viders and humanitarian groups. 
However, in many situations, the agencies' unwillingness or inability to 
incorporate suggested changes or to communicate its policies to the field 
limited the effectiveness of these informal meetings. Accordingly, Con-
gress should consider mandating public liaison meetings and providing the 
staff and resources necessary to publish the text of the meetings and the 
agreed to recommendations.437 In the current procedures, AILA or other 
groups external to the agency usually write the minutes of the meetings and 
submit them to the agencies for approval. Although this is done in a very 
consultants). 
435. The INS did convene such a group when it hired outside consultants to advise it on 
reforming its operations. The consultant reports are not public, see Interpreter Releases 
where such reports are referenced. Still, there is a continuing need to create such advisory 
committees on an institutional level. Congress mandated the creation of one such commit-
tee to oversee INS operations at international airports. See 8 U.S.C. § 1356(d) (Supp. V 
1999). The committee is required to publish notice of the meetings and to prepare written 
minutes. See Immigration and Naturalization Service User Fee Advisory Committee; 
Meeting, 65 Fed. Reg. 8209 (Feb. 17, 2000). At times, local advisory committees have also 
been established. See, e.g., New York District Advisory Committee. However, the minutes 
of these meetings reveal little or no information about the items discussed at the meetings. 
See, e.g., Minutes of March and June meetings (on file with author). If the advisory com-
mittees are to fulfill the role of providing feedback and increasing accountability, the min-
utes must be detailed and publicly available. 
436. While the AILA performs this function very well, it is a private bar association and 
the liaison minutes are not routinely made available to the general public. To join AILA, an 
individual must be an attorney admitted to practice and the individual must pay dues. Al· 
though AILA offers some reduced dues for non-profit attorneys, membership is not free. 
437. Apparently, AILA has been discussing a similar proposal. See Interview with 
Frances Berger, Member of AILA Board of Governors (Aug. 29, 2000). 
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expeditious manner and even when agency management commits to proce-
dural reform, the minutes of these meetings are not consistently transmitted 
to the operational levels to guide the adjudicators. 
Some, but certainly not all, of the topics discussed in the liaison meet-
ings should be reduced to written policy memoranda. These memoranda 
should be widely distributed to commercial publishers and participant or-
ganizations. Further, they should be posted on the INS Web site and pub-
lished in the Federal Register. Where accountability is essential and the 
agency has not initiated AP A rulemaking, the non-governmental actors 
should consider formalizing the liaison agreements into petitions for rule 
making.438 Although the petitions may never be promulgated as regu!ations 
under the AP A, the agencies could publish rule proposals as policy memo-
randa when they are in general agreement with the petition.439 
While an agency is not required to take steps to actually promulgate 
rules based on a petition for rule making, the AP A requires that, within a 
reasonable time, it either deny the petition or begin the rulemaking proc-
ess. 440 In the immigration area, Congress should consider giving petition-
ers more power by creating a specific time period wherein the agency must 
explain why it will not act on the procedure recommended or notify peti-
tioners of an adoption of similar or modified procedural solutions. With 
specific time frames, actors could petition federal district courts for an or-
der for agency action or, if court participation is deemed too burdensome, 
for referral to a Congressional oversight committee.441 
2. Improve Public Reporting of Procedure 
Some of the recommendations made here are easy to implement and 
438. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("Each agency shall give an inter-
ested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."). See 
generally Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1267-89 (1992) (discussing lack of judicial review of petitions). 
439. Many commentators have discussed agency reluctance to engage in rulemaking. 
See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 
Duke L.J. 1385, 1391 (1992). Those agreements which are purely procedural are also ex-
empt from the rulemaking requirements of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(A). 
440. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing limits on judicial review of failure to act on a petition for rule-
making). Generally, courts have held there is no right to force the agency to consider the 
petition, but there may be limited review of the agency rejection of the petition. See ALFRED 
C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1.l (1998) (gathering 
cases on petition for rulemaking). 
441. While I recognize that these rulemaking efforts divert agency resources in the short 
term, forcing the agency to adopt more rules over time will increase efficiency and transpar-
ency. 
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greatly increase the ability of the participants to comply with filing re-
quirements. Congress should consider creating a special provision for pro-
cedural rules for the agencies and, although not requiring the full APA 
rulemaking protocol, require the publication of all procedures in the Fed-
eral Register and on agency Web sites.442 District offices of the INS, re-
gional offices of the Department of Labor, state agencies, and the various 
consulates of the Department of State should maintain a public access li-
brary with these procedural memoranda, and whenever possible, post 
comments on their Web site addressing the local implementation of the 
procedures.443 These local implementation comments are very important. 
Merely announcing a new national procedure will not result in uniform 
change. For example, after the Department of Labor adopted the Reduction 
in Recruitment procedure, the various Regional Certifying Officers imple-
mented the program in very different ways, and in many regions Reduction 
in Recruitment was not widely available.444 Posting information about the 
current status of implementation of new national policies is essential. 
While the substantive Jaw is difficult to comprehend, the ability of non-
specialists to understand the procedural rules of the agencies is much 
worse. In recent months, with the growth of the Internet and government 
Web sites, more information is available, but even basic instructions about 
procedures and processing times are sorely lacking. Visit the INS Web site 
to learn how to sponsor your relative for immigration,445 and you will find 
that as a U.S. citizen you can indeed sponsor your brother or sister. No-
442. Recent amendments to FOIA appear to require electronic posting. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(t)(2) (Supp. V 1999). 
443. Publishing this data also bas the side benefit of allowing the public to monitor at 
least one aspect of the performance levels of the agency. Some of the regional Department 
of Labor offices are posting special procedures and information about special filing re-
quirements of the state agencies under regional supervision. See DEP'T OF LABOR, 
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, available at 
http://www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). The INS 
Web site is beginning to provide more detailed information about forms, the proper juris-
diction for processing the application, suggestions for supporting evidence, and current in-
formation on filing fees. The INS Regional Service Centers now have pages on the INS 
Web site. These pages contain helpful information about preparing applications for submis-
sion, mailing the documents, and supporting documentation. They do not contain process-
ing time information. For how to file forms, see INS, FORMS, FEES, AND FJNGERPRJNTS, 
available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/formsfee/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2002). . 
444. Initially in New York, the state agency and regional office considered only spe-
cialty cooks to be an occupation suitable for reduction in recruitment. See Interview with 
Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 15, 
2000). 
445. See generally INS, at http://www.ins.gov. 
2002] BREAKING BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS 313 
where on the site, however, will you find a warning that the current waiting 
time in this category is approaching twelve years.446 Employers seeking 
information about sponsoring workers are rerouted to the Department of 
Labor Employment and Training Administration Web site.447 The Depart-
ment of Labor has been improving the Web site but the quality and consis-
tency of the information available makes it difficult to understand the 
regular and expedited processing procedures and the multi-year processing 
time differences in these procedures.448 
The Department of State Web site contains very helpful summaries of 
the immigration categories.449 However, this site, too, does little to explain 
the delays or complexity of the adjudication process.45° Consider the ex-
planation of the labor certification requirement: 
The applicant must complete DOL Fonn ET A-750B, Statement of Qualifications of 
Alien, and send this completed fonn to the prospective employer who completes 
Fonn ETA-750A, Application for Alien Employment Certification, Offer of Em-
ployment. The prospective employer submits both fonns to the local office of the 
State Employment Service in the area in the United States where the work will be 
perfonned. The employer will then be notified by the appropriate regional office of 
the DOL of its approval or disapproval.4s1 
It reduces a complex procedure to filling out forms.4s2 The description is 
446. There is a vague statement about how "demand may exceed supply" and a link to 
the Visa Bulletin. However, deciphering the Visa Bulletin is very challenging. 
447. See generally EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKFORCE 
SECURITY, at http://www. workforcesecurity .doleta.gov. 
448. An unusual exception is the Region III website (now renamed Region) which con-
tained processing times for the various types of applications in its office. Perhaps this office 
publicized the times because the region was processing cases filed within the last two 
months. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, ATLANTIC REGION, avail-
able at http://www.doleta.gov/regions/reg03/ (last modified Jan. 10, 2002). In contrast, the 
infonnation for Region II (renamed Region l) gave no processing times but did list a status 
phone line (212) 337-2193. These telephone numbers give tape-recorded infonnation about 
the date of the cases being worked on. It is also possible to call and speak to an individual 
officer. The Region IX website was unavailable. AILA reports that Region IX has the 
worst backlogs and based on liaison minutes, cases filed more than four years earlier may 
still be awaiting adjudication. 
449. See generally DEP'T OF STATE, VISA SERVICES, available at http://travel.state.gov/ 
visa_services.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
450. It also contains one gross error. The site still refers to the Labor Market Infonna-
tion pilot program. Although authorized in 1990, the statutory authority sunset four years 
later and the program was never implemented. For a discussion of this program, see supra 
note 151 and accompanying text. 
451. DEP'T OF STATE, TIPS FOR U.S. VISAS: EMPLOYMENT-BASED VISAS, at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa;employ-based.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
452. While fonns can be useful in guiding unsophisticated participants, far too often the 
immigration forms and accompanying instruction do not adequately inform the public about 
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irresponsible in its misleading simplicity.453 
Sophisticated participants may visit one of the public Web sites spon-
sored by law firms posting current processing time reports gathered by the 
AILA.454 However, the reports themselves use different criteria for de-
scribing the estimated processing times and can be completely deceptive.455 
The INS Web site does not even link the user to these reports. Instead, the 
INS tells the reader that the estimated processing times are reported on the 
receipts issued at the time of filing an application. In reality, the receipt 
times are often incorrect. Participants can try to call the INS customer 
service line to learn estimated processing times, however participants are 
not provided with information about how to contact the local or regional 
office if a case is beyond that time frame.456 Sophisticated participants may 
utilize internal agency tracking procedures, but the general public does not 
know these even exist.457 
the substantive criteria, adjudication standards, or processing times. Moreover, the forms 
are often out of date and infrequently updated. 
453. Given the need for clarity in this field and the high number of people who rely on 
the government to provide the information, the Department of State could at least link to the 
Department of Labor site or do more to reflect the nature of the certification requirement. 
454. See, e.g., LAW OFFICES OP CARL SHUSTERMAN, at http://www.shusterman.com (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2002); FRAGOMEN, DEL REY, BERNSEN & LoEWY, P.C., at 
http://www.fragomen.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); ILW.COM, at http://www.ilw.com 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
455. For example, the Texas Service Center reported processing times do not reflect the 
actual time required because the time necessary to get the case assigned to an adjudicator is 
not reported. The real processing times may double in many cases. See Interview with Ve-
ronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy (July 31, 2000). 
456. Interview with customer service representative concerning processing of naturali-
zation petitions in New York. The representative assured me processing required a mini-
mum of thirty-nine months. Receipts for these petitions said a processing time of up to 
thirty-six months. The Customer Service National Hotline processing information was con-
tradicted by the Vennont Service Center representative, who said that cases pending that 
Jong were sometimes closed for inaction or had to be rerouted by special procedure to en-
sure New York District processing. Telephone interviews with anonymous customer serv-
ice representatives (July 24, 2000). 
457. It is difficult sometimes, even for trained immigration professionals, to identify the 
status of a pending application because of the bureaucratic factors that complicate the ex-
isting inquiry process (Visa Bulletin reports, automated phone systems, etc.). Currently, the 
California Service Center's (CSC) Director's Office created a backup to the existing inquiry 
process. The Director's Office houses an Information Officer to field questions and resolve 
problems, an Adjudication Officer, who can make final decisions on cases, and an Ombuds 
who is specifically focused on those cases that require extraordinary involvement from the 
Director's Office. The most appropriate time to tum to the Ombuds is when issues simply 
cannot or have not been resolved through any other means. While the Ombuds can identify 
and resolve problems in a timely manner, the CSC warns that the Ombuds can only remain 
beneficial if used sparingly. See California Service Center/A/LA Liaison Meeting, 18 AILA 
MONTHLY MAILING 860-65 (1999). , 
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Ideally, the government would create a single Web site that would an-
swer the questions of a prospective immigrant or employer wishing to 
sponsor an immigrant. The physical jumping from site to site in cyber-
space is a poor introduction to the reality of journeying through this terri-
tory. The inability to imagine who would prepare and maintain such a site 
is a further illustration of the structural problems inherent in this admini-
stration process.458 
3. Use of Technology for Communication and Efficiency 
Communication must be improved. As was discussed above, it can take 
the INS more than one year to communicate to the Department of State that 
the INS approved an immigrant petition.459 This is a gross abuse of public 
trust and an example of the INS' failure to set appropriate priorities. The 
technology of the three agencies should be developed in concert. If we are 
going to continue with three separate entities, then the enterprise architec-
ture460 design of each agency must include coordination with the others. 
Apparently, the agencies appear unable to coordinate based on several 
years of reports to Congress about working groups and problems with the 
database designs.461 Congress, which created this three-headed monster, 
must take some of the responsibility and mandate coordination of the tech-
nological design.462 
Communication is essential to all three process values--integrity, effi-
ciency, and transparency. Many of the problems identified in this Article 
are directly attributable to the agencies' failure to establish inter and intra 
agency communication. Communication with the public is obviously an 
essential ingredient of transparency. 
458. See supra Part IV.BJ (discussing need to create a coordinating authority). 
459. See supra note 306 (discussing 1-824 processing times); see also supra Figures 4 
and 5, p. 280. 
460. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 332, at 2 (discussing GAO report on 
poor state of INS technological planning referred to as an enterprise architecture). 
461. Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and 
Advisory Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 29, 2000) (on file with author); 
see also NIKOLAI WENZEL, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES, AMERICA'S 0TIJER BORDER PATROL: 
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CONSULAR CORPS AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 7 (Aug. 
2000) (noting disconnect of State Department and INS databases creates difficulties for 
State Department employees conducting background checks), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/back800.html. 
462. Merely ordering the agencies to coordinate would be insufficient In 1999 Con-
gress ordered every agency to create a Central Information Officer. See discussion in GAO 
REPoRT, supra note 28. Here Congress may need to create and fund a single office with the 
authority to control the agency appropriations and technological development. 
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4. Measuring Performance and Participant Satisfaction 
In a popular book discussing efforts of governments to streamline and 
refonn operations, the authors stress t~e need for government organizations 
to be "customer oriented."463 One of the techniques mentioned is to create 
an ombud, an office devoted to listening to customers and empowered to 
act on customer complaints.464 The INS does not have an official ombud 
office.465 Although recent proposed legislation466 suggested creating such 
an office, the INS opposed the concept and in its draft reorganization plan 
discussed creating a Customer Service Advocate.467 Ideally the INS would 
support both a Customer Service Advocate and an independent ombud be-
cause the two do not necessarily serve the same function. Further, neither 
the Department of Labor nor the Department of State have om bud offices. 
If an ombud is to be effective, the office must be independent from the 
control of agency management but sufficiently connected to the agency to 
understand both the operations and how to resolve complaints or inquir-
ies.468 One of the functions the.ombud office could undertake would be to 
measure the satisfaction of participants in the system and to initiate inde-
463. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, RElNVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING nm PuBLIC SECTOR 167 (1992) (arguing be-
cause agencies obtain funding from the government, there is no motive for the agencies to 
satisfy the "customer"). 
464. See id. at 179. The ACUS also recommended the creation of ombud offices in fed-
eral agencies. See David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Report for Recommendation 
90-2, Ombudsman in Federal Agencies: The Theory and the Practice, in ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REcOMMENDATIONS AND REPoRTS 105, 111 {1990). 
See generally Harold J. K.rent, Federal Agency Ombuds: The Costs, Benefits, and Counte-
nance o/Confidentiality, 52 ADMIN. L. REY. 17 (2000). 
465. The INS does have an Office of Congressional Liaison. The mission of this office 
is limited to serving the constituent inquiries of Members of Congress. See INA, 
INFORMATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES, at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/ 
congress/index.htm ("The information we provide is intended to support Congressional of-
fices in their search for information .... ")(last visited Feb. 14, 2002); see also discussion of 
an ombud in the California Regional Service Center, supra note 457. In the fall of2001, the 
INS announced the creation of an Ombuds office directed at enforcement and a "Customer 
Relations Office" for business and family based cases. See INS, INS REsTRUCTING PLAN 
(2001), available at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/restruct.htm. It is 
too early to assess its structure and characteristics. 
466. See S. 1563, 106th Cong. § 104 (1999) (proposing creation of an office of the om-
budsman within the service bure!UJ). 
467. See July 1999 Draft Reorganization Plan, available at http://www.ins.gov. On De-
cember 7, 2001, the INS announced a new restructuring plan and named a Director of the 
Office of INS Restructuring. See New Release, INS Restructing Director Announced (Dec. 
7, 2001), available at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/insrestructrel.htm. 
468. See supra note 457 and accompanying text (discussing qualities of ombud). 
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pendent investigations of problems.469 
If a formal ombud is not possible, then the agencies should create infor-
mal feedback mechanisms such as regular customer satisfaction reports. 
Businesses and immigrants should be questioned about their experience 
with the system at regular intervals throughout the process. The INS and 
Department of Labor should provide a formal receipt for approved petitions 
and a written denial for denied petitions.470 A questionnaire inquiring about 
timing, information, and service should be provided with every petition.471 
These evaluations should be gathered by the agencies and special personnel 
devoted to analyzing trends in reported problems, delays, or complications. 
As mentioned above, one of the chronic problems of the agencies is the 
anonymous nature of most adjudications.472 All employees should sign 
their work and wear name badges to allow participants in the system to 
provide reports on their treatment and conduct.473 The INS has long had 
the practice of signing all actions under the stamped signature of the Dis-
trict Directors or Directors of Regional Service Centers. The Department 
of Labor prepares correspondence under the name of the Regional Certify-
ing Officer. The Department of State frequently protects the identity of 
469. Of course, creation of this independent office would take additional resources and 
the ombud may, from time to time, interfere with the operations of the agency adjudications. 
However, given the current complete lack of adequate customer service, for at least a trial 
period, an ombud is an appropriate way to measure performance and perhaps remedy long-
standing endemic problems. 
470. The Department of State does not routinely issue receipts, but in the immigrant visa 
system the individual interviewer has a clear opportunity to provide participants with cus-
tomer service evaluation forms, which could be mailed to a central office. 
471. The participant should be assured that all responses on the customer satisfaction 
report will remain confidential. Notwithstanding the desire of Congress to limit the amount 
of paperwork, there are some information gathering requirements that should be given a 
high priority. See, e.g., William F. Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Re-
duction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I, 116 (1987) (arguing agency 
paperwork should be evaluated on a cost-benefit basis); see generally 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3520 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (requiring justification for new imposition). 
472. This aspect of the administrative culture is discussed supra Part III.B.3.f. 
473. Of course, some participants will abuse this privilege and potentially harass a gov-
ernmental employee or inappropriately provide negative feedback. However, if feedback is 
continuously solicited and reported, the rare inappropriate evaluation will become obvious 
because of the number of contradictory reports of fair treatment from other participants. 
Moreover, employees of the government should be given some protection from sanction or 
unfair evaluation from participants in their job performance. Nevertheless, failing to collect 
the data simply because some will inappropriately blame the messenger disproportionately 
shifts the burden to the immigrants and other participants. Further, employees may be moti-
vated by praise and expressions of gratitude from participants as well as commendation and 
respect from managers observing their performance as reported by these new sources of in-
formation. 
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overseas personnel for fear of terrorist attacks. Yet, the Department of 
State lists key officers at foreign service posts on its Web site and generally 
makes available names of consular officers.474 
If there are sufficient and appropriate reasons why personal identity 
should not be revealed, then, at a minimum, all officers should be given a 
badge number so that public interaction with that particular individual can 
be tracked and reported.475 It seems strange that taxi drivers must display 
their names and license numbers but individuals making important and sig-
nificant decisions about visa status or naturalization remain anonymous. 
5. Publish More Administrative Decisions 
Almost all of the adjudications discussed in this Article are made on the 
basis of written submissions of forms and supporting documents. The ap-
plicant submits the material by mail in most cases and awaits written action 
from the agency. For the most part, the INS and Department of Labor ad-
judications are made without personal contact with either the sponsors or 
the individual immigrants.476 Given the large and growing volume of adju-
dications, this form of informal and written adjudication makes practical 
sense. However, understanding the procedures used to properly file the ap-
plications, identifying the standards the adjudicator will apply, predicting 
the outcome in any particular case, and measuring the consistency of the 
adjudications are all extremely difficult, if not impossible tasks. 
The approvals and denials of the various petitions at this adjudication 
level are not published. Individual applicants receive written denials con-
taining a basic explanation of the reasons for the denial.477 If a case is ap-
474. See DEP'T OF STATE, BIOGRAPHIES: PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/biog/index.4987.htm (providing biographies for "principal offi· 
cers" in the State Department) (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); see also AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS 
Ass'N, THE VISA PROCESSING GUIDE: PROCESS AND PROCEDURE AT U.S. CONSULATES AND 
EMBASSIES (Miller et al., 7th ed. 1999). 
475. Ironically, the border patrol, which has more physical contact with the public and 
are at times in dangerous confrontations, wear name identification on their uniforms. 
476. It is possible in most Department of Labor regions to speak with an adjudicator on 
the telephone. This is very rarely the case in the INS. 
477. The APA requires that the agency provide a brief statement of the grounds for de-
nial. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 267-68 (1970) (mandating a statement of reasons for determination and evidence relied 
on as a matter of proce~ural due process). While it is no~ my intent to argue the constitu-
tional requirement of due process necessitates this type of notice in all immigration cases, 
this practice has become fairly standard ii:i the agency operations even if not constitutionally 
required. See generally Verkuil, supra note 26 (discussing INS failure to provide sufficient 
protections in denial of adjustment of status cases); Verkuil, supra note 45 (noting most 
agencies should include this element in informal adjudications). 
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proved, the only document issued by the agency is a standard approval no-
tice.478 
In some visa categories, such as the national interest waiver discussed 
above, the lack of detailed regulations or informal policy memoranda make 
it difficult to assess the merits of any individual case or to gather the type 
of supporting evidence the agency desires. In other categories, where the 
regulations are more specific, issues arise about the interpretation of spe-
cific regulatory terms. In these areas,479 publishing the denials would go a 
long way to making agency actions more transparent and at least providing 
some tools for measuring consistency and accuracy in adjudication.480 
While publishing all of the denials made at this level may, at first con-
sideration, seem too labor intensive or burdensome for the agency, the 
overall rates of denial are fairly low.481 Using optical scanning devices and 
posting denials to INS Web sites or making copies available through FOIA 
requests would aid participants in understanding the evaluative process of 
In practice, the INS provides written denials, which may contain an explanation of both 
the evidentiary and legal inadequacies of the application. Some attorneys complain that 
these denials contain little specific information and contain boilerplate recitations. If these 
denials were to be publicly published it is possible that the agency would find it in its own 
interest to invest more time in providing detailed guidance to the public because this infor-
mation might prevent future insufficient applications. At the current time, there are no 
regulations that prohibit re-filing. Some attorneys use the denials to redocument and resub-
mit the application for the same worker. Although administrative appeal procedures do ex-
ist. many attorneys find it more expeditious to simply refile. The current backlog for ad-
ministrative adjudication of a business related petition is between eighteen and twenty-four 
months. See Interview with Nancy-Jo Merritt, Partner, Littler Mendelson in Phoenix, Ariz. 
(Aug. 15, 2000). 
4 78. In the case of the Department of State, the individual receives a formal stamp in his 
or her passport. The INS uses a single page document called Form I-797. This form con-
tains the name of the petitioner, beneficiary, and the visa category. If a petition is valid for a 
limited period of time, the length of the approval is also noted. See generally Memorandum 
from Thomas Cook, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications, INS, to All Regional 
Directors, All Service Center Directors, and Director, Administrative Appeals Office (Feb. 
I 3, 200 J), at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/11 blanke.pdf. 
479. Ideally, the INS would publish all denials in all categories but initially it would be 
sufficient to identify those visa categories where transparency and vagueness in substantive 
criteria are of particular importance. Rather than the agency selecting these areas alone, I 
recommend an oversight committee, including members of the private bar, identify the visa 
categories for publication and to remove from the publication list those where adjudication 
standards appear to be well-established and accessible to participants. 
480. Personal informati9n should be expunged in the published decisions to protect the 
privacy of the individuals. 
481. At least I believe the rates of denial are low. The INS does not formally report the 
adjudication rates for each visa category. My assumption is based on reviewing testimony 
before Congress, interviews with agency officials, and experienced immigration attorneys. 
The INS does report a seven percent denial rate for adjustment of status. 
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the agency.482 
The publishing of denials would benefit the agency as well. Adjudica-
tors would have the ability to search the work of other adjudicators. 
Agency management could study the operations and determine if national 
adjudication standards are appropriate. Congress and, other observers 
might be better prepared to fine tune or refine the substantive criteria when 
the agency appears to be too restrictive or narrow in its adjudications. Cur-
rently, the stories of "rogue" adjudications must be gathered on an ad hoc 
or anecdotal basis. Special industry exemptions and procedures have often 
been built into the statute on the basis of this type of evidence.483 The pub-
lishing of denied cases could also deter applicants from filing frivolous or 
weak cases that fail to meet the substantive criteria.484 
At first glance, the Department of Labor appears to provide more pub-
482. In August of2000, the INS began posting to its Electronic Reading Room optically 
scanned copies of adjustment of status decisions, which had been considered by the Associ-
ate Commissioner for Examinations. See generally INS, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, at 
http:l/www.ins.gov/graphics/lawsregs/admindec/index.htm (last modified Dec. 14, 2001). 
The decisions included both denied and approved applications. In a telephone interview, 
Pamela Ball, INS Reading Room Specialist, the Electronic Reading Room (ERR), stated 
that the aim of the Administrative Decisions portion of the ERR is to be representative and 
not to be complete. INS wants the public to be able to get an idea of the nature of INS Ad-
ministrative Decisions. Ms. Ball said the site is not meant to serve as a research tool for 
practitioners. She hoped that by September of 2000, the ERR would have several opinions 
posted for each of the types of administrative decisions handled by the INS examinations 
branch. Ms. Ball also said that all the opinions selected should be from the first three 
months of 2000. She also reported that the INS is thinking about putting all administrative 
decisions in CD-ROM format. According to Ms. Ball, the public could access the CD-ROM 
if they came to Washington, but she did not think the CD-ROM would be available at other 
offices. See Interview by Michael McCarthy, Reference Librarian, New York Law School 
with Pamela Ball, INS Reading Room Specialist, the Electronic Reading Room (Aug. 17, 
2000). The INS regulations require each District and Regional Center maintain a reading 
room with copies of its decisions. See INS Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Avail-
ability of Service Records, 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(e) (2001). We found the New York District 
Reading Room was closed and apparently there are no plans to reopen it. See Interview by 
Michael McCarthy with several New York District INS employees (Aug. 21, 2000). 
483. See, e.g., special treatment of professional athletes, sheepherders, professional 
models, and healthcare workers. See INA§ 10l(A)(l5)(0)(i), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(A)(15)(0)(i) 
(1994). 
484. Potentially, the agency could meet some of these goals by making the Adjudicator 
Field Manuals and Examiner training materials publicly available. However, publication of 
denials may be preferable because adjudicators may not follow the agency manuals, and the 
agency does not update these materials with sufficient frequency. Despite FOIA requests, 
Matthew Bender, a commercial publisher, has been unable to obtain all of these manuals 
and training materials. See Letter from Stephen Yale-Loehr, Editor, Matthew Bender trea-
tise, to Lenni B. Benson, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School (Sept. 18, 
2000) (on file with author). 
2002] BREAKING BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS 321 
lished decisions than the other agencies because currently the agency pub-
lishes all of the decisions of its appellate body, the Board of Alien Labor 
Certification Appeals (BALCA), on the agency Web site.485 However, as 
was previously discussed, few cases are denied and even fewer petitioners 
appeal.486 Also, publishing only at the appellate administrative level does 
little to provide immediate guidance for the applicant. Especially in recent 
years, where the Department of Labor has been reforming, retooling, 
streamlining, and prodding the system, it has been particularly difficult for 
participants to understand the current ground rules. This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that labor certification involves both state agency offi-
cials and regional certifying officers who may, and frequently do, interpret 
the national policies in their own way.487 
The Department of Labor regulations require that before a labor certifi-
cation application can be denied, the Regional Certifying Officer must is-
sue a written Notice of Findings detailing the insufficiencies of the appli-
cation.488 These decisions could be published and disseminated via the 
Web sites and commercial publishers.489 The state agencies frequently is-
sue similar "assessment notices," indicating changes the agency would like 
to see made in the initial application before the labor certification can be 
further processed.490 Publishing these notice of assessments would increase 
the transparency of the policy implementation, speed up correction by the 
national Department of Labor and perhaps, deter agency officials from pre-
485. See DEP'T OF LABOR, OALJ LAW LIBRARY: IMMIGRATION COLLECTION, at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libina.htm (providing BALCA decisions) (last visited Jan. 29, 
2002). These opinions are also published in Lexis and Westlaw. Summaries are also 
widely available in commercial reporters. 
486. Todd Smyth, BALCA Administrator, reports a workload as follows: 1996 dock-
eted, 495, disposed, 310; 1997 docketed, 559, disposed, 740; 1998 docketed, 294, disposed, 
719; 1999 docketed, 313, disposed, 579. See Letter from Todd Smyth, BALCA Adminis-
trator, to Lenni B. Benson, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School (on file with 
author). 
487. Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & 
Loewy (Aug. 29, 2000). 
488. See Labor & Employment Admin. Labor Certification Process, 20 C.F.R. 
§ 656.25(c) (2001) (detailing procedures following a labor certification determination). 
489. In some cases, the Notice of Findings is rebutted and the case is approved. Ideally 
the agency would update the prior publication to indicate how the rebuttal was successfully 
made. But even short of this ideal, the Notice of Findings alone would be a vast improve-
ment .. In cases where the rebuttal is insufficient, the Department of Labor.issues a final de-
cision and these should also be transmitted to the public. See id. § 656.25(e) (discussing 
procedures to rebut a Notice of Finding determination). 
490. Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, 
New York, N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2000); Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, 
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy (Aug. 25, 2000). 
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cipitous changes unsupported by policy or precedent.491 
The Department of State does not publish any denials or opinions con-
cerning individual cases and the decisions of individual consular officers 
are generally insulated from both administrative and judicial review.492 
Rather than perceive such a requirement as a burden, the Department of 
State might also consider the benefits such publication and review proce-
dures would add to its operations. Just as in the INS adjudications, partici-
pants would have a clearer understanding of the necessary level of docu-
mentation required to support eligibility and of the standards applied to 
cases. The Department of State decisions would also be a formal method 
of communicating to the INS and Department of Labor problems the con-
sular officers encounter in their individual adjudications. Congress would 
have a clearer picture of the areas of visa abuse and how the lack of clear 
standards might be leading to inappropriate denials of visas. 
One of the objections usually made by the agencies to requests for more 
guidance about supporting documentation or the application of the criteria 
is that the agency does not want to be a school for impostors. In other 
words, by studying the denials and cases rejected for insufficient evidence, 
the fraudulent applicant is taught how to build a stronger facade. While 
this may be true and some applicants might go to extreme lengths to docu-
ment false corporations or employment relationships, if the requested 
documentation is itself difficult to fabricate, the adjudicator should be more 
confident that the cases approved are actually deserving of approval. Nor 
does this suggestion mean that the agency would not be able to request dif-
ferent or additional supporting documentation should the examiner be in 
doubt of qualification. 
491. I realize that requiring publication may also freeze the programs because the 
agency will proceed more cautiously than when it issued individualized written notices. 
Nevertheless, the agency does, at the current time, prepare these written statements and it 
should be willing to make the decisions public. 
492. See Dep't of State Visas: Documentation ofNonimmigrants under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 41.12l(b) (2001); DEP'T OF STATE, 9 
FOREIGN A.FF. MANuAL § 41.121, PN 1 Visa Refusal (stating regulations provide consular 
officer must provide a brief written explanation of basis for refusal if the individual is ineli-
gible for visa). In.many cases the refusal is simply stated as "application accepted" but ~oes 
not note the reason for ineligibility. See id. In any case where the applicant can articulate a 
bona fide legal issue, the applicant may request a legal opinion from the advisory opinion 
office of the Visa Office. See also Dep't of State Regulations Pertaining to Both Nonimmi-
grants and Immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. 
§ 40.6 (2001); DEP'TOF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANuAL § 41.121, Nl.1. 
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D. Incentives to Improve Performance 
1. Fiscal Accountability and Incentives 
All immigration procedures, except the labor certification application, 
require a user fee.493 In recent years, Congress greatly increased the 
authority of the INS to charge these fees and sought to pass on many of the 
costs of operating the immigration system to the participants.494 At times, 
fees also served other purposes such as generating funds from business 
immigrants to support border enforcement operations. Congress should 
more carefully consider building in incentives for agency performance by 
intelligent allocation of the user fees. The business lines of operations are 
demoralized and all incentives for efficiency are removed when almost all 
fees from those operations are directed to other agency functions. There-
fore, as a paramount consideration, each operation should have sufficient 
appropriated revenue to staff its main adjudication operation and then ad-
ditional user fee revenue should be used to expand staff to meet demands 
and move floating personnel from other areas when demand grows unex-
pectedly in a particular product line. The ability to be flexible and adapt-
able is not a traditional characteristic of government because of the long lag 
terms in funding and appropriation cycles. However, if immigration op-
erations are going to keep up with market demands and changing country 
conditions or emergencies, the agencies must have the flexibility to use 
funds to move personnel quickly. As unfashionable as it may sound, the 
system should have a built in team of surplus adjudicators. In truth, there 
will probably never be surplus at current agency staffing levels, but the 
agency should be able to move these free agent teams when new needs 
emerge. 
Just as state governments object to unfunded congressional mandates, 
Congress should listen to agency officials when new proposals are being 
considered and seriously review requests for expansion of staff or user fees 
to allow new programs to be implemented in a timely and effective manner. 
Congress frequently gives INS performance deadlines for various visa line 
products without accompanying the deadlines for appropriations and lead 
times necessary to implement the changes or programmatic responsibilities. 
493. Some of the fees charged by the Department of State reflect the reciprocal charges 
the foreign country would charge a U.S. national. See INA§ 2~1, 8 U.S.C. § 1351 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999) (referencing non-immigrant visa fees); INA § 221(c), 8 U.S.C. § 120l(c) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (explaining reciprocal treatment of residents). 
494. See, e.g., Customs Border Security Act of 2001, H.R 3129, 107th Cong. § 136 
(2001) (empowering Comptroller General to conduct a study on amount of customs user 
fees the Customs Service can impose). 
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Not all the fault can be placed on Congress. The agencies seem to adopt a 
"well, what can you expect, woe is us" attitude when these mandates ap-
pear. Here again, outside consultants and reporting from constituent par-
ticipants can serve to mediate between Congress and the Executive. Hope-
fully, the informed dialogue would serve as a substitute for excuses and 
castigation. 
2. Fees Tied to Performance 
In the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 
1998 (ACWIA) provisions concerning the H-lB, Congress gave the De-
partment of Labor an incentive to adjudicate H-IB LCA forms within the 
seven days required by Immigration and Nationality Act§ 212(n)(l).495 If 
the agency reported substantial compliance with the LCA processing, Con-
gress authorized that six percent of all fees collected by INS in the H-lB 
program be returned to the Department of Labor for equal spending on the 
LCA adjudication itself and the enforcement operations of the Department 
of Labor.496 What the statute did not build in was reporting from partici-
pants in the system to verify the "substantial" compliance. If the agency is 
to be rewarded for on time performance, surely outside observers' assess-
ments of the performance is critical.497 Apparently, the incentive that led to 
a significant improvement in agency performance. In 1998, before the 
ACWIA legislation was introduced, employers routinely faced delays of 
more than thirty days.498 
The concept of incentives for good performance is an important one and 
should be carefully expanded. Even if only small amounts of revenue can 
be tied to the incentive, the process of measuring performance, and publicly 
reporting upon it is valuable in and of itself. However, reporting require-
ments should be more specific than an assertion of "substantial compli-
ance" without corroborating details and reports from the consumers of the 
495. Pub. L. No. 105-27, tit. IV,§ 414(b)(6) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(l) (Supp. V 
1999)). 
496. See, e.g., Letter of Secretary of Labor Alexis M. Herman, to Vice President Albert 
Gore Jr. (Mar. 2, 2000) (certifying compliance in 1999, published on AILA Infonet). 
497. As of July 2000, several Regional offices were reporting delays ofup to thirty days 
to return the LCA form. See generally LAW OFFICES OF CARL SHUSTERMAN, GoVERNMENT 
PROCESSING TIMES, at http://www.shusterman.com (listing processing times for INS Re-
gional Service Centers) (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). The entire fee sharing is, in a sense, 
laughable because the Department of Labor's role in adjudicating an LCA is nonexistent. 
The regional offices of the Department of Labor do not make an independent evaluation of 
the LCA other than confirming the form is completed and signed. No review is made of the 
accuracy of the wage attestations or other substantive information collected on the form. 
The original of the form is returned to the employer for re-submission to the INS. 
498. Seeid. 
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agency services. 
In addition to incentives for good performance leading to the redirection 
of user fees, Congress should consider fee penalties and rebates. Fees paid 
to the agency for the processing of immigration petitions could be paid to 
the special escrow accounts of the general treasury.499 If the agency failed 
to adjudicate a petition within the parameters established by congressional 
oversight, the agency would forfeit a percentage of the fee with the per-
centage growing as the adjudication languished. Of course, the agencies 
should be allowed additional time to process cases where the agency can 
identify a "good cause" for the delay. For example, it takes longer to pre-
pare a written denial than to issue a standard approval notice. If a petition 
is going to be denied the agency could transfer the case to a processing line 
affording greater flexibility. Such a system also requires outside monitor-
ing of the reporting. The agency should not be the sole evaluator of their 
timely performance and excused delays. 
At the end of 2000, Congress attempted to achieve some of these bene-
fits by providing the INS with authorization to charge a fee for "premium 
processing."500 The intention of the statutory provision was to allow spe-
cial service to be given those participants requiring expedited processing in 
business cases provided the participant paid a premium fee.501 The fees are 
to be collected and reallocated to improve overall INS services.502 Unfor-
tunately, as implemented, the program does not adequately address the im-
pact of premium processing on the overall workload and priorities of the 
agency. Moreover, early critics of the program suggest that the program 
creates perverse incentives where the INS will focus solely on the premium 
cases in an effort to increase fees for the agency.503 
3. Adjudicate On Time or Approve the Petition 
For certain applications and petitions, Congress should seriously con-
499. The federal government has an electronic payment system in development The 
program is www.paygo.program and is being developed by a joint partnership between the 
government agencies and BancOne. The INS is one of the top priorities of the 
www.paygo.program. Indirect fee payment is already in use by the Department of State for 
the payment of visa fees. 
500. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-41 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1356 (Supp. V 1999)) 
(di~position of moneys). . 
501. See INA§ 286(u), 8 U.S.C. § 1356(u) (Supp. V 1999) (setting fee at $1,000 in ad-
dition to "normal petition/application fee"). 
502. See id. (stating the fee "shall be deposited as offsetting collections in the Immigra-
tion Examinations Fee Account."). 
503. See generally Endelman, supra note 122. 
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sider a mechanism of authorizing a specified period for the agency to com-
plete adjudication and after the time period is exhausted, absent special 
formal tracking from the agency, the petition would be deemed approved 
and corroborating documents issued. This is the approach already utilized 
to grant work authorization to applicants for political asylum. The appli-
cant must wait 180 days after filing a good faith application for asylum be-
fore the INS will issue temporary work authorization.504 One of the side 
effects of this provision has been to give the agency management target 
goals for handling asylum adjudication within six months. For cases filed 
after 1998 the agency has largely met this goal. When the proposal was 
originally made, scholars and governmental agents argued that although 
asylum applicants may find the lack of work authorization to be a hardship, 
this reform was essential because far too many applicants were simply fil-
ing for asylum to obtain temporary work benefits. The faster adjudication 
of asylum claims aided the bona fide claims and deterred the false 
claims.505 
While perhaps inappropriate for all categories, Congress might consider 
interim work authorization and lawful status for some non-immigrant peti-
tions and the automatic approval of immigrant petitions pending longer 
than 120 days.506 The approval of the immigrant petition does not, in and 
of itself, authorize the individual to immigrate. He or she must still com-
plete the immigrant visa or adjustment of status processing. The agency 
could one-step review the adjudication of the visa petition at the time of the 
individual ·adjudication if necessary. 
I also advocate the automatic approval of employment-based adjustment 
of status applications pending longer than nine months. Potentially, this 
could grant permanent resident status to thousands of people.507 The 
504. See INS Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a) 
(2001 ). The application for asylum must be pending for 150 days, after that, the INS has 
thirty days to decide to grant or deny the work authorization. 
505. See generally Martin, supra note 26. 
506. See INS Control of Employment of Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (1997) (stating 
automatic approval or issuance of work authorization is already an approach used by INS). 
For example, ifthe INS can not adjudicate a request within 120 days for extension ofnon-
immigrant status or within 90 days for work authorization filed in conjunction with an ap-
plication to adjust status to permanent resident, the applicant may receive an automatic grant 
of work authorization for up to 240 days. See id. 
507. It would undoubtedly also act as an incentive for people to file weak or even 
fraudulent applications. The agency would have to combat these tendencies by first adjudi-
cating cases within the time frame so people knew the case would actually be examined. 
Second, the agency must publicize the tough, existing penalties for visa fraud that can result 
in permanent bars from immigrating as well as removal from the United States. The current 
statute also authorizes rescission of permanent resident status within five years of admis-
sion. The INS must establish by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that the status 
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agency would know this and I can envision no better incentive for the 
agency to complete their adjudication. There is already a low rate of denial 
of these petitions.sos Moreover, should the grant have been inappropriate 
for substantive reasons such as fraud or ineligibility, the INS can pursue re-
scission proceedings to revoke the permanent resident status.s09 
4. Create New Mandamus Statutes 
While I am loath to rely upon the federal courts to manage the opera-
tions of these agencies, there is a role the courts can play to ensure that the 
agency acts. Under current law, an aggrieved party may seek a declaratory 
judgement or mandamus relief when the federal agency fails to act.510 
While a court will only order the performance of a non-discretionary or 
ministerial act, litigants have found that the filing of a mandamus action 
can mysteriously move the agencies to action.sit Attorneys throughout the 
United States have filed mandamus actions against the Department of La-
bor, INS, and Department of State and many report that the usual resolution 
of these actions is that the attention of the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned 
to the case moves the agency to act.512 Mandamus does not necessarily re-
sult in an approval. However, inaction is paralyzing for the petitioners and 
at least when a petition is denied, the parties can seek administrative review 
or regular judicial review. If the INA is modified to contain specific time 
frames for adjudicating visa petitions, then a special mandamus statute 
should similarly be adopted to authorize a federal court to order compliance 
with the deadline. st3 The statute should provide an opportunity for the 
agency to explain why action was impossible within the mandated time 
frames, or why performance was excused under the statutory provision.514 
of pennanent resident was inappropriately conferred. The INS does not have to establish 
fraud or misrepresentation. See INA§ 246, 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see 
also Fulgencio v. INS, 573 F.2d. 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1978). 
508. See 1997 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 17 (reporting approximately seven per-
cent of all adjudication cases are denied). 
509. See 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (stating statute of limitations is five years). 
510. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
511. See id. Mandamus requires that the petitioner establish a clear and certain claim; a 
nondiscretionary ministerial act; and no other available adequate remedy. See generally IRA 
J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 623-24 (7th ed. 2000) (explaining 
and discussing mandamus jurisdiction). 
512. · Interview with Nadine Wettstein, Attorney, American Immigration Law Founda-
tion (June 15, 2000). 
513. In the past, some courts have read time frames within the INA as unenforceable. 
See Robertson v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 957 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(holding ninety day time limit to adjudicate removal of conditional resident status in a mar-
riage case is not mandatory). 
514. In my view, any mandated time frames should contain opportunities for the agen-
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Attorneys fees should be available in cases where the petitioner can dem-
onstrate that the delay was excessive and unjustified. 
Some precedent exists for special mandamus or calendaring statutes.sis 
They have been a part of the naturalization laws since 1952 and few abuses 
have been reported. Even if the federal courts are not the right place to 
handle these calendaring or mandamus type petitions, Congress should 
consider creating a legislative court with the authority to order the agencies 
to act.516 
Providing a federal court forum may seem excessive and expensive. 
However, without the formality and strength of the independent judiciary to 
force the government to act, it is hard to envision another mechanism avail-
able to provide relief in individual cases. One of the benefits of these judi-
cial filings would be the documentation effect of knowing how many cases 
were filed and how long the agency delays lasted. 
5. Increase Resources to Deter and Prosecute Fraud 
If I had to identify a single source of process problems, it would be the 
agencies' fear of fraud. So many of the roadblocks in the immigration 
system are present because far too often, the process designers focused on 
the worst case scenario. There is no doubt that some people will lie to im-
migrate to the United States; but there will never be any fair method of fer-
reting out the cheat for closer scrutiny.517 The issue is how can the agen-
cies design a process allowing flexibility to deter and detect fraud, but does 
cies to exceed the time period when the agency can show fraud or other exceptional circum-
stances. The mandamus statute should, however, provide for an automatic re-calendaring of 
any case where the government is granted an extension. 
515. See INA§ 336, 8 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994) (authorizing a court to take over the exami-
nation of qualification for naturalization if INS fails to complete the case within 120 days). 
516. See Legomsky, supra note 26 (discussing specialized Article I courts in immigra-
tion law); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. l (1980); see also M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review-A Nice Thing?: 
Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1525 (1997). 
517. At times, the lies or deception have been an understandable response to discrimi-
natory or irrational line-drawing in the immigration laws. For example, the exclusion of 
Chinese immigrants led to many people claiming to be the sons or daughters of Chinese 
who had become U.S. citizens. Becoming a "paper" family member may have been the 
only way to immigrate. See generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). In my own experi-
ence, business people did not defraud the government, but far too often, the immigration tail 
wagged the business dog. Promotions, transfers, and significant changes in work assign-
ments were delayed because a change would have meant a loss of immigration benefits for a 
key employee. After the employee completed the immigration process, it was often the case 
that she changed jobs, employers, or locations. 
2002] BREAKJNG BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS 329 
not create bottlenecks at every step. 
Several of the agency officials I interviewed for this Article, and others 
whom I have observed over the past fifteen years repeatedly, said they wish 
they had the resources to follow up on suspicious cases and to prosecute 
both civilly and criminally those who commit fraud. Ideally, the threat of 
audit or post approval investigation should also deter would be lawbreak-
ers. But U.S. administrative law is filled with statutes that allow for audit, 
fines, and sanctions that are rarely enforced. Interestingly, there are few 
civil sanctions directly connected with the employment-based immigration 
petitions described in this Article. But even where the immigration laws do 
require sanctions, they are frequently unsupported politically. 
Another example illustrating that process design alone is insufficient is 
the employment-based fifth preference for millionaire investors.m Con-
gress created a program with a built-in second chance to evaluate the bona 
tides of the investment. Each immigrant entering in this category must re-
file at the end of two years of conditional permanent residence to verify 
that he or she actually made the required investment and created bona fide 
employment.519 While Congress attempted to build a statutory design to 
deter or detect fraud, the INS and the Department of State began to per-
ceive significant numbers of cases as completely false or carefully tailored 
to meet the regulations while not actually requiring a true commitment of 
funds.520 Over time, the agency began to require more documentation con-
cerning the source of funds, questioning the value of the investment and 
whether the funds were truly at risk. Lacking sufficient resources to adju-
dicate the petitions to remove the condition or the new applications for this 
preference, the INS simply froze the adjudications. Eventually, the INS 
suspended adjudication of the immigrant petitions while the agency re-
examined the statutory and regulatory requirements. For more than two 
years cases sat still.521 Rather than issue new regulations, the agency issued 
518. See INA§ 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing for 
an investment of $500,000 in certain high unemployment or rural areas); see also INS Im-
migration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(i) (2001 ). In 1992, Congress also authorized a pilot 
program for investments of only $300,000. See Pilot Immigration Program, Pub. L. No. 
102-395, § 610, 106 Stat 1874 (1992) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153). This provision was set 
to sunset on September 30, 2000. 
519. See fNA § 216A, 8U.S.C.§l186b (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
520. Congress delegated adjudication of the immigrant petition to the INS. This gave 
the INS responsibility for adjudicating complex con;imercial law issues surrounding the for-
eign investments. The statute provides little guidance about the limits on qualifying invest-
ment. The INA was not explicit about whether the investment of capital could be a passive 
rather than an active investment. 
521. See INS, REPoRT TO CONGRESS ON nm EB-5 INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM, available 
at http://www.aila.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). This report is required by the Omnibus 
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four precedent decisions discussing particularly complex financial ar-
rangements.522 Based on the interpretative change, some people who had 
entered the United States as immigrant investors now faced a possible ter-
mination of their resident status because the INS no longer recognized the 
form of investment as valid.523 While the agency maintains these adminis-
trative decisions "clarified" the existing statutory and regulatory require-
ments, the investors believe the agency retroactively altered the qualifica-
tions for an investment.524 
After understanding the agencies' desire to prevent fraud, it seems nec-
essary to create some ability to do post approval audits of those cases that 
demonstrate a need for further inquiry. Currently, the agencies' examiners 
feel incredible pressure to route out the fraudulent cases, and the problem 
will likely worsen. As discussed above, the Department of Labor has be-
gun streamlining the labor certification process. Reduction in Recruitment 
is being utilized and the PERM attestation model Is expected by Spring of 
2001. It is likely that the INS and the Department of State will feel an even 
greater responsibility to catch the fraudulent cases because the Department 
of Labor engaged in cursory review. To relieve this burden Congress 
should authorize greater funding for fraud investigations. At the very least 
there should be increased support to investigate fraudulent cases and 
greater civil penalties for those that break the law.525 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public 
Law 105-277. Audio tape: Statement of Stephen Yale-Loehr reporting on the INS adjudi-
cations at the annual immigration conference of AILA (June 16, 2000) (on file with author). 
I served as a moderator and panelist on this program. 
522. See In re Soffici, No. 3359 (B.I.A. 1998); see also In re Ho, No. 3362 (B.l.A. 
1998); In re Hsiung, No. 3361 (Ass'n Comm'r Examinations, July 31, 1998); In re lzummi, 
No. 3360 (B.l.A. 1998). 
523. See Barry Newman, Green Card Blues: A Visa Program to Spur Foreign Invest-
ments Creates Grief for Some, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (reporting on freeze and 
numbers of investors who might face a termination of permanent resident status and even 
potential deportation). 
524. The legality of the agency retroactive decision making is in litigation. One district 
court has upheld the new interpretation as a gap-filler rather than the adoption of new sub-
stantive rules. See R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS, 86 F. Supp. 2d. 1014, 1016 (D. Haw. 
2000). Two class actions have been filed. See Ahn v. United States, C99-3950 SBA (N.D. 
Cal. filed Aug. 24, 1999) (cited in 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1350 (1999)); see also Chang 
v. United States, No. CV-99-!0518-GHK (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 2001) (cited in 78 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 875 (2001)). 
525. The Department of Labor has no statutory authority in the labor certification pro-
gram to issue fines. If the agency believes the employer or immigrant lied on the forms or 
in supporting documentation, the agency can refer the case to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution under title 18, section 1001 of the United States Code. These prosecu-
tions are very rare. See Interview with Harry Sheinfeld, Department of Labor (Sept. 5, 
2000). 
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From almost any viewpoint, the millionaire investor immigrant program 
has been a failure.s26 I have selected it here because it illustrates that a lack 
of commitment to adequately staff and fund a visa program leads to costly 
litigation and program failure. If Congress considers more opportunities 
for post adjudication investigation, it must also ensure that initial adjudica-
tions are well supported and the agencies have adequate funds to use the 
post adjudication procedures. While I hope to encourage Congress to pro-
vide the agencies with these tools, I urge caution. It would be completely 
inappropriate to force participants to bear the burden of post adjudication 
audit or sanction if Congress fails to provide clear standards in the substan-
tive statute, delegates to an incompetent agency and does not require ade-
quate agency rule making to define the proper parameters of the visa pro-
gram. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the experience of passing through the territory of 
immigration adjudication. By introducing the complexity of the system, I 
have tried to give some idea of the contour, some texture to the outline of 
the immigration law-the map drawn by Congress. Similarly, by giving 
526. This program is a good example of several of the process failures identified in the 
Article but it is beyond the scope of this Article to give a complete and detailed analysis. 
Even at its height, the program was nowhere near the 10,000 visas authorized per year. In 
1997, the INS reported entry of only 1,361 of 10,000 fifth preference visas. See 1997 INS 
YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 18 (1999) (charting immigrants admitted through various ad-
mission categories through FYs 1988-1997). The State Department reports that in FY 1999, 
only 256 visas were issued and in FY 2000, only 231 visas were issued. See Interview with 
Charles Oppenheim, Chief Immigrant Visa Control and Reporting Division (July 17, 2000). 
For a critique, see Beth MacDonald, The Immigrant Investor Program: Proposed Solutions 
to Particular Problems, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'LBUS. 403 (2000). 
It also illustrates the failure to provide clear statutory standards. Did Congress intend to 
require "active" investment with participatory investors, or could an immigrant qualify on 
the basis of investment of funds via equity or debt financing? One of the key issues was the 
use of arrangements which appeared as equity investments, but upon more sophisticated 
analysis were more similar to debt financing. The INS was poorly equipped to anticipate 
some of the complex commercial investment arrangements used to qualify immigrant in-
vestors. See Memorandum from INS General Counsel David Martin to Paul Virtue, Acting 
Executive Associate Commissioner, INS Office of Programs (Dec. 19, 1997), reprinted in 
75 INTERPR.ETER RELEASES 332-49 (1998). 
This program is another example where the interrelationship between the agencies be-
came very important. Many of the objections to the immigrant investors came from consu-
lar officers who grew suspicious of INS approved "millionaire" petitions for very young 
men and women or for people who clearly had no business experience. See Interview with 
Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, 
Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on file with author). 
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the readers of the map more information and understanding of the reality of 
the U.S. immigration system, one can see the gaping chasm between map 
and territory. By focusing both on the importance of process and the ne-
cessity of a system that protects the process values, integrity, efficiency, 
and transparency, this Article demonstrates the great failure of the current 
system-its lack of consideration of process. I trust policy analysts will 
pay new attention to the role of process in any future system. Focusing on 
the process elements can aid in designing new substantive provisions or re-
forming existing law to achieve the substantive objectives. Without the fo-
cus, pray, mark all maps, "beyond this place be dragons."527 
527. Ancient cartographers warning. 
